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This thesis seeks to account for the nearly four decade-long rule of the Zimbabwe 
African National Union-Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF) using the methods of Antonio 
Gramsci’s historical political economy, particularly his concepts of historical blocs 
and hegemony. Gramsci’s theories provide useful tools for explaining Zanu-PF’s and 
by generalisation other similarly entrenched regimes across Africa by employing an 
ontology, an epistemology and a method that incorporates historical, economic and 
ideological factors. Gramsci’s theories help us analyse dynamics of structure and 
agency, modes of production and ideology, as well as consent and coercion in the 
creation and maintenance of long lasting political dominance. The Gramscian concept 
of the historical bloc supplies a conceptual continuum between the base, a society’s 
mode of economic production and reproduction, and the superstructure, the dominant 
ideologies and political institutions. The thesis identifies three post-independence 
historical blocs in Zimbabwe, the 1980 era’s ‘corporatist/welfarist’ or ‘compromise 
state’ historical bloc; the attempted neo-liberal Economic Structural Adjustment 
Programme (ESAP) historical bloc and finally the crisis hegemonic bloc which 
corresponds with the Third Chimurenga and the Fast Track Land Reform Programme. 
The thesis considers that this last bloc includes the period of the Government of 
National Unity Between 2009-2013 and has to the present. Hegemony is understood 
as the continuum between ‘intellectual and moral leadership obtained by consent’ and 
the strategies employed on the terrain of ‘relations of force’ in achieving and 
maintaining political dominance (Gramsci, 2000, p. 202). The thesis concurs with the 
observation by Gramscian scholar David Moore that Zanu-PF has never enjoyed 
leadership based solely on intellectual and moral leadership without the threat of 
violence. Neither, however, is it the case that the party has ruled entirely by force 
without claiming to derive its authority from a higher ideological and moral source. 
The thesis will therefore seek to make explicit at which points either consent or 
coercion has been primary in maintaining the party’s dominance within each historical 
bloc. In applying Gramscian theories to Zimbabwean history and politics the thesis 
remains sensitive to the conundrums at the centre of Gramsci’s and indeed wider 
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Marxian theory. Firstly, the question of whether politics and ideology can be read off 
an analysis of a society’s mode of production and reproduction? Secondly whether 
scholars and political actors can develop accurate analyses or political strategies bound 
by relations of consent and coercion based off the analysis of production and the class 
structures it creates? The above theoretical questions notwithstanding; the primary 
concern of the thesis is to understand how Zanu-PF (and by generalisation other 
similarly entrenched African regimes such as those for instance in Algeria, Sudan, and 
Ethiopia) has used varying combinations of consensual and coercive measures within 
the framework of history defined by economic and ideological factors. The 
abovementioned theoretical concerns must be considered if reductionism and 
subjective voluntarism about base or superstructure, structure and agency or the 
dominance of either consent or coercion, are to be avoided. However the resolution of 
the theoretical questions will not be the core aim of this thesis. The dissertation applies 
the Gramscian method to address the question of Zanu-PF’s rule rather than using the 
Zimbabwean case to refine Gramscian theoretical debates. The methodological 
approach holds that Zimbabwe’s turbulent history is determined as much by modes of 
production as it is by ideology, politics and methods of representation and that Zanu- 
PF’s maintenance of power has relied on both coercion and consent. Gramsci’s 
theories provide useful heuristic tools to understand these dynamics and their deep 
historical roots in a manner that equally considers structural factors as it does key 
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This thesis applies Antonio Gramsci’s historical political economy, particularly his 
concepts of historical blocs and hegemony, to account for the nearly four decade-long 
rule of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF). Gramsci’s 
theories provide useful tools for explaining Zanu-PF’s and other similarly entrenched 
regimes across Africa by employing an ontology, an epistemology and a method that 
incorporates historical, economic and ideological factors. Gramsci’s theories help us 
analyse dynamics of structure and agency, modes of production and ideology, as well 
as consent and coercion in the creation and maintenance of long lasting political 
dominance. The Gramscian concept of the historical bloc supplies a conceptual 
continuum between the base, a society’s mode of economic production and 
reproduction, and the superstructure, the dominant ideologies and political institutions. 
The thesis identifies three post-independence historical blocs in Zimbabwe. These are 
the 1980 era’s ‘corporatist/welfarist’ or ‘compromise state’ historical bloc; the 
attempted neo-liberal Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) historical 
bloc and finally the crisis hegemonic bloc which corresponds with the Third 
Chimurenga and the Fast Track Land Reform Programme. The thesis considers that 
this last bloc includes the period of the Government of National Unity Between 2009- 
2013 and has persisted beyond the coup of 2017 and Emmerson Mnangagwa’s 
pronounced ‘Second Republic’. Hegemony is understood as the continuum between 
‘intellectual and moral leadership obtained by consent’ and the strategies employed on 
the terrain of ‘relations of force’ in achieving and maintaining political dominance 
(Gramsci, 2000, p. 202). The thesis concurs with the observation by Gramscian scholar 
David Moore that Zanu-PF has never enjoyed leadership based solely on intellectual 
and moral leadership without the threat of violence. Neither, however, is it the case 
that the party has ruled entirely by force without claiming to derive its 
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authority from a higher ideological and moral source. The thesis will therefore seek to 
make explicit at which points either consent or coercion has been primary in 
maintaining the party’s dominance within each historical bloc. In applying Gramscian 
theories to Zimbabwean history and politics the thesis remains sensitive to the 
conundrums at the centre of Gramsci’s and indeed wider Marxian theory. Firstly, the 
question of whether politics and ideology can be read off an analysis of a society’s 
mode of production and reproduction. Secondly whether scholars and political actors 
can develop accurate analyses or political strategies bound by relations of consent and 
coercion based off the analysis of production and the class structures it creates? The 
above theoretical questions notwithstanding the primary concern of the thesis is to 
understand how Zanu-PF (and by generalisation other similarly entrenched African 
regimes such as those in Algeria, Sudan, and Ethiopia) has used varying combinations 
of consensual and coercive measures within the framework of history defined by 
economic and ideological factors. The abovementioned theoretical concerns must be 
considered if reductionism and subjective voluntarism about base or superstructure, 
structure and agency or the dominance of either consent or coercion, are to be avoided. 
However the resolution of the theoretical questions will not be the core aim of this 
thesis. The dissertation applies the Gramscian method to address the question of Zanu-
PF’s rule rather than using the Zimbabwean case to refine Gramscian theoretical 
debates. The methodological approach holds that Zimbabwe’s turbulent history is 
determined as much by modes of production as it is by ideology, politics and methods 
of representation and that Zanu-PF’s maintenance of power has relied on both coercion 
and consent. Gramsci’s theories provide useful heuristic tools to understand these 
dynamics and their deep historical roots in a manner that equally considers structural 







How to account for the durability of Zanu-PF rule. 
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Zanu-PF came to power in 1980, following a fourteen-year armed struggle against the 
Rhodesian settler state which had ground to a stalemate by the end of the 19070s. The 
armed struggle concluded in the Lancaster House Agreement, which established a new 
constitution for the independent state of Zimbabwe. The party won the country’s first 
elections by universal suffrage in 1980, securing 57 of the 80 seats open for black 
contestation. By agreeing to the Lancaster House constitution in 1979, the nationalist 
party’s leadership, despite explicitly portraying themselves as Marxist, effectively 
acquiesced to maintaining the Rhodesian settler state’s modes of production intact and 
avoiding radical economic policies such as the nationalisation of businesses and 
initating the kind of moderate land reform that the British would fund to the extent of 
£45,000 instead of seizing setter estates (Herbst 1990; Karumbidza, 2004). Why the 
nationalist leadership compromised some of the more revolutionary aims of the 
liberation struggle and whether they had the intention or ability to made good on their 
promises is a central debate in the scholarship on Zimbabwe. Zanu-PF’s leadership 
would justify the compromises citing the pragmatic necessity to bring about 
independence and would point to the potential for land reform once the sunset clauses 
in the Lancaster House Agreement had expired. Scholars such as Mandaza (1986) and 
Moore (1991) argue that despite their ostensibly Marxist values, Zanu-PF’s leadership 
had never been ardent Socialists neither in terms of their petit-bourgeois class interest 
nor in their ideology. The system in which the means of economic production 
remained in the hands of white capital and land owners while a black nationalist party 
governed the state adding a welfarist dimension by increasing public spending on 
education and health created a compromise historical bloc in the state. Socialist or not, 
except in Matabeleland, there was little question about the party’s initial capacity to 
harness popular consent. Simultaneously, the machinery of state coercion began to be 
occupied by the guerrilla armies that had engaged in the fight for independence. The 
party’s authoritarian intolerance of opposition would become apparent between 1983 
and 1987 during the Gukurahundi, the brutal reaction to supposed dissident activity 
by former Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) combatants in the south 
of the country. By the end of the 1980s, against the tide of history, Zanu-PF had made 
clear its intention to establish a de jure one-party state in Zimbabwe, ostensibly due to 
a preference for Socialist systems of government. The chorus for the one-party-state 
gained momentum within the party following the signing of unity accord between 
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Zanu-PF and the opposition PF-ZAPU in December 1987. The accords subsumed PF-
ZAPU within Zanu-PF, rendering the country a de facto one-party state. 
The contradictions of a party that portrayed itself as ideologically Socialist while 
maintaining the economic structures of the settler state would become manifest in the 
1990s. The early part of the decade was defined by the application of market-based 
Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAP). Structural adjustment with its 
prescribed liberalisation of foreign exchange and trade, the deregulation of the 
economy and rationalisation and privatisation of public enterprises, all while rolling 
back on public expenditure and social welfare represented such a significant change 
to the economic base of the country that it is possible to determine the period between 
1990 and 1997 as a specific ESAP historical bloc. On the level of the superstructure 
the decade saw the abandonment of welfarism accompanied by the centralisation of 
power and intolerance to opposition just as the negative effects of structural adjustment 
began to affect the urban working class with a knock-on effect in the rural areas. ESAP 
and the drought of 1992 produced persistently high inflation, high unemployment and 
stagnant demand within Zimbabwe’s economy producing a real impact on the 
country’s poor and working classes. Inflation rose from an average of 14% in the 
1980s to 42% in 1992. By 1995, 20 000 workers had been retrenched in the public 
sector and 25 510 in the private sector, while real wages had dropped by 41% between 
1990 and 1993 (ZCTU 1996).  
 
 
The results of the economic downturn caused by ESAP and the increasingly visible 
erosions of political freedoms began to produce pockets of opposition against the 
ruling party. In 1996 public sector workers were joined by third-level students in a 
general strike over wages (Sachikonye, 2002; Nordlund, 1996). Under the leadership 
of Morgan Tsvangirai, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions began to articulate the 
linkages between the economic crisis and the problems of governance (Danserau, 
2003). Protests began to address issues of governance and the economy, and to decry 
the pronounced authoritarianism of the government. A movement comprising various 
strands of civil society (including the Zimbabwe Council of Churches, the Zimbabwe 
Congress of Trade Unions, the student movement and a burgeoning field of human 
rights NGOs), began to coalesce around the issue of the constitutional reform. They 
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formed the National Constitutional Assembly in 1997 and went on to form a political 
party in the Movement for Democratic Change in 1999. 
The hegemonic contest between Zanu-PF and the MDC since 1999 has taken place 
within a crisis historical bloc, an era which the ruling party declared the third 
chimurenga. The crisis historical bloc and the contest for hegemony which has taken 
place in this context has seen the country undergo large-scale land reform, catastrophic 
economic collapse marked by historic levels of hyperinflation and an attending 
humanitarian crisis. Throughout this period six separate elections were held; all of 
which resulted in violence and have been less than credible. 
The particularly violent elections of 2008 culminated in five years of a government of 
national unity. This thesis concurs with Brian Raftopulous’s Gramscian categorisation 
of this phase of Zimbabwean history as one of passive revolution. The concept refers 
to a historical phase in which hegemonic forces and those in opposition to them remain 
static often as the outcome of a war of position by the dominant classes after a war of 
manoeuvre by the dominated classes. While the GNU halted the economic freefall of 
2008, and led to the drafting of a new constitution and electoral laws; by the end of 
the power sharing government’s term in 2013, the opposition movement had failed to 
make good on the momentum of its inception and appeared to have stalled by the end 
of the shared government’s term of office. While Zanu-PF’s hegemony was arguably 
based less on popular support and consent than on coercion and fraud, it is certain that 




When Robert Mugabe was finally removed from power in November 2017 it was 
ultimately through unconstitutional means and at the hands of his own party rather 
than through the ballot box. This event and Morgan Tsvangirai’s death in 2018, before 
his party had determined his successor, represent clear indicators of Zanu-PF’s 
durability and the degree to which the opposition in Zimbabwe had failed to decisively 
bring about a change in the power dynamics of the country either electorally or 
ideologically. Zanu-PF’s internal change of leadership through unconstitutional and 
coercive means would ultimately be legalised and made legitimate through the party’s 
decisive victory in the 2018 elections. The foregoing would justify the continued 
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relevance of this thesis’ research question which is how do we explain Zanu-PF’s 
capacity to maintain power against a viable opposition for over twenty years, in the 
context of economic and political breakdown? 
 
  
Accounting for Zanu-PF rule 
 
 
The study of Zimbabwean post-independence politics and political economy is 
inescapably the study of Zanu-PF rule and the failure of opposition forces to bring 
about a decisive change in hegemony. The nationalist party has governed Zimbabwe 
since independence in 1980 and has in its evolving forms been the central political 
actor in the country’s history since 1957. Accounting for the party’s durability, 
particularly after the genesis of a viable opposition since 1999 is therefore fundamental 
to the study of Zimbabwean politics. Scholarship on Zimbabwean politics has been 
contributed to by a wide variety of approaches including political economy, history, 
and orthodox political studies. Notably however despite the different paradigmatic 
approaches, studies of Zimbabwean politics since the late 1990s have tended to 
demonstrate a transition bias which implied Zanu-PF’s eventual downfall (Bratton, 
2016, Moore 2001, Murithi et al 2011). So the question has often been how and when 
is Zanu-PF going to be removed from power rather than why it is managing to remain 
in power in the first place. The various disciplinary approaches situate the primary 
drivers of political history on different factors including the country’s mode of 
production and the classes it produces, the balance of coercive power, contesting 
ideologies, the agency of key historical actors and political movements as well as 
international relations and Zimbabwe’s place in the global system. Despite the above 
diversity in emphasis, Zimbabwean political studies have generally tended to eschew 
stark epistemological categorisation and the most prominent scholarship in the field 
often overlaps the various sub-disciplines. 
 
 
Assuming the interaction between economic base and superstructure in interpreting 
political events and explaining historical development, political economy studies of 
Zimbabwe can be traced to Giovanni Arrighi’s 1967 article “The Political Economy 
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of Rhodesia”. Arrighi demonstrated the interaction between colonial modes of 
extraction to the social systems and the classes production would generate to 
Rhodesia’s colonial history until 1965. Arrighi in his own right would become 
associated with Gramscian International Relations theory in general. Arrighi’s heirs 
addressing Zimbabwean history through the lens of political economy have included 
Mandaza, Sam Moyo, Ian Scoones, Suzanne Dansereau, Patrick Bond and Manyama, 
and Lloyd Sachikonye and Hevina Dashwood. Through this lens Zanu-PF’s durability 
has mostly been explained in relation to dynamics which have arisen from the 
country’s modes of production. 
 
 
A Gramscian focus on the ideologies legitimating Zanu-PF rule would overlap with 
and be informed by the rich historical work which is most prominently traced back to 
the work of Terence Ranger. The strand of historical scholarship on Zimbabwe has its 
roots in his studies of historical consciousness connecting anti colonial and modern 
nationalist struggles to primary resistance and pre-colonial society have been crucial 
ingredients in the regime’s deployment of a “patriotic history”. This itself has drawn 
upon academic analyses of Zimbabwe’s liberation war and its continuing political 
salience have informed contemporary academic debates. We will be including a 
consideration of Zimbabwean nationalist historiography in Chapter Three. 
Historiography is ultimately the study of intellectuals and the ideologies they generate, 
and in the case of Zimbabwe, academic historians have been critically engaged in 
hegemonic maintenance and contestation (Blessing-Miles, 2008).  This thesis will also 
show how Zimbabwean intellectuals have consciously been involved in the 
construction of intellectual and moral leadership of the country. 
 
 
Within the paradigms of orthodox political science, Zimbabwe is considered a 
prototypical example of a hybrid regime, what Schedler terms an electoral 
authoritarian regime or what Schmitter has caslled a competitive authoritarian regime 
(LeBas, 2013; Levitsky and Way, 2010; Masunungrure, 2009; Schedler 2006), to cite 
particular phraseologies associated with definitions of “democracy with adjectives” 
(Carothers, 2002). Hybrid regimes combine inherited authoritarian reflexes with a 
modern democratic facade, in such a way that the one undermines the other. As 
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Nicholas van der Walle suggests, they are often the product of incumbent authoritarian 
administrations imposing democratisation from above, on their terms, usually in 
response to external fiscal pressures rather than domestic rebellion (Van der Walle, 
2002) They may be neo-patrimonial, drawing principally upon networks of “affection” 
supplied by kinship and ethnicity rather than institutional sources of power; the latter 
co-exist with them but have little force (Erdmann et al, 2007). As this thesis will show, 
the Zanu-PF regime was not an incumbent regime forced into a pro-forma 
democratisation, but rather the product of a bargained transition into power of a popular 
liberation movement, relatively freely elected into office, and circumscribed by 
constitutional provisions which its leaders appeared to adhere to until faced with 
increasing dissent. Zimbabwean political power is effectively bureaucratised, as well, 
as its opponents learn to their cost. Hybrid regimes are often assumed to be transient 
or short-lived; as one very optimistic observer at the beginning of the 1990’s noted, “the 
half house does not stand” (Huntington, 1991, p. 174) and more widely “semi 
democracies” were believed to be unstable (Knutsen and Nygaard, 2015; Geddes, 1999, 
Brownleee, 2009 and Hadenius and Teorell, 2006). In power for nearly forty years, 
Zanu-PF’s rule has evidently enjoyed durable foundations. 
 
 
In the paradigm of positivist political science, Zimbabwe and indeed most African 
regimes are studied in the context of “Third Wave” democratisation (Huntington, 
1991): a chapter in the sometimes meandering but inevitable drive towards democratic 
transition and consolidation, a teleology popularised by Fukuyama (1992) but 
analytically implicit in much of the more recent writing on “stalled” democratic 
transitions. At the end of the Cold War, the empirical conditions for democratisation 
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to take root were more favourable in Zimbabwe than in most countries in the region 
(Bukart and Lewis-Beck, 1994, p. 907; Levitsky & Way 2010). The adult literacy rate 
was 76% and Zimbabwe was wealthier than most countries in Africa (Stoneman & 
Cliffe 1989). Indeed, Bratton and Van der Walle (1994) counted Zimbabwe as a 
“consolidated democracy” in their study, Democratic Experiments in Africa, between 
1988 and 1994, as the country had held regular multi-party elections, possessed an 
independent judiciary and a relatively vibrant civil society with constitutionally 
protected freedom of association and speech. If this was true, then Zimbabwe would 
embody a very rare example of a country that has degenerated from democratic 
consolidation. In fact, though by 2018 the country had held eleven separate elections 
and two referenda since independence but there had not yet been a single definitive 
turnover in power, for several analysts the key distinguishing characteristic of 
democratic consolidation (Huntington, 1991, p. 267; Przeworksi, 1991, p. 10) Again, 
objections can be raised simply to the chronology of such a presentation: Zimbabwe’s 
democratisation was in fact a decolonisation happening well before the end of the Cold 
War and its abandonment of constitutional forms has been halting and piecemeal. 
Studies of Zimbabwe within this paradigm either as a single case, in small-n or as part 
of large-N comparative studies have been marked by the teleological democratisation 
bias from which the entire transition paradigm suffers. This democratising bias 
affected a great deal of the work on Zimbabwe as even scholars from outside the strict 
positivist framework have at times viewed Zimbabwe as being “at a turning point” or 
“in transition” and that Zanu-PF as a regime which was likely to collapse. The fact 
that Zimbabwe, along with a large number of other such hybrid regimes has not 
actually transitioned or consolidated as a democracy points to the theoretical (both 
descriptive and predictive) weaknesses of the democratisation paradigm, with its 
emphasis on elite decision-making and organisational power (O’Donnell and 
Schmitter, 1986; Mainwaring et al, 1992; Whitehead 2002; Schmitter and Karl, 1991). 
The shortcomings of the democratisation scholarship with respect to understanding 
modern Zimbabwean politics are not the principal preoccupation of this thesis, though. 
Here our main point is that if we consider the problem of the durability of the Zanu- 
PF regime, we need to remember that in a day to day context administrations rely on 
beliefs and perceptions, on either willing acceptance or resigned acquiescence of their 
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presence among citizens. It is therefore necessary to place ideology at the centre of 
any analysis that seeks to account for why ZANU-PF has succeeded in staying in 
power. In other words, the regime’s hegemony is a continuum between coercion and 
consent, though the balance between the two shifts at different moments. We have 
noted above, scholarship on Zimbabwe has rarely been exclusive in its theoretical and 
methodological approaches. The prominent political economists of Zimbabwe have 
often traced historical trends even in their granular detail, and historical studies have 
been framed within political-economic context. The thesis would therefore not claim 
to make a significant methodological contribution to Zimbabwean studies, rather it 
uses Gramsci’s methods to explain Zanu-PF’s endurance because the method 
explicitly applies historical context, engages with economic as well as political and 
ideological elements and includes an analysis of consent as much as it does coercion. 
There have also been scholars who have written on Zimbabwe within an explicitly 
Gramscian perspective. The most resolutely Gramscian of these would be David 
Moore, though other prominent scholars such as Brian Raftopulous have sometimes 
used Gramscian theories in their work. In explaining and accounting for ZANU’s 
continued hold on power, Moore has drawn upon Gramscian ideas to argue that 
ZANU-PF rule is principally coercive and hence not hegemonic in the sense of 
exercising intellectual and moral authority, while Raftopoulos has used the Gramscian 
concept of “passive revolution” to explain the phase of the Government of National 
Unity between 2008 and 2013. By contrast this thesis, uses Gramscian notions of 
hegemony and historical blocs as a tool for understanding ZANU-PF rule more 
generally through its duration. 
 
 
Gramsci’s historical political economy 
 
 
Antonio Gramsci, Marxist political theorist and the General Secretary of the Italian 
Communist Party, wrote his most famous contributions to Marxist political thought 
Prison Notebooks while imprisoned under Mussolini’s Fascist regime between 1926 
and 1937. Gramsci’s writing covers a gamut of interests including his concern with an 
authentic and practical understanding of Marxist political theory, research 
methodology and political strategy. At the heart of Gramsci’s method is the 
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determination to balance the analytical and strategic importance of both the 
consciousness of material facts and ideological aspects of political change so as to 
avoid either the exaggeration of ‘mechanical causes’ of ‘economism’ or the 
‘voluntarist and individual element’ of what he calls ‘ideologism’. Arguing that the 
method of historical materialism was not ‘a string of parables laden with categorical 
imperatives, with absolute unquestionable norms beyond the categories of time and 
space’ (Gramsci, 2000, p. 37), Gramsci stressed that: ‘the history of a people is not 
documented by economic facts alone’ (Gramsci, 2000, p. 45). To support his 
argument, he turned to the historical texts of Marx and Engels, the Theses on 
Feuerbach, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, The Civil War in France 
and Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany. From these historical works 
Gramsci observed a number of methodological rules or ‘precautions’ from the works 
of his precursors. 
In a concept he appropriated from Georges Sorel, Gramsci understands the structure 
or base and the superstructure as reciprocally and dialectically interwoven in the 
‘Historical Bloc’. Linking the base and superstructure in this concept, Gramsci goes 
to great lengths to explain that the base should be studied with the methods of the 
‘natural and exact sciences’ because of the objectively verifiable ‘consistency’ of the 
structure (Gramsci, 2000, p. 195). However, in order to avoid the pitfalls of 
economism, the concepts of ethico-political history and hegemony are attached to the 
historical bloc. The first idea was borrowed from Benedetto Croce and is an awareness 
of the significance of cultural and ideational facts as key to understanding the 
maintenance of the historical bloc. The concept of hegemony has its roots in the work 
of Lenin, who refers to the political, cultural and ideological struggles. Thus, ‘Men 
acquire consciousness of structural conflicts on the level of ideologies’. The point is, 
‘the dominant factors in history [are] not raw economic facts, but man, men in 
societies, men in relation to one another, developing through these contacts 
(civilisation) a collective, social will; men coming to understand economic facts, 
judging them and adapting them to their will until this becomes the driving force of 
the economy and moulds objective reality’ (Gramsci, 2000, p.33). Hegemony is 
therefore understood as the combination of ideological ‘intellectual and moral 
leadership obtained by consent’ as well as the strategies employed on the terrain of 
‘relations of force’ in order to bring about the task a movement has set itself 
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(Gramsci, 2000, p. 202).The concept of hegemony encapsulates a number of 
dichotomies in his ontology, epistemology and strategy which apply to the dilemmas 
of durable regimes and the movements that oppose them. The first of these 
dichotomies, taken from Marx and Engels, consists of that between the base and 
superstructure (or material vs ideological factors). The second is the dichotomy 
between structure and agency. As a theory of both analysis and strategy, Gramsci’s 
hegemony seeks to account for continuity as much as it does for change. Furthermore, 
in seeking to account for political change, or indeed the lack thereof, the dynamic 
between consent and coercion is also crucial. It is this complex set of overlapping 
dichotomies and dynamics which we will attempt to outline in the following section. 
Hegemonic change is dependent on the ‘relation of forces’; the measure of which rests 
firstly within the structure-superstructure relation, and secondly with the nature and 
character of the movements seeking to challenge the hegemonic status quo. By nature 
and character here we refer to whether or not a movement is organic, meaning 
relatively permanent, or conjunctural which would designate an occasional, almost 
haphazard phenomenon. 
It is important here to reiterate that Gramsci was concerned not merely with analysis, 
but also with strategy. The question of the relation of forces is not merely a matter of 
analytical rigour but of historical strategy. He distinguishes these relations of forces as 
follows: the first of these relations is of economic forces incorporating the mode of 
accumulation and production, and the development of material forces. This aspect of 
economic relations is measurable using the methods of natural science. The second 
moment is the degree of homogeneity, self-awareness and organisation attained by the 
various social groups. The third is the relation of military forces. This last moment 
encapsulates not only brute coercive power, but also ideological consent. Power is 
therefore both a question of consent generated by how convincing an ideology is to a 
significant proportion of a polity, which may also be a function of the a movement’s 
capacity to organise and make itself heard, and coercion the physical capacity to make 
others do what they may not otherwise normally do. To symbolise this dialectic 
Gramsci used the metaphor of a Centaur the Greek “half man-half beast”. Precisely 
where on the continuum between consent and coercion a specific politically dominant 
entity derives its power is no t  onl y a question o f  historical analysis but also a 
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core theoretical conundrum of Gramscian theory. While Gramscian scholarship 
including the work of Laclau and Mouffe (1985), Cox (1983) and Worth (2015) would 
place the accent on theoretical debates on where precisely on the continuum of consent 
and coercion hegemony exists and where Gramsci would have been situated, this 
thesis chooses to avoid hermeneutic engagement with Gramscian theory on consent or 
coercion and uses hegemony as a heuristic rather than a rigid formula to be tested on 
the Zimbabwean case. The goal is not to determine whether or not Zanu-PF has been 
completely hegemonic in a Gramscian sense at any given moment. The answer to this 
question is probably that the party has more often relied on violence or the fear of 
violence than it has on consent to maintain its power. The point is that the party has 
never relied solely on elements of consent or coercion but rather shifting combinations 
of both. The purpose of this thesis is to understand how Zanu-PF (and by 
generalisation other similarly entrenched African regimes) has used varying 
combinations of measures of consent and coercion at different times to maintain its 
power and at what moment either of the two factors has been dominant within the 
framework of the historical bloc. 
The thesis will however be informed by Gramscian concepts which will enrich our 
analysis of how Zanu-PF has been able to maintain its grip onto power. Among these 
will be Gramsci’s various understanding of opposition to a hegemonic power. While 
Gramsci didn’t use the term counter-hegemony, Gramsci’s concepts of opposition to 
a hegemonic power has been developed from his ideas by a series of more recent 
followers and commentators. As such counter-hegemony doesn’t just mean 
opposition. Deeper conceptualisation of the ideas around ‘counter-hegemony’ would 
go some way to explain why opposing forces succeed or indeed fail to bring about 
decisive changes to hegemonic power, probably Gramsci’s principal pre-occupation 
as he wrote from Mussolini’s prisons. The ‘counter’ idea means thorough examination 
of how forces challenging the ruling group create alternative possibilities; and 
furthermore how those contestations are thwarted, either through the rulers or their 
organic intellectuals. This latter concept of will be applied further to ask: to what extent 
are members of an intellectual stratum or elite within a ‘fundamental’ social group or 
class or free-floating and autonomous, taking on new discourses and practices of 
reform or increased coercion. 
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In analysing why opposition or counter-hegemonic movements fail Gramsci’s 
distinction between organic and conjunctural movements is also necessary. The 
difference between the two kinds of movement is as much a question of correct method 
as it is of correct strategy. Gramsci explains the method of hegemony for analysing a 
political movement during the course of its development, with reference to the 19th 
Century Boulangist movement2 in France. Gramsci provides this example to develop 
an ideal method of how to analyse a movement during the course of its development. 
Gramsci proposed that research of opposition movements be guided by analysing the 
social content of the mass following of the movements, their function in the balance 
of forces – which is in the process of transformation and the means they apply toward 
the proposed end. Only in the last analysis, and formulated in political not moralistic 
terms, is the hypothesis considered that such a movement would be necessarily 
perverted, and serve quite different ends from those which the mass of its followers 
expected (Gramsci, 2000, p. 217). 
 
 
Analytical advantages of Gramsci’s political economy 
 
 
In order to answer the key research question we need to be able to decipher when 
structural factors or ideological factors are the most effective in maintaining power 
and when coercion or consent are decisive in maintaining power. Through the concept 
of the historical bloc, which combines both the material economic facts of production 
and the ideological explanation of the hegemonic forces and the forces which oppose 
them, the method provides a useful analytical tool for explaining both the role of 
economic realities and how polities understand them. This tool is particularly useful 
in a case such as Zimbabwe where economic catastrophies including historic 
hyperinflation, and mass unemployment were not sufficient to trigger a mass uprising 
against the incumbent government. Part of the reason for this is ideological, as will be 
shown in this thesis: that Zanu-PF was able to make a reasonably convincing argument 
for economic failure being due to western sanctions for which the opposition 
 
2 ‘The Boulangist movement was a right -wing movement led by General Boulanger, revanchist ex -minister of 
war, in 1887 - 89 . It called for a new constituent assembly, reform of parliament  and  military regeneration of 
the nation. Elected with a huge majority, Boulanger appeared about to attempt a  coup in  1889 but hesitated 
and fled the country.’ (Gramsci, 2000 , p. 410 ) 
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movement was to blame. The thesis will therefore aim to use this historical political 
economy to explain the material facts, but also to explain how the leadership is able 
to guide the perceptions of these facts and the reasons for their existence. Factors such 
as class and class identities are thus of importance in an analysis of a particular 
historical bloc and the hegemonic contestation taking place within it. Gramsci’s 
concept of civil society does not view it as a space of essentially virtuous organisations 
(in contrast to the dominant contemporary definitions) but rather a contesting space of 
ideas. The concept of civil society as an arena of contestation may help to account for 
the failure of certain movements to catalyse either mass support or adequate mass 
mobilisation to bring about a hegemonic change. Gramsci’s method accounts for why 
movements fail as much as why they succeed. The political significance of the 
opposition movement’s ideas and their capacity to resonate with the majority of the 
society are an important consideration in why a movement succeeds or fails. 
Factors such as the internal cohesion of the movement and its organisational and 
mobilising capacity have an impact on the outcome of contestation. The origins of the 
constituent parts of the movement will therefore have an influence on the movement’s 
methods. The methods the movement uses are also important in determining the 
success or failure of the counter-hegemonic push. Gramsci’s concepts of the war of 
position and the war of manoeuvre (in relation to the strategic choices taken to confront 
a hegemonic power or indeed to erode its ideological and cultural influence) are useful 
tools to apply in contexts such as Zimbabwe. 
The Gramscian method considers a number of individual variables such as methods of 
mobilisation, coercive capacities, and ideology that can and have been applied and 
controlled. The combination of structural and ideological factors, the analysis of the 
coercive as well as ideational power and the applicability to a single historical case 





This section provides an outline of the research design used in this thesis and 
justification, before elaborating on the practicalities of research methodology and how 
data collection was conducted in the case study. 
 
Research design for case study of hegemony and counter-hegemony in Zimbabwe 
                              
This thesis is a structured focused case study of Zanu-PF rule as a durable authoritarian 
regime. The case study approach in this instance is understood as, ‘the detailed 
examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical 
explanations that may be generalizable to other events’ (George et al., 2005, p. 5). This 
case study fulfils a number of objectives. 
First it will accomplish the objective of what Lijphart and Eckstein refer to as 
disciplined configurative or disciplined interpretive case studies. These are case 
studies which have the capacity to impugn established theories that ought to fit but do 
not. Secondly, the case study approach serves a heuristic purpose by inductively 
‘identifying new variables, hypotheses, causal mechanisms, and causal paths’ (George 
and Bennett, 2005, p. 75). Heuristic case studies are often conducted on deviant or 
outlier cases where outcomes do not reflect those predicted by traditional theories. In 
designing this project, I have been sensitive to the debates surrounding selection bias, 
whereby cases are selected on the dependent variable (in this instance incomplete 
democratic consolidation). I have taken the debates into account but believe, as do 
George et al., that case selection based on the values of the dependent variable is 
appropriate in some cases, and that ‘case studies allow a researcher to achieve high 





3 The disciplined interpretive case study interprets or  explains an  event  by  applying a  known  theory  to the 
new terrain. The more explicit and systematic the use of theoretical concepts, the more powerful the 
application. Although this method may not test a theory, the case study shows that one or more known theories 
can  be  extend ed  to  account for  a  new  event.  This type of  research will interest critics as  well as defenders 
of the theories, even those who care l i ttle about the particular event. This type of case study cannot fairly be 
called a theoretical nor i ts broader contribut ions nil (Odell, J. 2001 , International Studies Perspectives ). 
Harry Eckstein (1975, p. 103 ): ‘Aiming at the disciplined application of  theories to  cases forces one to  state 
theories more rigorously than might otherwise be done.’ As a result of this conceptual  work,  the author may 
ften be able to generate an additional type of contribution or new suggestions for improving   the theory.  
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represent the theoretical concepts the researcher intends to measure’ (George, 2005, 
p. 22). 
The method is structured, meaning that the researcher proposes general questions to 
reflect the research objective, and that these questions are asked of each case under 
study. This is in order to guide and standardise data collection, thereby making 
possible the systematic comparison and cumulation of the findings of the cases. The 
method is focused in that it deals only with certain aspects of the historical cases 
examined. The requirements for structure and focus ‘apply equally to individual cases 
since that may later be joined by additional cases.’ (George et al, 2005, p. 67). This 
thesis is not an atheoretical inductive case study; it will be employing a theoretical 
framework that combines elements (ontological and epistemological approaches) of 
critical political economy, particularly Gramsci’s hegemony, and the concept of the 
historical bloc. 
It is important to note that, in contrast to the dominant transition and consolidation 
theories in modern studies of African politics and indeed a lot of the scholarship on 
Zimbabwean politics, this thesis seeks to reject the teleological implication that the 
transition and consolidation of liberal democracy is inevitable. The phenomenon under 
consideration here is limited to a long standing “durable” regime which has used 
various levels of consent and coercion in order to maintain its power. 
 
 
Data collection: semi-structured interviews 
 
 
Data for this thesis was collected mainly through semi-structured interviews 
conducted in person by the researcher in Zimbabwe. The researcher conducted an 
initial seven-month field study between January and July 2010 in Zimbabwe while 
attached to the Zimbabwe Election Support Network in Harare. This period consisted 
of participant observation with the Zimbabwe Election Support Network, a prominent 
governance NGO in the country, participating in conferences and in the day-to-day 
activities of the organisation. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with actors 
in the NGO sector in Zimbabwe. By semi-structured interviews we refer to a flexible 
set of questions which allowed for elaboration by the interviewee, as well as additional 
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who straddled the space between NGOs, donors, the opposition political parties, and 
labour. Follow-up interviews were conducted in November 2016, July 2017 and 
January 2018. This period of interviews allowed the researcher to have an overview 
of the evolution of dynamics within the counter-hegemonic movement. 
Sampling for interviewees was dependent on a number of contextual variables in 
sub-questions following the direction of the interviewee’s narrative. More in-depth 










Zimbabwe which made access to some opposition movement actors difficult as a 
number of them held positions in the Government of National Unity and had their 
access restricted due to government business. The ability to find informants who 
straddle multiple organisations and roles in the movement, is a reflection of the extent 
to which these NGO- style civil society organisations have monopolised the non-state 
sphere; their undoubtable political influence, as well the polarisation of the civil 






As noted above, between January and July 2010 this researcher was employed in the 
Zimbabwe Election Support Network. This position allowed a great deal of access into 
the workings of a prominent coalition of civil society bodies as well as Zimbabwean civil 
society in general. During this period, he was able to attend a number of important 
rallies and commemorations of major events in the preceding 20 years of the 
movement’s struggle. The position allowed him to make personal contact with a 
number of prominent civil society actors as well as some of their former comrades 
who had moved into the political space through the MDC and the Government of 
National Unity. In June 2011, while based at Sabanci University in Istanbul as a Marie 
Curie Research Fellow in Sustainable Peace Building, this researcher spent two 
months at the Southern Africa Political Economy Series library in Harare. He 
conducted the bulk of his interviews during this period while attending the policy 
dialogues held at the SAPES trust, often meeting key actors in both the Government 
of National Unity and the opposition movement. From April 2013 he was employed by 
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the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa, initially in Johannesburg 
and subsequently in Somalia, during which time he was in contact with key actors in 
Zimbabwe’s politics from the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, as well as civil 






As well drawing upon the experiences just described, this thesis also relied on official 
and unofficial documentation from individual organisations and the Movement for 
Democratic Change. Documentation was collected in hard copy by the researcher 
while present in Zimbabwe. In addition, the researcher subscribed to regular updates 
from civil society organisations and the MDC daily newsletter – which became a 
regular source of information about the vicissitudes of the party between 2010 and 
2013 – and to the Allafrica.com news service. This website has archived newspaper 
articles in Zimbabwe since 1996 and allowed for in-depth archival research of events 






Interviews were transcribed on F4, a free transcription software, soon after leaving the 
field and while the questions and the impressions of the events were fresh in mind. 
This software allows for playing, stopping and rewinding recordings very easily and 
facilitated transcription and analysis by providing a timing tag on the transcribed 
document. The researcher was able to use notes taken during the interviews to record 
impressions during the original interviews and combine these with the transcribed 
documents. 
The researcher used NVIVO 10 software to code transcribed interviews. Interviews 
were first coded chronologically in order to place events within the causal trajectory 
of the counter-hegemonic movement between 1997 and 2013. Having coded the data 
chronologically a second round of coding was conducted along themes drawn from 
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the research question and the questions for analysing a counter-hegemonic movement 
outlined by Gramsci. Examples of these themes are: the social and class content of the 
movement, strategies for bringing about change, the relationship between civil society 
and the MDC, relationships between individual organisations, and the relationship 
between the opposition movement and international donor states. In going through the 
data, new themes would arise and these would be coded under new nodes as the 
analysis proceeded. Finally, the NVIVO software allows for the correlation of certain 
codes against each other. The data in this thesis is largely discursive and therefore did 
not allow for as strict a correlation as questionnaire data permits. The process of coding 





Chapter 2: Gramscian Historical Political Economy 
 
The second chapter provides an elaboration of Gramscian theories of hegemony and 
counter-hegemony which this thesis will use as its core theoretical paradigm. In doing 
so the chapter traces the genealogy of the concept of hegemony in Marxian political 
theory prior to Gramsci to explain the political, epistemological and ontological tools 
which Gramsci proposes in his theory. The emphasis will be placed on these tools and 
how they can be used within a heuristic framework to understand the 
durability/hegemony of a regime such as Zanu-PF. 
What is important is to understand and explain what is happening in Zimbabwe not 
whether or not Zimbabwe fits a specific understanding of Gramscian theory. 
Gramsci’s theory is useful in that it provides a useful framework that doesn’t privilege 
one historical driver over another but allows for us to consider multiple dynamics in a 
single evolving context. The thesis will certainly underline which of the various factors 
are judged to be dominant at any given moment. Other important theoretical 
considerations such as whether or not an uneven class formation produce ‘real’ organic 
intellectuals or if these are “ruling classes in the making” are secondary to the core 
purpose of this thesis. So, while theoretical debates about consent and coercion in 
Gramsci are considered, our analysis of why Zanu-PF has been able to maintain power 
is the primary consideration. 
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The chapter then outlines the contested interpretations of Gramsci’s concept of 
hegemony understood firstly as an arena of ideology and culture, and secondly as a 
continuum between consent and coercion. Arising from this second interpretation of 
Gramsci’s hegemony the chapter explains the second key Gramscian concept of the 
historical bloc, which is understood as the continuum between base and  
superstructure. This concept is fundamental to Gramsci’s method for understanding 
political change by combining both raw economic facts and the mode of production 
as the drivers of history, and the equally important role of ideology and political 
institutions. 
The thesis will be guided by this method of analysis and will seek to understand 
Zimbabwean history within the theoretical framework that conceives of power as the 
combination of violence and consent. Furthermore, in this framework the political 
history of any society, Zimbabwe included, is seen as driven by the modes of 
production and how they aggregate class interests, as well as how these different 
societal aggregations are able to explain and justify their interests on the intellectual 
and ideological terrain. The chapter then explains the ideas of organic crisis as 
moments where core contradictions of the society erupt into open conflict for power. 
Gramsci’s strategic concepts of war of manoeuvre and war of position are then 
detailed. It will be shown how these strategic options of overt frontal confrontation 
and more tactical ideological opposition respectively are defined by Gramsci as 
counter-hegemonic tools. 
The remainder of the thesis will seek to understand the Zimbabwean counter- 
hegemonic movement’s strategies within these categories. The concept of passive 
revolution, understood as a reversal or stalling of counter-hegemonic thrust by the 
hegemonic power will then be elaborated upon. This specific concept will later be 
used, following Raftopoulos’s observations, to explain the phase of Zimbabwean 
history following the 2008 elections and the formation of the government of national 
unity. The chapter then proceeds to outline key Gramscian concepts of organic 
intellectuals as the producers of ideological consent: these are the modern political 
party which is likened to Machiavelli’s prince, and Gramsci’s method for the analysis 
of counter-hegemonic movements which may help account for some of the 
weaknesses in Zimbabwe’s opposition capacity to bring about decisive hegemonic 
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change. The chapter concludes with a review of examples of Gramsci’s method in 
other African cases, as well as instances in which scholars have used Gramsci in 
relation to Zimbabwe. 
 
 
Chapter 3: The construction and consolidation of Zanu-PF hegemony 
 
 
The third chapter deals with the construction of Zanu-PF hegemony within the context 
of pre-independence and post-independence historic blocs. The chapter explains 
colonial historic blocs using Giovanni Arrighi’s political economy of the Rhodesian 
settler state as a general framework for understanding the country’s modes of 
production and how these generated and drove political interests along racial and class 
lines. The African nationalist movement and its leadership will be situated within the 
context of colonial settler state historical bloc. It will be shown how an educated black 
elite became the organic intellectuals for a nationalist movement which chose armed 
guerrilla warfare as the primary means for counter-hegemonic struggle. The chapter 
shows how this petit-bourgeois leadership was historically and racially attached to the 
peasantry, and how the strategy of armed struggle impacted the party’s understanding 
and methods of maintaining power. In keeping with the Gramscian method the chapter 
will seek to elaborate on the ideological inclinations of the nationalist movement. This 
critical discussion will touch on the internal ideological struggles within the nationalist 
movement while avoiding a categorical judgement on the nationalist leadership’s 
intentions. The chapter will trace nationalist history through the second Chimurenga 
until the Lancaster house agreements and the coming to power of Zanu-PF in 1980. 
The chapter then situates the postcolonial historical bloc in the compromise of class 
forces enshrined in the Lancaster House Constitution. Further, it outlines how the new 
governing class sought to construct its own hegemony through a base which applied 
corporatist practices to maintain white settler capital and the interests of international 




Chapter 4: The “Neo-liberal” Historical Bloc 1990-1997 
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Chapter 4 chapter focuses on the Zimbabwe’s experiment with neo-liberal economic 
reforms driven by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank between 1990 
and 1997. The chapter considers this Economic Structural Adjustment Programme 
(ESAP) phase as a distinct historical bloc. This phase would ultimately bring about 
the organic crisis historical bloc would characterise Zimbabwean politics after 2000. 
The chapter elaborates on the decisions to implement the Structural Adjustment 
Programme and its impact on the national modes of production. This period of 
immense economic change took place in a context of relative political freedom 
following the abandonment of the one-party state idea in the global context of “the end 
of history”. The blocs combination of economic pressures and increasing political 
dissent led to the coalescence of a counter-hegemonic movement combining labour, 
students, and an increasingly relevant organised civil society. 
 
 
Having outlined the base superstructure dynamics of the ESAP bloc the chapter breaks 
down the various components of Zimbabwe’s opposition civil society as they 
coalesced to form the National Constitutional Assembly and the Movement for 
Democratic Change political party. This outline addresses one of Gramsci’s key 
questions in analysing counter-hegemonic movements: what is the social content of 
the mass following of the counter-hegemonic movement? This section begins with an 
outline of the labour movement as the core, organised, membership-based force in the 
opposition. The history of the labour movement in Zimbabwe, the Congress of Trade 
Union structures and leadership, internal dynamics and core grievances in the lead-up 
to the food strikes of 1997 and 1998 will be explained through interviews with leaders 
of the congress of trade unions during this period. The second core group to be 
analysed will be the student movement. Students would be the only other mass 
membership based group that would form a central part of the opposition in Zimbabwe 
after 1997. The chapter will show the differences in strategies, ideologies and interests 
between labour and students as this was a central theme of the data collected during 
interviews. The differences between labour and students would become a core 
cleavage point in the leadership battles of the MDC after 2008 as well as after the 
death of Morgan Tsvangirai in 2018. Associated with the student groups were 
academics and intellectuals at the nation’s tertiary education institutions. Their 
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individual ideological persuasions and emphases would influence segments of 
students, labour and the movement as a whole in often contradictory directions from 
the formative stages of the counter-hegemonic movement. 
The chapter then analyses the roles of other core groups, which, unlike the labour 
unions and students, were represented mostly by individuals in leadership rather than 
membership-based power. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) would become 
central to the counter-hegemonic movement in Zimbabwe. From a space dominated 
by church groups such as the Zimbabwe Council of Churches, this segment would 
begin to draw from the student movements and by the mid-1990s became entirely 
dependent on western donor funding. These new NGOs and their leadership would be 
central to the drive for democratisation through their focus on both constitutional and 
electoral reform and human rights monitoring. This section of the opposition would 
generate important dynamics in how it related to the labour movement, its reliance on 
donor funding and the complications that this would cause, as well as its relatively 
shallow membership base. Based on interview data and reviews of other secondary 
data such as blog posts, newspaper articles and books on the history of Zimbabwe’s 
opposition, the chapter will explain the core role of these NGOs and their leadership 
as well as the often overlapping and interpenetration of their leadership with those of 
student movements, donor agencies and the main opposition political party. 
The chapter then outlines other influential, though weakly represented occupations 
and groups in the counter-hegemonic movement. Among these are lawyers, farmers 
and business leaders, and the national staff of donor agencies. The chapter then 
concludes by returning to a chronological narrative which outlines the conjunctural 
roots of the opposition movement in the formation of the National Constitutional 
Assembly in 1997 and the Movement for Democratic Change in 1999. 
 
 
Chapter 5: The Organic Crisis Historic Bloc 2000-2008 
 
Chapter 5 traces the history of counter-hegemonic struggle between 2000 and 2008. 
This phase allows us both a chronological and thematic analysis of the interaction 
between the hegemonic power in the state and Zanu-PF, and the counter hegemonic 
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movement. This early phase of the crisis bloc was punctuated by elections in 2000, 
2002, 2005 and finally 2008. Elections represent the key moments of confrontation 
between the ruling party and the counter- hegemonic forces. The chapter will also 
detail key moments that occurred between the elections and how they contributed to 
the balance of forces between the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces. In 
keeping with Gramsci’s framework of the historical bloc, the chapter will outline the 
broad economic realities of the period beginning with land reform policies of the early 
2000s and the economic crises these precipitated. 
The chapter will analyse the impact of de-industrialisation, mass unemployment and 
hyperinflation on political interests in the country. Superstructural elements such as 
the passing of the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and the Access to 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) in 2002 would become central to 
the Zimbabwean historical bloc during this period. Additional factors include the 
centrality of ideological warfare between the opposing hegemonic forces around issues 
of democracy, land reform and the role of western powers in shaping Zimbabwe’s 
political future. Conjuctural moments such as Operation Murambatsvina in 2005, as 
well as the ‘Save Zimbabwe Campaign’ in 2007 will be outlined to establish their 
impact on the trajectory of the hegemonic struggle. The chapter will also use interview 
data to highlight the internal dynamics of the counter-hegemonic movement during 
this period. 
 
The different strategies that the movement put into place and explanations for their 
success or failure will be outlined, as well as an analysis of the increasingly visible 
fractures within the movement which would lead to the MDC splitting in 2005. The 
chapter is informed by the Gramscian tool of the historical bloc, which seeks to 
understand the historical phase by elucidating economic realities and economic 
interests as well as the ideological debates of the period. The analysis of hegemonic 
power will combine the extent to which violence was used to maintain or challenge 
power, as well as the observable capacity for the contending hegemonic forces to 
generate ideological consent from the Zimbabwean population. Finally, the strategies 
of the counter-hegemonic movement will be analysed as they relate to the Gramscian 
concepts of war of position and war of manoeuvre. The elections of 2008 represented 
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a crucial turning point in Zimbabwe’s hegemonic history, as the evident defeat of 
Zanu-PF and Robert Mugabe in the combined elections resulted in a brutal campaign 
of violence by the ruling party against MDC supporters. The year 2008 marks the end 
of the first phase of hegemonic confrontation and forms a logical conclusion to the 
analysis of the initial phase of confrontation. 
 
 
Chapter 6: Passive revolution and the resurgence of Zanu-PF hegemony 2008- 2013 
 
 
Chapter 6 addresses the period of the Government of National Unity between 2008 
and 2013. Following the violence which accompanied the second round of the 
presidential elections in March 2008, a political settlement was negotiated between 
Zanu-PF and the two factions of the Movement for Democratic Change. The 
settlement, known as the Global Political Agreement (GPA), put in place a 
Government of National Unity (GNU) which maintained Mugabe as president and 
appointed Morgan Tsvangirai as prime minister. This chapter describes the period of 
the Government of National Unity using the Gramscian concept of passive revolution, 
echoing the work of Brian Raftopulous, and relies on observation and interview data 
collected during 2010 and 2011 during the constitution-making process of the GNU. 
The chapter highlights the shifting dynamics within the opposition movement as 
cracks began to widen between the varying ideological camps within the party and 
throughout opposition civil society. It will also be shown that, once in power, members 
of the counter-hegemonic movement would show tendencies to corruption similar to 
those of Zanu-PF. 
The chapter concludes with an analysis of why Zanu-PF and Robert Mugabe won the 
2013 elections. Theories have been proposed by Bratton (2016) and Chan and 
Gallagher (2017), among others, for why the MDC lost the 2013 elections, despite 
evident improvement in the economy during the GNU. This thesis will structure its 
analysis of the MDC’s loss in 2013 within the Gramscian framework. It will ask to 
what extent this outcome was driven either by economic or ideological factors, or the 
degree to which the threat of violence or the building of consent accounts for Zanu- 
PF victory. This victory occurred despite the fact that Zanu-PF had led the country to 
the disastrous economic hyperinflation of 2008 which the MDC had theoretically 
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changed between 2008 and 2013. A Gramscian analysis will also assist in studying the 
strategies of the MDC and consider the potential errors in judgement in the counter- 
hegemonic battle against Zanu-PF in Zimbabwe. 
 
 
Chapter 7: New counter-hegemonic arenas 
 
 
Chapter 7 will analyse events after 2013. The post-2013 period saw the rise of 
powerful new counter-hegemonic forces such as the Tajamuka movement which had 
its roots in youth and student activism, as well new forces such as Pastor Evan 
Mawarire’s #ThisFlag movement. Despite these movement’s effect on the dynamics 
of hegemony in the country Zimbabwe’s history after 2013 will be defined by the 
removal of Robert Mugabe from office by his own party, and its inseparable blending 
with the nation’s military. Chapter 8 will therefore discuss how internal dynamics 
within Zanu-PF led to Mugabe’s removal, beginning with the conflict between Vice- 
President Joyce Mujuru and Emerson Mnangagwa and then finally the conflict 
between Mnangagwa and the First Lady Grace Mugabe. The chapter will show how 
internal party rules, which date back to the Chimurenga period as outlined in Chapter 
4, were instrumental in the outcome of the events of 2017. On the counter-hegemonic 
side, the post-2013 era will be defined by the death of Morgan Tsvangirai and the 
turmoil within the opposition movement. Internal struggles between ideological and 
class cleavages outlined in Chapter 4 left an even more divided opposition in the build-
up to the country’s first post-Mugabe elections in 2018. These events allow for a useful 
comparison of internal dynamics within the resurgent hegemonic force in Zanu-PF and 
the waning counter-hegemonic movement in the MDC. 
 
 
Chapter 8: Conclusion, general findings and implications for the analysis of other 
durable African regimes. 
 
 
The thesis concludes with its proposed answers as to why Zanu-PF has been able to 
maintain hegemonic power in Zimbabwe, and why Zimbabwe’s opposition has been 
unable to bring about conclusive change in the country. These answers are based on 
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the analysis and arguments in the preceding chapters. As this is a structured, focused 
case study which we have defined above as ‘the detailed examination of an aspect of 
a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable 
to other events’, the concluding chapter will seek to provide hypotheses generated 
from the Zimbabwean reality. These may account for a more general research problem, 
which is how to account for the durability of authoritarian regimes in African states of 
which there are multiple similar examples including Algeria, Sudan, Ethiopia, Burkina 
Faso. The Gramscian approach in this thesis views the survival and durability of a 
regime through the lens of hegemony, with the use of power as a consent/coercion 
continuum. The conclusion will argue that Gramsci’s method is a useful paradigm for 





Gramsci’s Political Economy: Historical Blocs and Hegemony 
 
This thesis seeks to account for the durability of the Zimbabwe African National 
Union-Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF) regime in Zimbabwe. The party has been able to stay 
in power for over 39 years and, arguably, has been the country’s most important 
political force since the 1970’s. After coming to power at independence in 1980 Zanu-
PF has faced off all opposition, including a relatively strong opposition in the 
Movement for Democratic Change for nearly 20 years. Gramsci’s theory of hegemony 
is used to analyse the relationship between the power of the Zimbabwean incumbent 
and how it is maintained through various applications of coercion and consent within 
a historical framework that emphasises questions of production and ideology. This 
chapter presents the theory of hegemony as elaborated by Antonio Gramsci and his 
successors. The theory provides a method that follows Gramsci’s historical 
materialism as an elaboration of Marxist political economy. The theory thus holds that 
the understanding of political movements and their historical context requires both an 
understanding of material factors arising from the mode of production as well as the 
ideational superstructure and political institutions which accompany the base mode of 
production. In order to do this the chapter traces the genealogy of Gramsci’s concept 
of hegemony from the work of Rosa Luxemburg, through the Marxist orthodoxy of 
Kautsky and Georgi Plekhanov, and finally through Lenin. The chapter situates 
Gramsci’s theories as they dissect the Marxist dualisms between coercion and 
persuasion, base and superstructure, and civil society and the state. The chapter then 
elaborates on the Gramscian debates on hegemony as “intellectual and moral 
leadership” or as a continuum between consent and coercion. This thesis will argue 
that while the concept of hegemony as ideological supremacy has normative 
significance the concept hegemony as a continuum between consent and coercion has 
more methodological use. As we have noted in the introduction, the answer to the 
question of whether Zanu-PF has held undisputed intellectual and moral leadership in 
Zimbabwe, is a simple “no”. However, Zanu-PF as with all similarly durable regimes 






The chapter will outline Gramsci’s political strategic concepts of the war of position 
and the war of manoeuvre, and Gramsci’s idea of the political party as ‘the new prince’ 
in his reading of Niccolo Machiavelli’s treatise. The thesis will apply these tools to the 
analysis of a resilient hegemon or failed opposition movement. Gramsci provides a 
method for analysing opposition social movements and why they are successful and 
indeed unsuccessful using the 19th Century Boulangist movement in France as an 
illustrative case. This chapter will outline this method for analysing opposition 
movements as it will be applied to the Movement for Democratic Change in Zimbabwe 
for the remainder of this thesis. In this regard the thesis also applies the categorisation 
of movements as either organic or contingent in their capacity to bring about the tasks 
they have set for themselves. Gramsci’s hegemony was first developed to account for 
the durability of capitalism despite the fertile conditions for revolution, and the failure 
of revolutionary struggles in Italy, Germany and elsewhere to transform themselves 
into successful revolutions. It is equally appropriate in addressing the durability of 
regimes such as Zanu-PF and the dilemmas of opposition movements such as the 
MDC. Gramsci’s political strategic concepts will also be outlined; these include the 
war of position versus the war of manoeuvre, and Gramsci’s idea of the political party 
as ‘the new prince’ in his updated reading of Niccolo Machiavelli’s treatise. The thesis 
will apply these tools to the analysis of a resilient hegemon and a failed opposition 
movement by applying Gramsci’s method of analysing social movements as he did 
with the 19th Century Boulangist movement in France. In this regard the thesis also 
applies the categorisation of movements as either organic or contingent in their 




Genealogy of the concept of hegemony 
 
In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Laclau and Mouffe trace the genealogy of 
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony from the strategies of Rosa Luxemburg, through the 
Marxist orthodoxy of Kautsky and Georgi Plekhanov, and finally through Lenin. 
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They demonstrate how the concept has generally been used to analyse conditions 
which they refer to as ‘contingent interventions’, meaning periods of theoretical and 
strategic crisis in the expected Marxist historical development, usually characterised 
by a failure of the working classes to organise sufficiently against the bourgeoisie 
(2001, p.7). Luxemburg’s comparative analysis of conditions in Russia as opposed to 
those in Germany, in The Mass Strike, the Political Party and Trade Unions, noted 
that mass strikes in Germany were significantly more fragmented than those in Russia 
despite being more prevalent. She infers that the reason for this lay in the fact that in 
Germany mass strikes generally concentrated on political issues while in Russia the 
call for strikes had combined economic and political issues. Hence for Luxemburg this 
isolation and fragmentation is an ‘artificial product of the parliamentary period and 
bourgeois society’ (Cited in Laclau and Mouffe, 2006, p.9) in which ’economic 
struggle is split into a multitude of individual struggles’ while political struggle is 
directed through representatives in correspondence with the bourgeois state. 
Laclau and Mouffe identify another crisis in social democratic theory and strategy at 
the end of the 1800s and the first decade of the 1900s. The transition to ‘organised 
capitalism’ and the empowerment of the working classes by the trade unions and the 
political leadership of the Social Democratic party made ‘a general crisis of capitalism’ 
unlikely (p. 17). They observe the response to this ‘crisis of Marxism’ through the 
various approaches of the Marxist orthodoxy of Kautsky and Plekhanov, Bernstein’s 
revisionism and the revolutionary syndicalism of Sorel (Laclau & Mouffe, 2006, pp. 
28-43). The fundamental problem is the incapacity of the economic base to ‘assure 
class unity in the present, while politics, the sole terrain where that present unity can 
be constructed, is unable convincingly to guarantee the class character of the unitary 
subjects’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 2006, p. 37). 
Lenin represents Gramsci’s most immediate antecedent in formulating his own theory 
of hegemony, and the closest theoretical perspective. His theory developed while he 
was discussing how the proletariat should take either leadership or a hegemonic role 
in the struggles against Tsarist absolutism (Femia, 2010, p. 25). In this sense Gramsci’s 
reading of hegemony in Lenin can be equated with the dictatorship of the proletariat, 
and therefore a combination of dominance and consent. Femia is adamant that Gramsci 
is ‘decidedly un-Leninist’ and constitutes a departure from all previous Marxist theory 
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in emphasising the cultural rather than the coercive (Femia, 2006, p. 25). This question 
poses a central dilemma to readings of Gramsci, between the concept of cultural 
hegemony or a combination of consent and dominance. 
Certainly, Gramsci is effusive in discussing Lenin’s contribution as ‘the greatest 
modern theorist of the philosophy of praxis has – on the terrain of political struggle 
and organisation – in opposition to the various tendencies of “economism”, revalued 
the front of cultural struggle and constructed the doctrine of hegemony as a 
complement to the theory of the state-as force’ (Gramsci, 2000, p.195). Gramsci 
further states that this assertion of epistemological as well as the theoretical-practical 
principle of hegemony is Lenin’s ‘greatest theoretical contribution to the theory of 
praxis’ (2000, p. 192). ‘The realisation of a hegemonic apparatus, in so far as it creates 
a new ideological terrain, determines a reform of consciousness and methods of 




Gramsci’s hegemony builds on the above-mentioned antecedents by addressing a 
similar crisis in theory and strategy: the failure of revolutionary struggles in Italy, 
Germany and elsewhere to transform themselves into successful revolutions (Femia, 
2010; Fonseca, 2016; Laclau & Mouffe, 2000). His theory engages with the theoretical 
constructs and dichotomies and dualisms in Marxist theories between base and 
superstructure, state and civil society, and coercion and persuasion (Bobbio, 1997, 
2005; Forgacs, 2000; Laclau & Mouffe, 2000; Femia, 1981; Fonseca, 2016). As a 
result of these overlapping dialectics, and the relational nature of his concept of 
hegemony, a precise location of the concept of hegemony in Gramsci’s work is still a 
matter of controversy. As mentioned above, the broad division in the debate is whether 
Gramsci perceived the concept of hegemony to refer purely to consent or rather to a 
combination of consent and coercion as expressed in the interplay between base and 
superstructure in the concept of the ‘historical bloc’. 
 
 
Hegemony as intellectual and moral leadership. 
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The most popular understanding of Gramsci’s concept is the equation of hegemony 
with ideological and cultural dominance4. Femia emphasises this understanding and 
makes a clear distinction between hegemony and dominance in the following 
statement (1981, p. 24): 
Hegemony is the predominance obtained by consent rather than force of one class or group 
over other classes. And whereas domination is realised essentially through the coercive 
machinery of the state, “intellectual and moral leadership” is objectified in, and mainly 





Bobbio (2006) also underlines the distinction between hegemony and dominance as 
the correct reading of Gramsci’s theory. Further highlighting Gramsci’s emphasis on 
civil society as the realm of hegemonic contestation, he explains that: ‘Gramsci saw 
civil society as the sphere where ideological apparatuses operate and whose task it is 
to exercise hegemony and through hegemony to obtain consensus’ (2006, p. 29). 
It is important to note that while Femia and Bobbio place the accent on ideologies and 
consent, neither discount Gramsci’s grounding of ideological hegemony in the 
economic reality of modes of production. Both point to Gramsci’s assertion that ‘if 
hegemony is ethico-political it must also be economic, it must have its foundation in 
the decisive function that the leading group exercises in the decisive nucleus of 






4 An interesting i l lustration of the perception of Gramsci’s hegemony as cultural dominance is a  reference  to 
Gramsci on Fox News’ O’ Reilly Factor. In a segment on ‘Who is winning the culture  war?’,  Bill  O’Reilly 
and his guest, the conservative writer and presidential primary  candidate  Pat  Buchanan, discussed a Paris 
Hilton advert and the effects of Gangsta Rap and surmise that ‘cultural Marxism and militant secularism are 
clearly winning in  the  United  States today’. Buchanan remarks  that: ‘There  was a communist known as 
Antonio Gramsci in Italy who  argued that this is  the only  way  that Marxism is  going to win. And I have to  
say  they are sure making progress and I think they' re  on  the offensive… this is  sort of, if  you  will, soft 
Marxism. And what i t ' s  done is  replaced Christianity. You know, a  culture is  a product of a cult. Western 
civilization is a product of Christianity.  And Gramsci and the others realized they had to de-Christianize the 
culture. They had to change values. They had to make people think differently,     and     then     the      citadel       
of       western      civilization       would      collapse.”  http://  www. foxnews. com/ story/ 2005 /05 /27 / who -is-
winning-culture-war. html 
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Hegemony as a consent-coercion continuum 
 
This understanding of Gramsci’s hegemony places less emphasis on ideology and 
interprets Gramsci’s approach as an attempt to balance base and superstructure, 
consent and coercion, and state and civil society. Hegemony then lies at the 
intersection of these dichotomies and balances the contending extremes of economic 
determinism or ‘economism’ and an exaggerated emphasis on ideologies, 
‘ideologism’. 
Forgacs (2000, p. 190) explains this balance as follows: 
 
For Gramsci: changing socio-economic circumstances do not of themselves “produce” 
political changes. They only set the conditions in which such changes become possible. What 
is crucial in bringing about these changes, are the “relations of force” obtaining at the political 
level, the degree of political organisation and combativity of the opposing forces, the strength 
of the political alliances which they manage to bind together and their level of political 
consciousness, of preparation of the struggle on the ideological terrain”. 
 
In order to understanding this decidedly more methodological than strategic 
application of the concept, it is necessary to return to Gramsci’s reading of Marx and 
Engel’s historical works, Theses on Feuerbach, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis 
Bonaparte, The Civil War in France and Counter-Revolution in Germany. From 
Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, some key points 
paraphrased by Gramsci are important. Firstly, the assertion that ‘It is not the 
consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that 
determines their consciousness’ (Gramsci, 2000, p.200). Secondly, that: 
No social formation is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient 
have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before 
the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old 
society. Mankind thus inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to solve, since closer 
examination will always show that the problem itself arises only when the material conditions 





Historical bloc: the base-superstructure continuum 
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The key to understanding the consent/coercion dynamic is the concept of the ‘historical 
bloc’ which Gramsci appropriated from Georges Sorel’s ideas about myths (Siotis, 
2018, p. 97). In the historical bloc Gramsci sees the economic base and the institutional 
and ideological superstructure as reciprocally and dialectically interwoven. He 
elaborates: 
Structures and superstructure form a historical bloc. That is to say, the complex, contradictory 
and discordant ensemble of the superstructures is the reflection of the ensemble of the social 
relations of production. The accusation of theological dualism and of breaking up of the 
process of reality is vacuous and superficial…. it is not true that the philosophy of praxis 
“detaches” the structure from the superstructures when, rather, it conceives their development 
as intimately connected and necessarily interrelated and reciprocal (2000, p. 193). 
 
Poulantzas’s argument for this understanding of hegemony as a heuristic continuum 
is convincing: 
contrary to a widespread tendency; its [hegemony’s] contribution cannot be restricted to some 
domain of “ideology” in general, indicating the role of a ruling class, which by means of its 
intellectuals – ideological functionaries- succeeds in getting its own world view accepted by 
the whole of a society and thereby rules more through conditioned consent than domination in 
the strict sense of the term. If the concept of hegemony has a distinctive scientific status, it is 
because it allows us, when applied to the capitalist state and the classes to whose interests it 
corresponds, to elucidate their particular historical characteristics in their relations with a 
historically determinate mode of production (Poulantzas, 2008, p. 77). 
 
Arising from Gramsci’s role as theorist and strategist, elements of his theories of 
strategy and his methodology of analysing movements are virtually indissociable. 
Additional concepts are therefore necessary for the elaboration of his overall strategic 
and methodological theories. These include his definition of civil society, organic 
crises, relations of force, the difference between the war of manoeuvre and the war of 
position, the concept of passive revolution, the role of intellectuals, and the political 
party as ‘the new prince’. 
 
 
Organic crisis and relations of force 
 
In Gramsci’s theory (2000, p. 201), a crisis exists when: 
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the incurable contradictions have come to light within the structure and that the political forces 
positively working to preserve the structure itself are nevertheless striving to heal these 
contradictions, within certain limits, and to overcome them. These incessant and persistent 
efforts... form the terrain of the “conjunctural”, and it is upon this terrain that the forces of 
opposition organise. 
 
To qualify the application of the concept of crisis Gramsci distinguishes between 
organic and conjunctural movements and facts. He warns that the failure to distinguish 
between the two constitutes a serious methodological error as it leads to the incorrect 
attribution of causal factors or overestimating the causal impact of a single 
contributing element in a range of factors. 
The difference between the organic and the conjunctural ultimately lies in the relations 
of forces. Gramsci again dissects the base-superstructure, consent-coercion dialectic 
and takes exception to ‘a vulgar liberal conception’ of the relations of forces which 
focuses solely on the political forces; ‘organised in the various forms of party 
(newspaper readerships, parliamentary and local elections, the mass organisation of 
parties and trade unions in the strict sense)’ (2000, p. 202). He counsels instead that 
the relations of forces must be distinguished on three levels or moments. The first of 
these relations is the relation of economic forces, the mode of accumulation and 
production, and the development of material forces. This aspect of economic relations 
is measurable using the methods of natural sciences. The second moment is the degree 
of ‘homogeneity, self- awareness and organisation attained by the various social 
groups’. The third is the relation of military forces. This last level encapsulates not 
only brute coercive power, but also ideological consent (2000, p. 202). 
Gramsci insists that the relations of forces are determined exclusively by applied 
research after the fact and not as a principle of strategy (2000, p. 204). 
In addition to the relation of forces bound within the nation is the role of international 
relations. Gramsci elaborates (2000, p. 206): 
it is also necessary to take into account the fact that international relations intertwine with these 
internal relations of nation-states, creating new, original and historically concrete 
combinations. A particular ideology, for instance, born in a highly developed country, is 
disseminated in less developed countries, impinging on the local interplay of combinations. 
(Religion for example, has always been a source of such national and international ideological- 
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political combinations, and so too have other international organisations – Freemasonry, 




War of manoeuvre, war of position, and passive revolution 
 
In outlining the strategies of opposition once a crisis has commenced, Gramsci 
differentiates between the war of manoeuvre and the war of position, to which his 
theories of civil society and state are closely related. Drawing on early 20th century 
military terms, the war of position consists of protracted trench warfare while the war 
of manoeuvre (or war of movement) is a rapid frontal assault on the adversary’s base. 
Gramsci observes a similar relation in political movements. In the advanced states of 
the West, where ‘there is a proper relation between state and civil society’, he equates 
the superstructures of civil society with the military trench system, standing behind 
the ‘outer ditch of the state’ (2000, p. 229). As such ‘civil society has become a very 
complex structure, one which is resistant to the catastrophic irruptions caused by 
immediate economic factors (crises, depressions, etc.)’. In advanced capitalist 
societies, the dominant ideology is highly institutionalised and interwoven with the 
society so that a frontal attack on the state is unlikely to be effective. Hence a war of 
position in the trenches of civil society is necessary to bring about hegemonic change. 
The war of position thus requires ‘enormous sacrifices by infinite masses of people’ 
both in challenging and in maintaining hegemony. Gramsci defines this phase as a 
reciprocal siege between a ruler who has to ‘muster all political and administrative 
resources’, and the opposition movement (2000, p. 230). Finally, once the war of 
position has been won it is definitively decisive, epochal, as it were. 
Gramsci adds the concept of passive revolution to the foregoing distinction. This 
concept refers to the coming to power of a new historical situation in which social and 
economic relations remain static. Passive revolution is often the outcome of a war of 
position by the dominant classes after a war of manoeuvre by the dominated classes. 
Gramsci introduces the concept as an analytical tool for understanding Italian politics 
– the Risorgimento, post-1815 liberal movements and fascism (Forgacs, 2000, p. 428). 
However, he warns against the interpretation of this concept as ‘historical defeatism’ 
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while proposing that the concept ‘postulates as necessary a vigorous antithesis which 
can present intransigently all its potentialities for development’ (2000, p. 264). 
An interesting methodological addition by Gramsci’s methodology is its openness to 
the potential for errors in calculation. By considering the potential for errors Gramsci 
places an emphasis not only on the agency of the political leaders of the dominant 
classes as well as groups seeking to assume hegemony, but also their capacity for error. 
Gramsci uses this as a nuance to the mechanistic application of historical materialism 




Gramsci’s concept of Caesarism is related to that of the passive revolution.  This 
describes a “situation in which the balance of forces in conflict balance each other in 
such a way that a continuation of the conflict can only terminate in their reciprocal 
destruction” (Gramsci, 2000, p.269). Caesarism expresses a situation in which this 
“equilibrium of forces” is managed, when a by “great personality is entrusted with the 
task of ‘arbitration’ ” (2000, p.270). Gramsci established his concept in reference to 
“heroic personalities” such as Caesar, Napoleon I, Napoleon III and Cromwell. The 
historical contextual variance and individual complexity of each of these “heroic” 
personalities and indeed the fact that Gramsci himself notes that Caesarism can be 
expressed both progressive and regressive nor does it specifically require a single 
heroic personality would mean that the concept is useful as a loose description of 
personalised or centralised power in the context of tense political equilibrium rather 
than a rigid category with which to gain analytical leverage. In emphasising the 
usefulness of the concept Gramsci underlines that the concept of Caesarism is to be 
understood as a “polemical-ideological formula” and not a canon of historical 
interpretation (2000, p.270). The concept’s a priori value for our thesis would 
therefore be as a Gramscian descriptive categorisation of Zanu-PF and the obvious 
analogy that can be made with Robert Mugabe and what Ndlovu-Gatsheni et al. (2014) 






The notion of intellectuals has a very important role in Gramsci’s overarching theories  
and particularly in his understanding of hegemony. By acting as political intermediaries,  
intellectuals are responsible for the production of continuity and change, that is to say  
hegemony. As he explains (2000, p.39): 
every social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential 
function in the world of economic production, creates together with itself, 
organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and 
awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social 
and political fields. (2000, p.39) 
Intellectuals arise as both functions and products, as well as interpreters, of the 
economic and social structure and the class it produces. The production of 
‘homogeneity and awareness’ is essentially through all cultural and social activity ‘by 
participating in… and contributing to sustaining or modifying a moral conception of 
the world’. Gramsci asserts therefore that ‘all men are intellectuals’ even if they don’t 
fulfil the function of intellectuals. 
He distinguishes between traditional and organic intellectuals. The first hold ‘a 
monopoly of a number of important services: religious ideology, that is the philosophy 
and science of the age, together with schools, education, morality, justice, charity, 
good works etc.’ (Gramsci, 2000, p. 302). This monopoly produces what he calls the 
‘common sense’ of the age. Gramsci is careful to not present a passive relationship 
between intellectuals and their given class, explaining that the relationship is 
‘mediated in diverse ways by the entire social fabric, by the complex of 
superstructures’ (Femia, 2000, p. 132). However, traditional intellectuals often 
maintain this conservative form of common sense, and either through direct or indirect 
controls they serve to reflect the perspectives of the dominant economic classes. The 
process of hegemonic change therefore requires capturing or shifting the perspectives 
of traditional intellectuals who are capable of change. 
Organic intellectuals are those who arise from a specific economic stratum. In order 
to bring about hegemonic change, working-class intellectuals must provide 
40  
homogeneity and awareness through moral and cultural leadership. The mechanisms 
for this are therefore not always within the forms of traditional intellectual pursuits. 
Gramsci also makes the distinction between urban and rural intellectuals. The former 
‘have grown up along industry and are linked to its fortunes’. Rural intellectuals, in 
the context and time of Gramsci’s writing, are therefore more likely to come from 
traditional intellectuals such as priests, teachers, doctors and members of the state local 
administration (2000, p. 308). 
As Gramsci noted above, international ideologies propagated through associations 
such as Freemasonry and Rotarianism also fall into this category of intellectuals as 
they frame the perspectives of political leadership. 
 
 
The Modern Prince 
 
The key protagonist in the battle for hegemony is the political party, which Gramsci 
identifies as the ‘modern prince’, reading Machiavelli’s treatise on this topic as a 
symbol of ‘the collective will’. 
In keeping with Gramsci’s combination of the cultural and the economic perspective 
of history, the political party must therefore be: 
the proclaimer of intellectual and moral reformation, that is to the question of religion or world 
view. Which also means creating the terrain for a subsequent development of the national- 
popular collective will towards the realisation of a superior, total form of modern 
civilisation…. Intellectual and moral reflection has to be linked with a programme of economic 
reform- indeed the programme of economic reform is precisely the concrete form in which 




As a methodology for the analysis of political parties, Gramsci advises that: 
 
it is necessary to distinguish: their social group; their mass membership; their bureaucracy 
and general staff. The bureaucracy is the most dangerously hidebound and conservative force, 
if it ends up by constituting a compact body, which stands on its own and feels itself 
independent of the mass of members, the party ends up by becoming anachronistic and at 
moments of acute crisis it is voided of its social content and left as though suspended in mid- 
air. (Gramsci, 2000, p. 219) 
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The foregoing methodological advice will inform the analysis of Zanu-PF and the 




Gramsci’s method for the study of opposition movements 
 
Gramsci explains his theory of hegemonic power by analysing a political movement 
during the course of its development, with specific reference to the 19th Century 
Boulangist movement in France. In analysing the Boulangist movement Gramsci notes 
that ‘economism asks the question: “who profits directly from the initiative under 
consideration?” and replies with a line of reasoning which is as simplistic as it is 
fallacious: the ones who profit directly are a certain fraction of the ruling class’ (2000, 
p. 216). In a warning that is particularly useful in studying opposition movements that 
have stalled or failed to bring about the change they sought to effect, Gramsci writes: 
‘until such movements have gained power it is always possible to think that they are 
going to fail’ (2000, p.216), as Boulangism ultimately did. 
Gramsci proposed instead the following guidelines for research into a movement 
(2000, p. 217): 
 What is the social content of the mass following of the movement?
 
 What function did this mass have in the balance of forces, which is in the 
process of transformation, as the new movement demonstrates by its very 
coming into existence?
 What is the political and social significance of those demands presented by the 
movements’ leaders which find general assent; and to what effective needs do 
they correspond?
 To what extent does the means conform to the proposed end?
 
 The hypothesis that such a movement will necessarily be perverted and will 
serve quite different ends from those which the mass of its followers expected,
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will be considered only in the last analysis, and will be formulated in political 
not moralistic terms. 
The broad questions listed above and the preceding concepts will direct the analysis 
of why Zimbabwe’s opposition in the MDC has not been able to bring about a 
hegemonic change in Zimbabwe. 
 
 
Applications of Gramscian political economy to African political economy 
 
 
In introducing the Gramscian method which this thesis will be using it is necessary to 
outline some examples of Gramsci’s method in other African cases as well as the 
instances in which scholars have used Gramsci in relation to Zimbabwe. Though there 
is little evidence that Gramsci was concerned with Africa in his writings the his own 
attempts to geographically limit his theories seem to take the form of a distinction 
between the “East” where he perceived the the State as excessively dominant while 
“civil society was primordial and gelatinous” and the “West” where “ a proper relation 
between State and civil society” existed. This strategic, rather than methodological 
observation serves as an a posteriori comparison of the success of Bolshevik 
revolution while in Western Europe “when the state tottered, a sturdy structure of civil 
society was immediately revealed. The State was just a forward trench; behind it stood 
a succession of sturdy fortresses and emplacements”. (Gramsci, 2000 p.169). Where 
it is necessary to relate specifically to previous African applications of Gramscian 




Gramsci’s work has contributed significantly to the field of International Relations 
where the concept of hegemony has been central to critical international political 
economy. One of the principal concerns is situating African political economies within 
global historical blocs, in particular the global neo-liberal hegemonic bloc which has 
been in place since the end of the cold war. Worth has underlined that Gramsci’s own 
concept of hegemony emphasises the bond between being forged by social classes 
within a specific era or historical bloc rather than the role of individually powerful 
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states within the global order (2015, p.5). This thesis takes heed of Worth’s 
observation in trying to situate international dimensions of Zimbabwe’s internal 
hegemonic struggle within global hegemonic blocs. At the beginning of the third 
chimurenga historical bloc Zanu-PF began to self-consciously cast its internal hold 
over national power within a context of a global anti-imperialist struggles. This thesis 
will critically examine Zanu-PF’s supposed anti-colonial ideology within this context 
but emphasises Gramsci’s method as it relates to maintaining national power while 




Activist and theorist Mzwanele Mayekiso’s 1996 study of township politics in 
Johannesburg chronicles the struggles of the Alexandra Action Committee and its 
incarnation after 1990 as the Alexandra Civic Organisation. He describes how the 
organisation’s struggle against the apartheid state was based on the organisation’s 
strong community base as well as the creation of global solidarity networks. Mayekiso 
contrasts the challenges in contesting the apartheid state through direct confrontation, 
as opposed to the post-apartheid state which, he acknowledges is constrained by 
national political pressures as well as the imperatives of transnational capital. He is 
also critical of the conception of civil society which masks the contending and 
antagonistic class interests of different associations under one umbrella. He argues for 
a working class civil society as ‘a far more class-conscious perspective on civil society, 
one that highlights those strategies and instruments of the working class that are crucial 
to social, political, and economic progress’ (1996, p. 12). 
In discussing the application of concepts of hegemony and counter-hegemony in 
Africa, Rita Abrahamsen (1997) argues that the analysis of democratic movements in 
Africa ought to take into account the integration of African states in the global 
economy, and the international division of labour. She further argues that explanations 
of African democratisation which ignore the impact of global, economic and political 
conjunctures and how these shape the dynamics of domestic development, are weak. 
Abrahamsen’s paper takes as a point of departure Robert Cox’s neo-Gramscian 
assertion that ‘Theory is always for someone and for something’, and the implication 
that intellectual work is often directly or indirectly linked to political strategies. She 
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contends that discourses on democracy such as the World Bank’s technocratic ‘good 
governance’ terminology, are ideologically laden with concepts of the ‘good society’ 
as a minimal state and a free market. Finally, Abrahamsen concludes that: 
‘democratisation appears to be a continuation of Africa's passive revolution and 
amounts to little more than a new popular ratification of the prevailing social order’ 
(1997, p. 151). 
The concept of hegemony has arguably been applied more to the case of Zimbabwe 
than any other African context. David Moore (1991) has engaged Gramscian concepts 
in analysing the ideological formation of the ruling class in Zimbabwe. Moore 
addressed the notion ‘whether or not the petit bourgeois leaders of the struggle for 
national liberation had the intention or were capable of transforming national 
liberation’ into socialism, and whether or not the leading nationalists would be able to 
take the mantle of organic intellectuals and achieve what Femia termed ‘minimum 
hegemony’. He argues that Zimbabwe’s elites opted for elitism and capitalism over 
populism and Marxism and argued that if the young socialists who remained in the 
national intelligentsia were to succeed in difficult task of dislodging the present 
hegemony of the ruling class they would ‘have to extricate their ideology from that of 
the state and its managers’ (1991, p. 495). In addition, Moore (Vambe, 2008) uses the 
language of Gramsci’s hegemony in analysing Zanu-PF’s quest for hegemony through 
the forced mass urban evictions of the 2005 Operation Murambatsvina, in which an 
estimated 700 000 people lost their homes and livelihoods. Moore places the events of 
Murambatsvina within the framework of coercion, consent and context. He contends 
that this operation is best understood as ‘the logical extension of the techniques of a 
party that has consistently failed to rule Zimbabwe through consent rather than force 
or its possibility’ (2008, p. 25). Moore presents the concept of hegemony as consent 
and argues that even leading elements within the ruling party fail to reach a position of 
‘minimal hegemony’ which he defines as ‘agreements within factions of a ruling group’ 
(2008, p. 34). Maintaining a distinction between domination and hegemony as consent, 
Moore asks whether what he understands as ‘ZANU-PF’s failure to attain hegemony 
infringes on systemic functioning and legitimacy’, supposedly based on sufficient 
coercion to maintain Zanu-PF’s power. Despite arguing that Zanu-PF is not hegemonic 
he maintains hope for counter-hegemonic struggles, while also opening up the 
possibility of a more dialectical unity of hegemony (as consent-coercion) though not 
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quite accepting their indissociability. He further posits that the Zanu-PF slogan ‘the 
land is the economy and the economy is the land’ is ‘at the root of Zimbabwe’s long 
crisis, as until the structural conditions brought into being when capitalism arrived in 
Zimbabwe’s space and failed to transform it fully are solved with an acceptable and 
productive tenure system, hegemony will be but an unevenly articulated dream’ (2008, 
p. 35). More recently, Moore in an article co-authored with Zenzo Moyo and informed 
by empirical research (2018), studies how rural NGOs in Zimbabwe are more likely to 
cooperate with the state than their urban counterparts. Moore and Moyo interpret this 
within Gramsci’s categorisation of ‘rural intellectuals’ noted above. In another 
application of Gramscian theory to Zimbabwe, Raftopoulos has studied the Global 
Political Agreement and the Government of National Unity of 2009 as an example of 
passive revolution. 
Cornelias Ncube’s doctoral dissertation utilises the Gramscian dialectics of hegemony 
and the historical bloc to study Zimbabwean civil society’s role in legitimating and 
contesting Zanu-PF hegemony between 2000 and 2008. Ncube notes that ‘shifting 
analytical focus on the repressive apparatus of the state to “cultural and leadership” 
(hegemony of purely ideological nurture) might underestimate some of the challenges 
that militate against the emancipative role of civil society in Zimbabwe’ (2012, p. 65). 
His study applies the concept of hegemony as a continuum of consent and coercion, 
as well as broadening the concept of civil society to include those intellectuals and 
associations which support Zanu-PF. In so doing he builds on Erin McCandless’ 
(2005) comparative study of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) as an 
opposition social movement, and the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veteran’s 
Association (ZNLWVA) strong relationship with the ruling party. McCandless 
situates these associations within the context of their particular emphasis in the 
dialectic between rights (NCA) vs redistribution (ZNLWVA) and the historical 
conflict between donors and the state, whose interests each organisation represented. 
Studying the shifting relationship between the state and NGOs in Zimbabwe, Rich 
Dorman (2001) applied a Gramscian analysis which also operationalised the dynamic 
between consent and coercion and problematised the conflation of NGOs with civil 
society and the uncritical expectation of NGOs’ contribution to democracy. Dorman 
also queries the drive towards professionalisation of civil society which she identifies 
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as the practical result of the dominant theoretical assumptions about civil society. 
Writing soon after the birth of the Movement for Democratic Change, her study 
chronicles the shift from inclusion to the exclusion of Zimbabwean NGOs. 
Though not working explicitly in the tradition of Gramsci, Blessing-Miles Tendi’s 
(2010) work on patriotic history is particularly informative in its treatment of the 
production of ideology by ‘patriotic intellectuals’ and critical intellectuals in the 
opposition. Tendi builds on Terence Ranger’s (2004) argument of Zanu-PF’s rule by 
‘historiography’ in that the party has narrowed the national narrative into a simple 
distinction between patriots and traitors. While certainly not discounting the ruling 
party’s capacity for violence, the work contributes to understanding the material and 
ideological mechanisms for the production of hegemony as consent in Zimbabwe. 
This dissertation will build on these contributions by pushing the boundaries 
chronologically as well as conceptually, introducing an explicit study of the how the 
mode of production produced class as the line of contestation, and how these interests 
have been contested through the superstructures of institutions in the state and civil 
society, as well in the ideological battle for consent. An additional contribution of this 
thesis will be the formulaic application of Gramsci’s method for analysing a social 
movement. At the time of writing (2018) this appears more definitively to have failed 
to bring about hegemonic change than in the previous decade when this work’s 





The remaining chapters of this thesis seek to apply Gramsci’s methods to the case of 
Zanu-PF’s hegemony in Zimbabwe. Accordingly, the following chapter will apply 
Bobbio’s approach to political economy (base, superstructure as institutions and 
superstructure as ideology) to three phases of Zimbabwe’s history: firstly from 
colonisation to independence in 1980 (in which the Rhodesian state established the 
 
 
5 There is a rich  tradition of  political economy studies of  Zimbabwean politics and  the  production of  class 
in Zimbabwe including Arrighi 1969 ; Mandaza et al 1988 ; Stoneman  &  Cliffe 1999 ;  Dansereau,  2000 ; and 
Kanyenze et al. 2010 . Al l these will inform our understanding of the prevailing mode of production and i ts 
influence on class formations in Zimbabwe.  
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means of production and the dynamics that would affect the state of Zimbabwe); the 
second phase is the immediate post-colonial period from 1980 to 1997 (or compromise 
state and its creation of new class dynamics); and finally the crisis state (or failing 
state) from 1997 to the present. These phases will be analysed in relation to both the 
base (mode of production and the class forces it produces), and the superstructure in 
its two manifestations. These are the institutions and the prevailing ideologies through 
which power and counter-power seek to legitimate themselves. This analysis will 
establish the broad historical bloc, a combination of relations of force and 
superstructural power understood as political institution, or rules of the game, and 
ideological underpinnings. The following chapters will make reference to the other 
key Gramscian theoretical tools noted above including, organic crisis, the war of 
position and the war of manoeuvre, the modern prince, passive revolution and 























The construction and consolidation of Zanu-PF hegemony 
 
 
This chapter outlines the construction and consolidation of hegemony by the 
Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF). The analysis of this 
hegemony will serve as a point of departure for addressing the primary research 
problem, that is of accounting for the durability of the regime when faced with a 
seemingly robust opposition in the late 1990s. The chapter applies the Gramscian 
theoretical constructs of the historical bloc as a base/superstructure continuum, and 
hegemony as the continuum between consent and coercion, in order to analyse how 
Zanu-PF came to power through its counter-hegemonic struggle against the white 
settler state and how the party constructed its own hegemony in the post-independence 
historical bloc. The chapter thus commences with an outline of the nature of the 
African nationalist movement in Zimbabwe by situating the movement and its 
leadership in the political economy of the colonial settler state. The chapter will 
elaborate on how a black educated elite became the organic intellectuals for a 
nationalist movement which chose armed guerrilla warfare as the primary means for 
counter-hegemonic struggle. The chapter will seek to show how the centrality of this 
petit bourgeois leadership, the strategy of armed struggle and the necessity that this 
would entail a connection to the peasantry would impact on the party’s understanding 
of power as well as how power is maintained. The chapter then situates the post- 
colonial historical bloc within the compromise of class forces enshrined in the 
Lancaster House Agreement. It further outlines how the new governing class sought 
to construct its own hegemony through an economic base which applied corporatist 
practices to maintain both white settler capital and the interests of international capital 
in Zimbabwe while also adding a welfarist component to the state. The chapter outlines 
how Zanu-PF hegemony was constructed from 1980 until the organic crisis which 
became apparent from about 1997 onwards. The post-independence historical 
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bloc is divided into two phases: the transitional phase from 1980 to 1990 and the period 
of economic structural adjustment between 1991 and 1997 which precipitated the 
organic crisis and the counter-hegemonic struggle against the Zanu-PF regime. The 
party’s tendency towards authoritarianism was revealed in how it immediately sought 
to fuse itself with the state. Its intensifying intolerance of opposition in quashing 
rebellion in the south of the country in the Gukurahundi and the calls for a one-party 
state by the end of first decade of independence highlight another key Gramscian 
dichotomy between the state and civil society. The chapter will show Zanu-PF’s 
varying strategies between consent and coercion in establishing and maintaining its 
hegemony in the first decade of independence and an increasing reliance on coercion 
as dissent began to arise after the application of neo-liberal economic reforms. The 
chapter will seek to provide only as much economic and historical detail as is 
necessary to situate the hegemonic struggles in each of the above phases. These consist 
of the mode of production and the regime of accumulation which has defined it, 
dominant class interests as well as superstructural factors such as the institutions and 




Colonial political economy 
 
The territory between the Zambezi and Limpopo rivers and its population were 
irrevocably dragged into statehood and capitalist modes of production with the arrival 
of Cecil John Rhode’s British South Africa Company’s Pioneer Column in 
Mashonaland in 1890. The engagement of the African peasantry with the colonial 
political economy was due to the need to secure labour for the mining industry, which 
had vastly exaggerated the mineral resources of the territory by claiming the existence 
of a second gold-rich Rand. The most notable example of this drive to exploit African 
labour was seen in the British South Africa Company’s dual interests in both 
commercial exploitation and colonial administration. It sought to compel Africans to 
enter the labour force firstly by expropriating African land and stock while 
encouraging the dispossessed to remain as tenants and thereby commute their labour 
for rent. In addition, a hut tax of 10 shillings per hut was applied in 1894, thereby 
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forcing adult males to spend up to three months as paid labourers (Arrighi, 1966; 
Pakenham, 1991, p. 498; Van Onselen, 1976, p. 94). Van Onselen surmises that the 
combination of slave labour, taxation, alienation from the land, and competitive white 
commercial agriculture led to the proletarianisation of black labour. The number of 
Africans in wage employment in an industry that had not existed before 1890 had 
exploded to 14 000 by 1911, almost entirely through coercion. 
Giovanni Arrighi, in his seminal study of the political economy of Southern Rhodesia, 
determines the existence of five classes by the period preceding the Second World 
War: large-scale international capital, a white rural bourgeoisie, white wage workers, 
a petit bourgeoisie of white traders and a black African peasantry who had been 
coerced into becoming wage earners (Arrighi, 1966, p 42). The power of the white 
settlers in using the state to guarantee labour supply while also insulating racial 
economic competition would be seen most manifestly in the Land Apportionment Act 
of 1930. This Act and its results would ultimately reflect political economic 
contestation well into independence. The 1930 Act formally demarcated areas of 
settlement according to race, as European Areas, Native Areas, and three other 
categories: Undetermined, Forest Areas and Unassigned Area. The total area 
apportioned under Native Areas was 28.5 million acres of which 21 million constituted 
reserves while 7.5 million acres were apportioned to Africans who wished to purchase 
land to farm on an individual rather than communal basis. European Areas amounted 
to 49 million acres in 1930. Apart from the obviously disproportionate distribution of 
land the Act had specific effects on African agricultural output and competitiveness. 
Firstly, the Act confined Africans to poorer land resources which forced African 
peasants to move from shifting to continuous agriculture, which resulted in aggressive 
soil erosion and inevitably saw decreasing productivity. By converting those Africans 
who were not evicted from the land into becoming labour tenants, white farmers were 
able to guarantee labour supply while also reducing the marketable surplus of the 
peasantry as a whole. Finally, by racially dividing areas of occupation the Act 
effectively directed access to infrastructure away from black agriculture towards white 
farmers, thereby further increasing the differential in productivity (Arrighi, 1966, p. 
42; Yudelman, 1964, pp. 72-73; Stoneman, 1989, p. 13). The interventionist colonial 
state also controlled African competitiveness through discriminatory price policies 
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such as the Maize Control Act of 1931, while lack of access to credit and measures 
such as the Native Registration Act of 1936 restricted African hawkers to African 
locations (Arrighi, 1966, p. 43) The coalition of white wage workers and white 
bourgeoisie in maintaining the unequal competition of races was consolidated in 
colonial government policy under the Industrial Conciliation act of 1934. This Act 
explicitly excluded Africans from its definition of employees, and therefore hindered 
the chances of Africans to rise up the industrial ladder. It also ensured the scarcity 
value of white skilled workers by preventing Africans from acquiring certain skills. 
The terms of the Act restricted Africans from qualifying for apprenticeships or joining 
recognised trade unions while simultaneously curtailing the formation of African trade 




At their core, the colonial political and ideological superstructures reflected the 
institutionalisation and legitimation of the economic structure outlined above. Like 
Gramsci, Franz Fanon explains the interrelation of base and superstructure in the 
colonies by asserting that ‘the economic infrastructure is also a superstructure. The 
cause is effect’ (2004, p. 5). From the moment it conquered Mashonaland and 
Matabeleland the BSAC established a Native Affairs Department to handle African 
affairs, appointing European officials as native commissioners to oversee the social 
and economic lives of natives. The Native Affairs Department was primarily charged 
with forestalling rebellion after the First Chimurenga, and with ‘reconciling Africans 
to their status as hewers of wood and fetchers of water in the colonial order’ (West, 
2002, p. xxiii). Ndlovu-Gatsheni notes how for the BSAC to establish colonial 
hegemony it had to fulfil the tasks of learning local languages and understanding 
indigenous cultures as well as the broader African world view over which it had to 
inscribe its dominance. Accordingly, the Native Affairs Departments focused on rural 
areas and what they observed as traditional authorities (chiefs and headmen) whose 
stature they sought to bolster, in opposition to a would-be urban elite or African middle 
class. They were inspired, certainly at first, by a belief in white racial superiority and 
then by the need to maintain an uncontested position. Once the economy developed 
and Africans acquired skills and education, the BSAC administration and its successor 
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colonial state created a society permeated by a caste-like division between the settler 
(white Rhodesians) and the indigenes (Ndebele and Shona) (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009, 
p. 68). The creation of separate administrative units for Africans (managed by white 
commissioners) was thereby institutionalised in separate agricultural agencies, 
separate taxes, separate medical and social facilities, and separate rights and privileges 
(Yudelman, 1964). Apart from the above administrative segregation the electoral 
franchise was ostensibly colour blind; however, the qualifications of ‘civility’6 for the 
franchise meant that virtually all Europeans could vote while very few Africans 
qualified to do so. Indeed, only 60 black voters qualified for the franchise in 1923 and 
by 1948 only 258 black voters out of a total voter’s roll of 43 000 qualified to vote. 
Even this very low percentage was cause for consternation for almost the entire white 




The nationalist movement and African counter-hegemony 
 
The initial colonial occupation of the country had not been without resistance. In 1896, 
the measures of hut taxes and forced labour as well as a plague of rinderpest struck the 
region, triggering a period of resistance from both Shona and Ndebele peoples in the 
First Chimurenga. The rebellion, which had been inspired by traditional spirit 
mediums, lasted from 1896 to October 1897 when the spirit mediums of Kaguvi and 
Nehanda were executed (Keppel-Jones, 1983; Pakenham, 1991; Van Onselen, 1976). 
This First Chimurenga (meaning struggle in Shona) and the mediums of Kaguvi and 
Nehanda would inspire a nationalist armed struggle in the Second Chimurenga 
between 1967 and 1979. In a Gramscian sense, by articulating the African resentment 
towards colonialism and its economic and political impact, the spirit mediums of 




6 The  BSAC Reform of  1898 made no  reference to  race in  relation to  voting rights, offering the vote ‘to all 
males twenty- one years  of  age  or  older who  met  certain qualifications, namely, personal ownership of 
immovable property valued at £75 (which, significantly for Africans, excluded both cattle and communally 
owned land), or an annual income of £ 50 , plus the ability to write one' s name, address, and occupation in 
English’. 
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intellectuals in the struggle against the colonial historical bloc and colonial 
hegemony7. 
After the quelling of the First Chimurenga colonial authority would remain largely 
unchallenged until after the Second World War. For the black labour force, urban 
associationalism was mostly confined to Shona and Ndebele cultural associations, 
sports clubs, dance societies and burial societies. These reflected the transitory nature 
of the urban African existence in which black workers were required to straddle their 
rural and urban lives (Raftopulous, 2000). Apart from these social organisations, the 
Southern Rhodesia Bantu Voter’s Association was formed in 1923 with the intention 
of securing African voters on the voter’s roll. The SRVBA was strategically 
conservative, seeking only limited rights for the African elite, primarily voting rights 
for the few Africans who qualified, and individual ownership of property. The 
association certainly did not harbour any counter-hegemonic ambitions (Raftopulous 
& Yoshikuni, 1999). The first black trade union, the Industrial and Commercial 
Workers Union, was established in 1927; by 1931 it had grown to 5 000 members in 
13 branches across the country (Raftopulous, 1995). The ICU did not possess the 
formal structures of a trade union nor did it ever succeed in organising a strike, as it 
was arguably concerned more with the status of a minority of educated Africans. 
Nevertheless, the ICU faced repression that included the banning of its meetings and 
the imprisonment of its leaders, and by 1934 it had all but disappeared (Arrighi, 1966). 
Trade unionism resurfaced after the Second World War with the formation of the 
Reformed Industrial Commercial Workers Union (RICU) under the leadership of 
Charles Mzingeli. In 1946 the union successfully organised a protest against the Native 
(Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration Act which curtailed the movements 
of Africans in urban areas (Raftopulous, 1995, p. 84). The rise in political activity 
culminating in the railway strike of 1946 and a general strike in 1948 marked the 
coming of age of proletarian power, as the black urban population realised a decline 
in real wages and general living conditions (Raftopulous, 1995, p. 84; Yoshikuni, 
1991). Seen through a Gramscian methodological lens the post-Second World War 
 
 
7 David Lan and Terence Ranger have separately studied the moral leadership of spirit mediums in pre - colonial 
society as well as  how this leadership mobilised military struggle in  both  the  First Chimurenga  as well as 
the Second Chimurenga after 1966. 
54  
period represented an organic crisis in colonial hegemony as the system’s 
contradictions became evident not only in Rhodesia but throughout the colonised 
world. 
A new stage in African politics had first been evident in the formation of the Harare 
Youth League in August 1955 This was under the leadership of George Nyandoro, 
James Chikerema, Edson Sithole and Duduza Chisiza who were influenced by African 
nationalism in Kenya (Martin et Johnson, 1981). The most notable act of mobilisation 
by the Youth League was the bus boycott protesting against the rise in fares in 
September 1956 (Martin & Johnson, 1981; Raftopulous, 1995). In September 1957 the 
first country-wide nationalist movement, the Southern Rhodesia African National 
Congress (later the ANC) was formed under the leadership of Joshua Nkomo8. The 
formation of the ANC represented a shift in the nature and composition of African 
politics in Rhodesia from the more conservative and labour-based organisation of the 
RICU under the leadership of Charles Mzingeli to an increasingly radical national 
movement that had surfaced in the Harare youth league in 1956. This was led by a 
growing African intelligentsia which exhibited more of a national agenda and had 
become increasingly disenchanted with the potential for progress under the multi- 
racial policies of the Federation and the Todd administration (Raftopulous, 1995, p. 
86). By May 1958, the party had established 39 branches across the country and had a 
membership of over 6 000. The ANC focused its protests on the Native Land 
Husbandry Act, de-stocking, and the unpopular soil-bunding or Makandiwa 
conservation. The ANC’s focus on these apparently rural concerns reflected the 
bifurcated nature of African existence between rural and urban lives, and the inevitable 
union of rural and urban African political concerns which would define the nature of 
the nationalist movement from the early 1960s. 
Garfield Todd’s United Rhodesia Party lost the 1958 general election to Edgar 
Whitehead’s United Federal Party. This election had been perceived as a referendum 
 
8 Nkomo had been educated in South Africa before returning to Bulawayo in 1948 to work as a welfare  officer 
for Rhodesia Railways, where he soon became the president of the African Railway Employees Association 
(Ranger, 2014 , p. 195 ). Nkomo had cut his teeth as a prominent and articulate black employee of the railways;  
both his employers and the Southern Rhodesian government felt he would be a compliant African 
representative in the 1952 conference on the formation of the Federation of Rhodesia  and Nyasaland. He 
became a hero by walking out of the conference, thereby incurring the ire of the Rhodesia authori ties.  Nkomo 
was a successful trade unionist and became president of the Southern Rhodesia Trade Union Council.  
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on the policy of multi-racialism and ultimately put an end to black aspirations of 
partnership, leaving nationalism as the only available route towards eventual 
representation. In February 1959 a state of emergency was declared, the ANC was 
banned under the Unlawful Organisations Act and 307 members of the African 
National Congress were detained including Chikerema, Nyandoro, Hamadziripi, J Z 
Moyo and Sithole (Martin & Johnson, 1981, p. 66; Raftopulous, 1995, p. 90). In 
addition, the Law and Order Maintenance Act and the Emergency Powers Act were 
introduced in 1960. Both these laws would affect the nature of the counter-hegemonic 
struggles against the state both before and after independence. 
Following the banning of the ANC, the National Democratic Party (NDP) was formed 
on 1 January 1960. Its formation had been driven by senior ANC detainees from within 
prison. The new party chose Michael Mawema, the Provincial Organising Secretary 
of the Railway African Workers’ Union, as President. Nkomo had been in exile for 
over twenty months having avoided detention in 1959 as he had been outside the 
country (Martin & Johnson, 1981, p. 66). It was only upon his return in October 1960 
that he would be appointed as a compromise candidate after an NDP executive ballot 
had been split equally between Morton Malianga and Leopold Takawira. The NDP 
featured within its ranks a number of the intellectual elite who would become 
prominent in the politics of the liberation struggle. These included Herbert Chitepo, 
Tichafa Parirenyatwa, the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, Enoch Dumbuchena and 
Robert Mugabe9. This stage represents the rise to prominence of a class of organic 
intellectuals who, through their access to education, were able to articulate the 
concerns of the black people, both peasants and labourers. 
Some scholars emphasise the entry of petit bourgeois intellectuals into nationalist 
politics only after white politicians had indicated the limits of the liberal project, as an 
indicator of their reluctance towards radical change in the country (Moore, 1991). 
While this class had a degree of mobility and was ultimately destined to rule the state 
there was no question that they were organic to both the peasantry and the urban 
working class, given the interconnectedness of these classes in the colonial mode of 
production. Virtually all these men had been raised as peasants, had attended mission 
 
9 Mugabe had returned permanently to Rhodesia in 1960 from Ghana where he had been employed as a 
teacher. 
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schools and gone on to tertiary education in South Africa at the University of Fort 
Hare. While their petit bourgeois nature was reflected in their social mobility, they 
were still intrinsically organic to an economic system which relied on rural labour for 
urban work. The realities of rural life such as the soil bunding regulations, the Land 
Apportionment Act and de-stocking resonated with the whole black society and not 
just the rural population. 
What ultimately distinguished the entry of the educated young petit bourgeois elite 
from their predecessors was a question of counter-hegemonic strategy through military 
confrontation. This strategic dilemma within the nationalist movements became 
apparent at the federal constitutional talks held in Salisbury in January 1961. Nkomo, 
representing the NDP at the talks, had acquiesced to an electoral system which would 
have guaranteed Africans only 15% of the seats in the national legislature despite the 
agreement by the NDP executive to insist on parity. The decision was met with anger 
from the NDP executive and Nkomo was forced to retract his position on the franchise. 
The NDP boycotted the referendum on the 1961 proposals and as a result the party 
was banned on 9 December 1961. Nkomo’s capitulation at the conference as well as 
his earlier engagement in the federal constitutional conference and his failed attempt 
to run for a parliamentary seat would continue to haunt him, as nationalists constructed 
a mythology of bravery and cowardice around the strategic decisions to either confront 
or cooperate with the Rhodesian regime (Martin & Johnson, 1981; Ranger, 2009). 
The Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) was formed ten days after the banning 
of the NDP. For Mugabe, the most significant change in approach after the formation 
of ZAPU in 1961 was ‘the deliberate abandonment of the methods of strikes, 
demonstrations and passive resistance as “official” means of struggle’ (Mugabe, 1979, 
p. 40). He explains that the reason for abandoning these methods was ‘the extent to 
which they expose thousands of defenceless supporters to wanton shooting, arrest, 
torture and intimidation by the racist police’. ZAPU therefore called for a new policy 
of resistance which consisted of extensive sabotage of white commercial interests 
including farms, industrial and commercial concerns using ‘any available destructive 
means’. The objective, Mugabe would later state, was ‘to push Britain to a 
constitutional conference to negotiate a settlement which would yield universal 
suffrage and therefore lead to majority rule’ (Mugabe, 1983, p.42). In 1962 the ZAPU 
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executive council made key decisions on how to achieve this objective. Firstly, the 
party would begin to smuggle arms into the country and train young men outside the 
country on how to commit acts of sabotage; and secondly, should the party be banned 
they would operate underground rather than regroup under a new name (Martin & 
Johnson, 1981, p. 69). When ZAPU was banned in 1962, Nkomo was in Zambia 
whereas most of the party’s leaders in Rhodesia were detained, including Takawira 
and Mugabe (ibid.). When Nkomo proposed the idea of forming a government in exile 
based in Dar es Salam and then attended the conference to end the Federation in June 
1963, the other members of the ZAPU executive lost confidence in his leadership, 
citing his previous vacillation and reluctance to confront the settler governments. 
The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland dissolved in 1964 in an atmosphere 
typified on one hand by the rise of African resistance stimulated by insufficient and 
unwelcome reforms. On the other hand, there was a reactionary shift to the right in 
Southern Rhodesian white politics under the Rhodesian Front who vehemently 
opposed the reforms of both the Federation, and the general wave of decolonisation 
and majority rule in Africa. The Rhodesian Front Party under the leadership of Ian 
Smith had come to power in 1962, aiming to maximise white settler power and prevent 
any hope of majority government in Rhodesia. They were also determined to attain 
full independence from Britain (Du Toit, 1995). The Smith regime’s Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence (UDI) for Rhodesia was made on 11 November 1965. 
The Rhodesian Front Government put into place policies that maximised European 
political and economic power through segregation. For instance, the movement of 
Africans into urban areas was subjected to rigorous control though the local 
government areas regulations 1964, the African Urban Areas Registration Act, and the 
equivalent to the South African pass laws, the African Registration and Identification 
Act (1973). Social segregation of races within towns was established through the 
Municipal Amendment Act of 1967 which created separate public amenities (Du Toit, 
1995). The delivery of public goods provided a very high standard of living to white 
Rhodesians at the expense of the black population. This was patently evident with 
regards to health care, education, and public service employment. In 1965, the 
differences between white and black wage rates were at a ratio of 10:1, the ratio of 
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public expenditure on education exceeded 12:1 in favour of the whites (Du Toit, 1995, 
p. 91; Clarke, 1975, p. 5). 
The Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union (ZANU) was formed on 8 August 1963 with 
Ndabaningi Sithole as president, Leopold Takawira as vice-president, Robert Mugabe 
secretary-general and Morton Malianga as secretary for youth. Nkomo remained the 
president of ZAPU. The tribal cleavage that would characterise the nationalist 
movement began as Nkomo was Ndebele and as such had a loyal following in 
Bulawayo, whereas the new leadership of ZANU were all Shona10. The split in the 
party immediately triggered violence within the nationalist movement, and Tekere 
recounts that Chikerema led crowds into Highfields location and attacked the houses 
of the new ZANU leadership including those of Mugabe, Takawira and Enos Nkala. 
Owing to the fighting taking place in Salisbury and Bulawayo, ZANU’s first structures 
were established in Gweru. Violence within the movement would become a defining 
trait within the movement in the 17 years of independence struggle that would follow, 
and this would continue into the movement’s leadership of the state. 
In 1964 both ZAPU and ZANU were banned and their leaders were imprisoned. The 
ZANU leadership, including Ndabaningi Sithole, Robert Mugabe, Leopold Takawira, 
Edgar Tekere, Basoppo Moyo, Simon Muzenda and Crispen Mandizvidza were 
imprisoned at Whawha, while the ZAPU leadership of Joshua Nkomo, Chinamano 
and Madzimbamuto were detained at Gonakudzingwa prison. While imprisoned the 
ZANU leadership remained committed to the strategy of armed conflict. Describing 
the tactical approach of the organisation with which he would become synonymous 
for over half a century, Mugabe notes: ‘whereas the methods of pressure employed 
hitherto had eschewed the use of direct force upon the enemy, ZANU became the first 
nationalist organisation to choose armed struggle as the chief means of subduing the 




10 The identification of ZAPU with the Ndebele was not entirely clear, as a number of prominent Shonas 
(including Chikerema, Nyandoro, Chinamano and Madzimbamuto) remained in ZAPU leadership.  A  similar 
identity cleavage would take place when Ndabaningi Sithole was removed from his post in ZANU. After 
independence his ZANU-Ndonga party would successfully garner realistic support only  from Sithole’s Ndau 
tribe in their regional stronghold of Chipinge. 
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In 1964 most of the nationalist leadership were in prison and the first guerrilla recruits 
were sent abroad for training. ZANU’s set of five guerrillas was sent to China for six 
months for both military as well as ideological training11. Other groups would follow 
these five, initially for training in Ghana, Tanzania and Egypt as well as to the Nanking 
Academy in Peking, China, where they received training in mass mobilisation, 
training, strategy and tactics. Josiah Tongogara, who was to become the commander 
of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), ZANU’s military 
wing, trained at the Nanking Academy in early 1966. Tongogara had realised from his 
training in China that it was vital to mobilise the masses whom guerrillas would meet 
(Martin & Johnson, 1981, p. 11). This strategy would be central to ZANLA’s military 
progress but would also explain ZANU’s approaches to maintaining hegemony after 
independence. 
The reality of detention combined with the strategy of armed conflict would have a 
significant impact on the nature of the nationalist movement. Leadership of the 
movement drew on the black intelligentsia (educated petit bourgeoisie) and as a result 
of the armed struggle the movement would rely heavily on the nation’s peasantry. This 
accounted for why the movement became less reliant on a politicised labour movement 
and thus the nature of the counter-hegemonic struggle, as well as the nature of post- 
independence nationalist hegemony. In addition, as most of the nationalist leadership 
would remain in prison for a decade, the internal dynamics of the movement therefore 
took place in extremely close quarters and had an intimate nature as these individuals 
were living physically close to each other in prison. Mandaza, in interviews, points to 
how prison life often forced a reliance on closer clan and regional identities as even 
within the ZANU Shona groups, Zezuru, Karanga, Manyika and Ndau identities 
became important. He infers that these tribal allegiances arose during a period of 
internal conflict in the party and would continue to do so even fifty years later in the 
ZANU succession battles of the 2010s. These prison politics would crystallise in 1968 
when, after an interrogation by the Special Branch, Ndabaningi Sithole agreed to 
disengage ZANU from the armed struggle and work ‘constitutionally’ in exchange for 
 
 
11 This group was led by Emmerson Mnangagwa who held a central position in ZANU’s  military  and political 
wings. He was a central ZANU -PF actor after independence, becoming minister of defence and  vice president 
in 2014 . He  was a  key antagonist in  ZANU’s s uccession battles after 2013 and  ultimately, as Mugabe’s 
ouster, he became president of Zimbabwe in 2018 . 
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his release and that of the ZANU leadership from prison. The other five members of 
the ZANU executive in Connemara prison saw Sithole’s apparent decision to engage 
in talks as a betrayal of their struggle and of the ZANLA recruits. As a result, Edgar 
Tekere moved a motion to remove Sithole. With Morton Malianga as chair and 
therefore unable to vote, Enos Nkala, Maurice Nyagumbo and Edgar Tekere voted to 
remove Sithole and replace him with Mugabe, who was secretary-general of the party 
and next in line after the death of the party’s vice-president Leopold Takawira. Thus, 
by a vote of three to one, conducted in a prison cell, and with one abstention (Mugabe 
himself), Robert Mugabe became president of ZANU and would remain so for over 
half a century (Tekere, 2007). 
 
 
The Second Chimurenga: armed struggle as counter-hegemonic strategy 
 
The Smith regime’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) for Rhodesia was 
made on 11 November 1965. The Rhodesian Front Government put into place policies 
that maximised European political and economic power through segregation. Again, 
the most outstanding area of inequality was in relation to land tenure. Under the Land 
Tenure Act of 1969, 39 million hectares of land were apportioned in equal amounts 
between the African and European populations. 15.6 million hectares of the European 
land was allocated for farming, with the land owned privately by individuals or local 
and transnational companies (Moyo, 2002, p. 83). However, land designated for 
Africans remained for the most part communally owned as tribal trust lands. The fact 
that the African population was at this point 4.75 million, while that of the whites was 
250,000, certainly highlights the grossly inequitable nature of land distribution. This 
situation caused major environmental and social repercussions as overgrazing and 
over-population on land mostly deemed to be ‘totally unsuitable for farming’ meant 
that white land owners were reaping far more rewards from greater tracts of land 
(Clarke, 1975, p. 2). What is more, the Rhodesian state instituted highly unpopular 
regulations controlling the conduct of Africans in the tribal trust lands through 
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regulations that controlled land use in the communal lands, enforcing tree planting 
measures, soil bunding and irrigation schemes. This generated further insecurity 
among blacks leading to resistance to land management programmes, and further calls 
for the return of alienated land (Du Toit, 1995; Moyo, 1995). 
While the British Government outwardly opposed the UDI regime, its commitment to 
confronting the system was unclear. The option of military intervention by Britain at 
the time of UDI was largely opposed by British public opinion and the Labour 
Government of Harold Wilson, who perceived the use of force to end Rhodesian UDI 
as an attack on ‘kith and kin’. However, faced with economic sanctions, Rhodesia’s 
state-controlled and highly corporatist economic policy of import substitution 
industrialisation was introduced in order to counteract dependence on imports. The 
policy brought about high economic growth which buoyed the UDI regime between 
1965 and 1973 (Jenkins, 1997). Given their common purpose of obstructing majority 
rule, South Africa’s apartheid regime also provided substantial economic support to 
the Rhodesian Government after UDI. 
Importantly, in the years preceding UDI, the Rhodesian Front Government set up 
highly effective and extremely repressive state machinery against the threat of rising 
African nationalist resistance. This was done through the enactment of security laws 
by amendments to the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act (1960), Emergency Powers 
Amendment Act of 1967 and the Official Secrets Act (Du Toit, 1995). These laws 
considerably impeded the functioning of the African nationalist movements as non- 
violent movements. By the early 1970s both liberation parties had come to accept an 
armed struggle as the only effective means of defeating oppressive and intransigent 
elements of colonialism and racism. 
 
The first armed confrontation between ZANLA guerrillas and Rhodesian forces took 
place in Sinoia (Chinoyi) on 15 March 1967.  Earlier armed action by Zimbabwean 
nationalists included Emmerson Mnangagwe blo9wjg up of a train; in late 1964.  
Though the Sinoia encounter was a total defeat for ZANLA, the battle which resulted 
in the deaths of seven of a group of 21 guerrillas was of immense political and 
psychological significance for the movement. In July 1967 ZAPU’s Zimbabwe 
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People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), with the support of South Africa’s African 
National Congress, launched its first attack in Hwange (Martin et al. 1981) .This battle 
also ended in significant losses for ZIPRA as thirty-one guerrillas were killed and 
another thirty wounded, while the Rhodesian forces had seven men killed and fourteen 
wounded. By the end of the decade most of the trained guerrillas had been either killed 
or captured and both nationalist movements were forced to reconsider their tactics 
(Martin & Johnson, 1981, p. 12). The strategy and ideological approach of each party 
would also be influenced by the international backing each group received. From the 
early 1960s ZAPU, as the most prominent nationalist movement, had received most of 
its support from the Soviet bloc while ZANU was backed by China. David Martin and 
Phyllis Johnson (1981) make the case that a defining moment for the struggle was the 
decision of ZAPU leadership to decline the overtures from Samora Machel’s Front for 
the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) to join forces and launch an entry into 
Rhodesia from Tete. ZANU had not been an obvious ally of FRELIMO. In fact, ZAPU 
had been the more prominent of the two liberation movements. Because of its inclusion 
in the Soviet- supported ‘authentic’ African liberation movements which included 
FRELIMO, the South African ANC, the MPLA in Angola and SWAPO in Namibia, 
it was expected that ZAPU would join FRELIMO in Mozambique. However, once 
ZAPU declined to use Tete as its rear base with the support of FRELIMO, ZANLA 
was then free to conduct their war from Mozambique as they did from July 1970 
(Martin & Johnson, 1981, p .20). 
 
 
Ideology and the nationalist movement 
 
With the rise to prominence of the educated young elites, the nationalist movement 
began to espouse a Marxist-Leninist ideology. Much of the analysis of the nationalist 
movement’s superstructural attributes both as a counter-hegemonic force and then as 
the governing class, constitutes a hermeneutical study of the party and its leadership’s 
true commitment to socialism. This has largely pointed to the leadership’s lukewarm 
commitment to socialism (Moore, 1991; Herbst, 1990; Mandaza, 1986; Dashwood, 
2000; Chung, 2006). In analysing the role of ideology in the nationalist movement and 
the liberation war it is important to remember Gramsci’s analytical formulation of 
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hegemony as the continuum between consent and coercion, as well as the observation 
that ideology serves both a theoretical and a strategic function. The nationalist’s 
devotion to socialism was arguably due to the zeitgeist of national liberation on the 
continent and the dominance of Marxist ideologies as the driving force behind change 
on the continent. Socialism certainly provided a utopian normative horizon for the 
post-colonial era, which inspired the Zimbabwean nationalists and their followers as 
much as it did virtually all anti-colonial movements. The fact that the USSR and China 
were among the only international actors supporting these movements also tempered 
the nationalist’s inclination towards either brand of socialism. The writings of Lenin 
and Mao, Guevara, Cabral and the inspiration of Ho Chi Minh also provided a clear, 
counter-hegemonic, military strategy for how to bring about change. The practical 
application of military strategy and the accompanying offers of arms, funding, training 
and forward operating bases in frontline states also made devotion to socialism 
(however superficial) particularly practical. This was also a result of the Western 
support for racist regimes in South Africa, and the blind eye turned towards the 
Rhodesian post-UDI white supremacists. The perception of counter-hegemony as 
being both military and ideological is evident in Mugabe’s characterisation of the 
movement’s counter-hegemonic struggle: ‘We firmly believe that power is not only 
political but is also military. The people’s votes and the people’s guns are inseparable 
twins’ (Mugabe, 1983). 
Writing in the decade following independence, Mandaza was not convinced that the 
leadership of the nationalist movement had ever been sincerely committed to socialism 
(1986, p. 29). He observes instead that the movement was initially reformist in 
character, and subsequently evolved towards a radical nationalism that sought to 
overthrow white settler colonialism and thereby win independence. The difference 
here was an emphasis on the tactics needed to bring about majority rule rather than an 
ideological inclination. Mandaza continues (1986, p. 30): 
it was this militancy, this belief that only through armed struggle could independence be won, 
that mobilised the Zimbabwean masses into the motive force of the struggle itself. In turn, it 
was the certainty of the demise of the colonial system which gave momentum to the struggle. 
Despite this tactical preoccupation Mandaza argues that there was ‘no historical 
evidence to suggest, as others have been keen to extrapolate from this momentous 
process of the liberation struggle, that this armed struggle encompassed within it even 
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the idea of a socialist revolution’.   Another point made by Mandaza and demonstrated 
by Martin and Johnson in their chronicle of the Second Chimurenga is that among the 
guerrillas themselves, there was less evidence of Marxist ideological fervour than of 
adherence to traditional and supernatural beliefs. Thus, it was the symbols of the First 
Chimurenga, the spirit mediums of Mbuya Nehanda and Sekuru Kaguvi, which became 
the inspiration for the bravery and relentless determination in the minds and hearts of the 
guerrillas rather than Marx, Engels or Lenin (Mandaza, 1986; Tekere, 2006, p. 78). A 
similar observation has been made by Ranger about Nkomo’s leadership of ZAPU as 
reflecting the feudal legacy of the Ndebele kingdom, with Nkomo representing a 
reincarnation of the Ndebele monarchs Lobengula and Mzilikazi. Ranger’s own work on 
the First Chimurenga, particularly his Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, as one commentator 
has noted, itself “helped to feed the nationalist invention of a continuous thread of anti-
colonial struggle” (Brian Raftopoulos, 1999, 117), later academic critiques of his work 
notwithstanding. Ranger had apparently exaggerated the role of the Mwari sprirt medium 
cult, and over-stressed its supra-ethnic or unified dimension. 
Strategy and tactics of the war 
 
With most of the nationalist movement’s political leadership in prison, the struggle 
was divided between its political and military leadership as field commanders like 
Josiah Tongogara established bases and began waging war against the Rhodesian 
military in 1967. ZANU’s military wing the Zimbabwe African National Liberation 
Army (ZANLA) had established itself in Mozambique in 1970, while the military 
wing of ZAPU, the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), formed a front 
in Zambia. The bifurcation of the military and political wings of the struggle would 
prove problematic both strategically and ideologically once the political leaders were 
released from prison and joined the military leadership at the front. 
The armies first mobilised through political rallies known as pungwes run at night with 
ZANLA commissars politicising the peasantry. Appeals and recruitment were made 
referring to the resonant issues of land alienation, together with the evident inequality, 
racism and oppression of the white settler state, and colonialism. Spirit mediums took 
such as Fact and Zimbabwe News spread socialist ideology in both urban and rural 
African areas. Describing the daily routine of guerrillas at the Mgagao camp in 
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Tanzania, Martin and Johnson note that following exercises and a 16-mile run, 
guerrillas underwent political education every morning. This included an inculcation 
of ‘National Grievances’ as outlined in ZANU’s political manual Mwenje which had 
been drawn up by members of the high command. These grievances focused on 
‘dealing with deprivation of land, limitations in the number of cattle a family could 
keep, restrictions on education and job opportunities, and the inferior African health 
service’ (Martin & Johnson, 1981, p. 81). Political education also focused on the 
writings of Marx, Lenin and Mao. These theories, particularly Maoism, were more 
useful in relation to strategic mass mobilisation than as broader normative political 
theory. Tongogara, quoted in Martin and Johnson, noted that the first cadres sent into 
north-eastern Zimbabwe were more political commissars than guerrilla fighters. Fay 
Chung notes in her memoir of the Second Chimurenga that despite his military interest 
in the strategic contributions of Maoism in China Tongogara ‘never made any 
pretensions to intellectualism and had read little of Marx and Lenin’ (Chung, 2006, 
p.131) 
As the war escalated the peasant population were caught between guerrillas and the 
Rhodesian security forces. Early academic analysis of the war argued that peasant 
participation in the war was informed by historical memories of conquest; alienation 
and official agrarian interference during the 1930s, and that generalised peasant 
disaffection and memories shaped the liberation movement and its strategy (Ranger, 
1981, p. 182). This truly was a “Second Chimurenga”. Guerrillas very often depended 
on the rural population for food and other resources, as well as for recruits. But 
resources were often taken forcibly (Mclaughlin, 1996; Sithole, 1999). In addition, 
ZANLA and ZIPRA coerced young men and women to join, setting up revolutionary 
courts to punish collaborators. The coercive aspects of guerrilla mobilisation are the 
subject of a key study by Norma Kriger which in particular addressed ways in which 
“internal conflicts within peasant communities motivated revolutionary participation”, 
especially conflicts along lines of gender and generation (1992, p. 240). Ranger later 
joined another critic of his earlier work to help write a history of the warfare and 
conflict in Matabeleland, in which the liberation war is projected as a struggle that 
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featured internecine conflict (Alexander, McGregor and Ranger,2000, p. 8). Once an 
area had been liberated its inhabitants would be ‘regularly organised and politicised 
through political consciousness and an awareness of the party’s revolutionary goals, 
the correctness of the party line, the nature of antagonistic forces at play and the 
deviationism in the present situation in the country’ (Mugabe, 1979, p. 20). The 
guerrilla concept of capturing and maintaining liberated zones both in a coercive sense 
as well as through ideological indoctrination would become the modus operandi for 
Zanu-PF. It was re-employed after independence when the party was driven to defend 
its position against a robust opposition party. The roots of post-war coercive tactics in 
the liberation struggle were noted by Masipula Sithole (2000): 
The liberation struggle also left a significant mark on Zimbabwe’s political culture. The 
commandist nature of mobilisation and politicisation under clandestine circumstances gave 
rise to the politics of intimidation and fear. Opponents were viewed in warlike terms, as 





The manner in which the nationalist movement and in particular ZANLA dealt with 
internal rebellion is instructive of the internal schisms in relation to strategy, ideology 
and to a degree tribal identity. It is also a pointer as to how the movement dealt with 
dissent and ultimately would continue to deal with opposition after independence. The 
most notable instance of internal schisms within ZANU and ZANLA occurred when 
disaffected young ZANLA field commanders, known as the Nhari group after their 
leader Thomas Nhari, began a rebellion within ZANLA and kidnapped members of 
the ZANU leadership in Zambia.  Nhari’s and his associates’ grievances stemmed 
from tactical differences with the ZANU command as well as Nhari’s subjection to a 
beating when he originally raised his objections; a humiliation for any field 
commander (Tendi, 2017, pp. 143-159).  The rebellion was put down in 1974 by 
Tongogara and the leaders of the rebellion were executed by firing squad on his orders. 
The ensuing tribal distrust between Manyikas and Zerurus, who made up a significant 
proportion of Nhari rebels and ZANLA’s mostly Karanga commanders including 
Tongogara, has been cited as the potential motive behind the assassination of Herbert 
Chitepo, Chairman of ZANU’s war council.  
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Other versions, more conveniently, identify manipulative white Rhodesians as the 
prime culprits (White, 2003, 12). White’s own study examines a range of different 
answers to the question of who might have killed Herbert Chitepo. While she does not 
claim to evaluate each theory for Chitepo’s murder, her analysis suggests that factional 
conflict within ZANU was more complicated and more profound than the intra-elite 
rivalries described by John Saul (Saul, 1979, p.113). David Moore argues that the main 
tensions within ZANU at the time of the Chitepo killing were due to the consolidation 
of a new cohort of well-educated soldiers in the training camps “holding clandestine 
(because forbidden) seminars… on the classics of Marx, Lenin and Mao” and their 
impatience of an “authoritarian populist ‘old guard’ led by Tongogara” (Moore, 1991, 
p. 491).  A second challenge to the established ZANU leadership came from the 
Vashandi (workers) group, in 1976-1977.  Chung attributes an ideological factor to 
this assertion, describing the rebels as ‘a group of young Marxists who realised that 
their commanders were not only ignorant of, but also totally indifferent to Marxism’ 
(2006, p. 90).  They also had complaints about predatory sexual behaviour (Parpart, 
2015, p. 317).  Mugabe presided over a disciplinary tribunal which ended in the 
Vashandi group’s imprisonment in Mozambique until 1980, by ZANU’s harsh 
standards relatively lenient treatment.  A more general study of the operation of 
ZANLA’s internal disciplinary structures has identified in the guerrilla army’s internal 
history “a growing tendency.. to celebrate ‘the gun’ under the guise of restoring order”. 
In this view, “military measures” that checked internal rebellions “shaped ZANU as a 
political party in the following years” (Mazarire, 2011, p. 572). 
This final phase of Zimbabwe’s colonial history has since 2000 been subjected to an 
official “patriotic” narrative broadcast on television and radio and projected in schools 
and in the Youth Militia camps, instituted in 2001. This is a story which privileges 
former combatants as the true national heroes, an assignment which followed 
extensive parliamentary debates during the 1990s about who should qualify for veteran 
benefits and state funerals (Kriger, 2006, pp. 1155-1160). It is a version in which the 
liberation encampments are citadels of unity: it is a history that has no space for the 
internal or fratricidal struggles of the kind detailed by David Moore or Masipula Sithole 
(1984, pp. 117-125). In this militarist saga, primarily political leaders such as Robert 
Mugabe himself, are “reinscribed” as military men (White, 2003, 96). In this narrative, 
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racial categories, as opposed to any other kind of social classification, as might be used 
by Marxists, for example, enjoys pride of place. As one critical reader of Zimbabwean 
history has noted, a central problem in Zimbabwean historiographical debates has been 
the issue of “relating nationalist hegemony to difference, and discourses of unity to the 
contradictions born out of the struggles and varying perspectives of subordinate 
classes” (Raftopoulos, 1999, p. 116). In this patriotic history, amongst Africans, there 
are patriots and sell-outs, the latter group who through the projecting of the “Second 
Chimurenga” as primarily a struggle for land (rather than for a range of human rights 
and entitlements) can also embrace modern opponents of the continuing struggle for 
land, that is the post 2000 land seizures, or “Third Chimurenga”. Hence, the ZANU-
PF’s political opposition can be grouped in the “sell- out” camp. So for example in the 
militia camps, “war veterans” would insist that anyone voting for the MDC was in 
effect voting for “the whites” to reoccupy the country (Solidarity Peace Trust quoted 
in Ranger 2004: 219). In this history today’s political conflict is a continuation of the 
liberation war, and its youthful participants are already veterans. It was an historical 
narrative that drew upon the earlier work of academic historians such as Terence 
Ranger, but offered its insights in a condensed and vulgarised from: as Ranger himself 
observed “I recognised the outlines of many of my own books but boiled down in the 
service of ZANU/PF” (Ranger, 2004, p.218). And indeed, at least one of Zimbabwe’s 
patriotic historians, Aneas Chigwedere, Robert Mugabe’s Minister of Education, in 
his earlier publications acknowledges Ranger’s influence on his own work on pre-
colonial history (Ranger, 2005: 224). The patriotic history includes other key features: 
the reference to it being a British colony until 1980, a characterisation that fitted in 
with the then current ZANU-PF demonology of Tony Blair (White, 2003, p 97) 
 
 
The Lancaster House Agreement 
 
The end of Zimbabwe’s colonial history and the framework on which the post-colonial 
state was established took place at the Lancaster House Conference, which opened on 
12 September 1979. The Rhodesian state and the guerrillas had fought to a stalemate 
and negotiations were brought about through joint Anglo-American efforts by the 
Carter Administration and the Thatcher government. The conference was held 
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between 10 September and 15 December 1979, and its outcome was certainly one of 
compromise borne out of a military stalemate. Ibbo Mandaza, himself a ZANU 
delegate to the conference, argued that the outcome of the conference and the 
compromises the Patriotic Front made reflected ‘a result less than that which might 
have been expected of a national liberation movement had it won outright victory on 
the battlefield’ (1986). The conference established a ceasefire and a route towards 
elections while also enshrining a constitution that would provide a framework for the 
establishment of liberal democracy, but also modes of accumulation which would 
characterise the post-independence dispensation. 
The Constitution’s Bill of Rights guaranteed freedom of speech and association. It 
was, however, the clauses on the ‘Freedom from the Deprivation of Property’ which 
would mitigate against any large-scale economic redistribution. The fact that the bill 
of rights could only be amended by a 100% majority in parliament for the first ten 
years from 1980 guaranteed white control of the economy. As such the government 
would be restricted from acquiring property other than on a willing buyer-willing seller 
basis, and compensation had to be remittable in foreign exchange. Though as Astrow 
(1983) notes: 
the cost of buying the estimated 40-60% of European land not being fully utilized would be 
so high that even if a new government of Zimbabwe were committed to implementing a 
comprehensive land resettlement programme under the constitution it would find it well-nigh 
impossible to carry it out. 
 
In addition, the Lancaster House Constitution guaranteed the independence of the civil 
service and the military which were crucial concerns for white settler communities. 
These concessions, in the form of constitutional safeguards for white settlers, were for 
commentators such as Mandaza and Raftopoulos (1988): 
synonymous with a neo-colonial plan for Zimbabwe...the retention of white settler economic 
power as a safeguard for the continued efficient exploitation of material and human resources, 
the retention of such military machinery as would inspire the “confidence” and “maintain the 
high standards” of both the white settler element itself and the imperialist world as a whole. 
 
In a Gramscian sense Zimbabwe’s post-independence history can be categorised as 
passive revolution in that while the governing class changed, economic relations 
remained to a great degree static. For Moore, despite the rhetoric of socialism and the 
74  
protracted military struggle waged by the guerrillas, the struggle for hegemony by the 
nationalist movement amounted to ‘the prolonged effort of the African intelligentsia 
to persuade local and international ruling groups that it indeed was worthy of the state 
– that leading nationalists were fit to act as organic intellectuals or the hegemonic 
organisers for capital’. This analysis is borne out to a degree in analysing ZANU 
hegemony in the decades following independence. 
 
Post-independence historical blocs 
 
Zanu-PF won the 1980 elections by a clear majority, securing 57 of the 80 seats open 
for black contestation while PF ZAPU took 20 seats. Bishop Abel Muzorewa’s UANC 
dropped from 51 seats in the 1979 election to 3. The UANC’s is a conclusive indicator 
of the extent to which the nationalists held ideological sway with the black population. 
Ian Smith’s Rhodesia front took all 20 seats reserved for the white minority. The 
Lancaster House Constitution provided for a bicameral parliamentary legislature 
consisting of the House of Assembly and the Senate. The House of Assembly 
comprised 100 members. Of these, 80 were elected on the common voter’s roll, while 
the remaining 20 were elected by white voters from a separate roll. The Senate was 
made up of 40 members: 14 elected by an electoral college consisting of the members 
of the house, 10 elected by members of the house from the white roll; 10 chiefs 
appointed by the Council of Chiefs and the remaining 6 elected by the president. The 
executive consisted of the prime minister and the cabinet with a president as 
ceremonial head of state (Du Toit, 1995). Mugabe, as prime minister, made 
reconciliatory overtures to the white population immediately after winning the 
election. In a speech at independence he called for drawing a line on the past and 
turning ‘swords to ploughshares’. In practical terms this reconciliatory atmosphere 
was reflected in a new coalition government which counted 5 PF-ZAPU ministers and 
2 white ministers. The appointment as Minister for Agriculture of Denis Norman, the 
former leader of the Commercial Farmers Union, was of particular symbolic 
importance in relation to maintaining the economic structures intact. Certainly, the 
safeguards of white capital interests in the new Zimbabwe went beyond the symbolic 
appointment of ministers. 
In its first major policy document published in 1981, Growth with Equity, the new 
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government indicated that its major policy objectives upon coming to power in 1980 
were threefold. Firstly, consolidating state power and creating conditions of peace and 
national unity; secondly embarking on a vigorous resettlement, reconstruction, and 
rehabilitation programme; and thirdly laying down the political, economic and social 
bases for the transition to socialism (Dashwood, 2000). The dilemma of ‘laying down 
the social bases for the transition to socialism’ while maintaining growth in a system 
designed to protect white economic interests would prove to be the central 
contradiction of Zimbabwe’s post-independence political economy. This was 
particularly so as the sincerity of the new ruling elite had always been questionable 
and would be even less credible as this class transformed from a petit bourgeois 
intelligentsia to a state-based bourgeoisie. EA Brett characterises the first decade of 
independence as a corporatist policy regime created by the settler state, to which some 
redistributive elements were added (Brett, 2005, p. 6). Similarly, Dashwood assesses 
the Zanu-PF government’s approach as a combination of a nationalist development 
strategy that entailed state interventionist controls inherited from the colonial period, 
to which very strong social welfarist elements were added. This latter element 
implemented was through a commitment to social equity in terms of income 
distribution and improving the quality of life for the poor (Dashwood, 2000, p. 29). 
In practical terms, the first administrative step for the new government was to place 
competent and trusted Africans in the bureaucracy. At the time of independence, of 
the 10 570 established posts in the public service, only 3 368 (32%) of these were held 
by black people, none of which was above the post of senior administrative officer. In 
addition, the white exodus was at a rate of 1 500 persons per month; and between 
independence and October 1981, 32 000 white citizens had departed (Mandaza, 1986,  
p. 48). Zimbabwe’s white population, which had peaked in 1961 at 270 000 or 5,6% 
of the population, shrank to about 110 000 in 1982, following the exodus of whites in 
the years following independence. The recruitment of Africans, mostly into lower-
level positions, had begun under the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia (Muzorewa-Smith) 
settlement. As the public service expanded dramatically, by 1983 the number of blacks 
employed as civil servants had risen to 17 693. By the end of the first decade of 
independence, the service had grown to 95 000, the majority of whom were black (Du 
Toit, 1995, p. 121). 
76  
The new government set about immediately to focus on the development of the rural 
areas. Rural development was partly achieved through limited land redistribution and 
state control of prices of agricultural products. Reforms were instituted to support 
African farmers in the production of maize which had up until this point been the 
monopoly of commercial farmers. Through finance from the Agricultural Finance 
Corporation (AFC) and the Zimbabwean Grain Marketing Board (GMB) commercial 
crops were increasingly produced in the former Tribal Trust Areas (Herbst, 1990). 
The new government also set about redressing the racial inequality that had typified 
the Rhodesian health care system. In order to provide more equitable health facilities, 
the health system was decentralised, eliminating regional and ethnic biases and 
providing health centres to the rural population. Each province had a medical 
directorate with strong emphasis on primary health care. Infant mortality declined 
rapidly by 120 deaths per 1 000 live births in 1980, to 83 within 2 years (Brett, 1999, 
p. 7). 
 
Deracialisation of the education system and massive adult literacy campaigns were 
launched, and by the end of the 1980’s Zimbabwe’s education system was the envy of 
many other African countries which had long been independent. Universal free 
education was launched at primary level and government secondary level. Public 
expenditure on education was 18 million Zimbabwe Dollars a year between 1980 and 
1985, despite the recession of 1982 and 1984 (Dashwood, 2000, p. 41). 
Secondaryschool enrolment increased from 73 000 in 1979 to 550 000 in 1985, while 
enrolmentat the University of Zimbabwe expanded by 200% from 1 481 students in 
1979 to 4 
482 in 1985 (Brett, 1999, p. 7; Du Toit, 1995, p. 129). 
 
Herbst asserts that the government did embark on a number of policies which it 
labelled socialist, such as the increase in social services, increased access to land and 
the installation of the minimum wage. However, these were all actions which had been 
put in place by previous governments to benefit the white population and therefore 
could not be considered as socialist per se (1990, p. 227). Indeed, it is evident that 
market forces, though distinctly corporatist in nature, held primacy in post- 
independence Zimbabwean structures. Hence just as white governments had made 
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policies intended to protect white constituencies – or socialism for whites as Herbst 
argues – so too did post-independence Zimbabwean government make policies 
intended to serve its supporters, albeit a significantly larger constituency. Dashwood 
argues that: 
Even without the provisions of the constitution, it is doubtful that the new leaders would have 
proceeded with a truly socialist transformation. The policy of reconciliation reflected 
Mugabe’s recognition that, although his government aspired to root itself in the peasantry, the 
vitality of the productive sectors of the economy would have to be ensured if the government’s 




Changes in the configuration of class since 1980 
 
The class compromise resulted in the petit bourgeois nationalist leadership gaining 
access to the state. This meant that while the state’s institutions were intended not to 
challenge the central interests of the agrarian and entrepreneurial elites, the black 
bureaucratic and political elite within the state began to transcended its petit bourgeois 
status through privileged access to state resources and the capacity for patronage that 
these produced. As a number of commentators have noted about these changes in class, 
the change in the economic sphere also resulted in the gradual embourgeoisement of 
the governing class (Dashwood, 2000; Mandaza, 1986; Astrow, 1986). Mandaza 
(1986, p. 51) recollects the change in the rhetoric and behaviour of the governing class: 
‘as they found their class aspirations fulfilled, whatever there was of a commitment to 
socialist transformation became increasingly isolated as the rhetoric of a few 
committed leaders in a society whose appetite was so much whetted for capitalist 
development’. 
 
Seen through the hermeneutical lens of the new governing class’s commitment to 
socialism, Zanu’s failure to implement a socialist system has been attributed to the 
apparently inherent contradiction of petit bourgeois commitment to class suicide once 
they take over the state. The argument is that the petit bourgeoisie are unlikely to install 
true socialism once they gain access to trappings of state power and the inevitably 
embourgeoisement this entails (Moore, 1991; Mandaza, 1986; Dashwood, 2000). Brett 
(2005) makes the general observation that corporatist systems such as Zimbabwe’s 
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post-independence state ‘lead directly to rent-seeking, predation and economic 
stagnation’. Rent-seeking and predation were certainly evident in the scandals which 
began to emerge by the end of the first decade of independence. These included the 
Willowvale Motor company scandal which implicated Zanu leadership including 
Ministers Dzingayi Mutumbuka, Maurice Nyagumbo and Jacob Mudenda. The 
outcome of the scandal probably drove Nyagumbo to suicide, though as Tekere points 




Post-independence state superstructures 
 
Zimbabwe held general elections in 1985, the first simultaneous presidential and 
parliamentary election in 1990, parliamentary elections in 1995 and another 
presidential election in 1996. 
 
Each of these instances had what were considered negligible occurrences of election 
violence, often targeted at the handful of opposing candidates who dared to stand 
against Zanu-PF. These elections were noteworthy for the relatively insignificant 
showing of opposition parties and candidates which were never able to garner more 
than 5% of the presidential vote, or 3 parliamentary seats (Forum party in 1990, and 
ZANU-NDONGA in 1995). An exception was the Edgar Tekere’s Zimbabwe Unity 
Movement which took 20 % of the vote in 1990, garnering only two parliamentary seats, though 
with Tekere winning 1%t of the [resendential ballot.  While electoral opposition was generally 
weak, incidents of dissent in the country had always been dealt with a heavy hand. 
Most notably were the disproportionate reactions to the dissident problem in the early 
1980s which resulted in the Gukurahundi massacres in Matabeleland, in the south of 
the country. The end of the Gukurahundi in the form of the unity accord between Zanu-
PF and the Zimbabwe African People’s Union turned the country into a de facto one-
party state. 
 
Another important factor in Zimbabwe’s political culture was the continuation of the 
repressive powers and institutions which had characterised the Rhodesian state. The 
Emergency Act of 1960, which had the capacity to enact executive emergency 
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regulations to bypass the regular legislative process, was used over 60 times in the first 
four years of independence – though these regulations included city name changes and 
laws regarding apprenticeships as opposed to conventional emergency powers 
(Weitzer, 1984, p. 533). The repressive Law and Order (Maintenance) Act of 1960 
which gives the police and Minister of Home Affairs arbitrary powers to control 
potential or suspected enemies of the state, and criminalises ordinary political activity, 
remained in place after independence. What is evident from the continuation of these 
powers is the considerable room for manoeuvre they permitted the government in 
interpreting societal pressures as prejudicial to national interests (Weitzer, 1984, p. 
557). 
Of the forces mentioned above, the destabilisation campaigns perpetrated by apartheid 
South Africa posed an imminent security threat to the Zimbabwean state in the decade 
after independence. Military raids and sabotage by former members of the Rhodesian 
security forces resulted in attempts on Prime Minister Mugabe’s life and the 
destruction of military aircraft (Weitzer, 1984, p. 537). These threats further served to 
raise the government’s security fears. Added to this, the continued adversarial 
relationship between ZANU and ZAPU was regarded as a major threat to the regime’s 
security within the Zimbabwean state after independence and resulted in the most 
evident application of official coercion. After a period of relative peace in which the 
coalition government was formed to include a number of ZAPU members, hostilities 
erupted in February 1981 when ZIPRA (ZAPU) forces attacked a ZANLA base in the 
suburb of Entumbane in Bulawayo. This uprising was quelled, resulting in the deaths 
of 300 guerrillas (Weitzer, 1984, p. 545). The antagonisms worsened after arms caches 
belonging to ZIPRA forces were discovered in 1982 (Du Toit, 1995; Weitzer, 1984, 
p.537). The ZAPU ministers, including party leader and Minister of Home Affairs 
Joshua Nkomo, were consequently expelled from the cabinet. In the aftermath, 
incidents of violent crime including armed robbery arose as an insurgency of former 
ZIPRA guerrillas took place in Matabeleland and the Midlands. ZAPU came under 
increasing suspicion and was branded a ‘subversive organisation’ by the government- 
associated press which claimed links between dissidents and the destabilisation 
campaign of the apartheid regime (Weitzer, 1984, p. 544). While the association was 
arguably minimal and was based on disgruntled individual party members, it was 
unclear whether ZAPU leadership explicitly supported the dissidents (Weitzer, 1984). 
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As a subversive organisation ZAPU faced official suppression, a number of ZAPU 
M.P.s were detained and permission for party rallies was seldom given. Nevertheless, 
ZAPU was never banned outright. The reluctance to ban ZAPU as a party could be 
explained by the popular support the party held in Matabeleland and the possibility 
that such an action would have resulted in the Ndebele population further 
consolidating under the party. As insurgency escalated, the Minister for Defence, Enos 
Nkala, deployed the army to the Midlands and Matabeleland. The operation known as 
Gukurahundi was carried out predominantly by the Shona Fifth Brigade army unit 
which had been trained by North Korean instructors since 1980. The Gukurahundi 
campaigns lasted until 1987, with widespread reports of brutality and atrocities 
committed by the army that affected thousands of innocent people. Information on the 
Gukurahundi campaigns is conflicting. The Zimbabwean state has denied any 
culpability for the events, and there has been no serious open dialogue on the issue 
since the signing of the Unity Accord between Zanu-PF and ZAPU (Mugabe and 
Nkomo) in 1987. The fate of ZAPU after independence was evidently tied to the idea 
of the one-party state (CCJP, 1999). 
 
 
The one-party state debate 
 
To some extent the new Zimbabwean state exhibited most of the characteristics of a 
functioning democracy as multiparty elections had been held every five years since 
independence. It is, however, important to note that the elections held in 1980, 1985, 
and 1990 were all beset by varying levels of political intolerance and intimidation of 
political opponents (Du Toit, 1995; Nordlund, 1995). The election-related violence in 
the 1980s and 1990s has often been put down to the legacy of the zero-sum political 
culture of the liberation struggle (Sithole, 1999, Dorman 2001 , Weitzer, 1984). 
Despite regular multiparty elections, the debate over the formation of a one-party state 
dominated the first decade of independence in Zimbabwe. Shaw outlines the principal 
arguments put forward, mainly by Mugabe, for the one-party state. Firstly, it was 
argued that the one-party state corresponds closely with African customary practice 
which traditionally has one uncontested chief and consensual decision-making (Shaw, 
1986, p. 377). The second argument held that as Zanu-PF carried an overwhelming 
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part of the (unopposed) popular vote, the one-party state was therefore what the 
majority of Zimbabweans wished (Shaw, 1986, p. 378). The third reason given was 
that it would have created unity among Zimbabweans and served to counter the ethnic 
animosities that manifested itself in the political rivalry between ZANU and ZAPU 
(Shaw, 1986, p. 379). Finally, it was believed that a unified national approach was 
required for the overall goal of development (Shaw, 1986, p. 381). The form of one- 
party state envisioned was only loosely defined, though Mugabe asserted that the 
system would be democratic, would allow for competition for seats apparently 
following the Tanzanian model. What is more, the question of how the one-party state 
was to be formed was divisive, even within the ranks of Zanu-PF. Edgar Tekere, the 
radical ZANU-PF leader in Manicaland, openly criticised the notion of creating a de 
jure one-party state and argued against disallowing opposition parties (Shaw, 1986, p. 
391). His opposition to the one-party state would lead to his expulsion from Zanu-PF 
in 1989 and to his forming the short-lived Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) party 
the same year (Tekere, 2007, p. 144). These disputes notwithstanding, altering the 
Constitution to create a de jure one-party state would have required a unanimous 
decision in the parliament. This would have been unlikely given the presence of 20 
white parliamentary seats until 1987, as well as the electoral presence of ZAPU in 
Matabeleland (Shaw, 1986; Weitzer, 1984). When the guarantees on white seats came 
to an end ZANU and ZAPU signed the Unity Accord thereby creating a de-facto one 
party state. Though ZAPU as an organisation had never been openly in support of the 
one-party state, Shaw emphasises the fear that such an arrangement would have been 
constructed without Nkomo and the rest of the ZAPU leadership, more or less ending 
the adversarial relationship (Shaw, 1986, p. 376). With the formation of a de facto one-
party state, amendments were made to the Constitution installing a unicameral 
legislature and an executive presidency which was occupied by Mugabe. Joshua 
Nkomo was appointed vice-president, and a number of ZAPU leaders, some of whom 
had been jailed during the period of the insurgency, subsequently took up posts in the 
cabinet. For instance, Dumiso Dabengwa, a former ZIPRA commander imprisoned 
during the dissident period, became Minister for Home Affairs for most of the 1990s 




State and civil society relations 1980-1990 
 
With Zanu-PF purposefully fusing the state and society, lower-level local government 
institutions were almost indistinguishable from the ZANU party structures (Du Toit, 
1995). This blurring of party and state boundaries was partly due to the anti-colonial 
counter-hegemonic movement in which nationalism had become a unifying social 
movement articulating the interests of nearly all black social movements; but it was 
also due to co-option and paternalism by the ruling party following independence. The 
relationship described above was particularly evident in state-labour relations. Labour 
movements were significantly fractured at independence, and labour-capital relations 
between 1980 and 1982 were marked by intense conflicts that resulted in numerous 
strikes. Differences were resolved during this period through heavy state intervention 
by way of statutory minimum wages, monitoring retrenchments and unfair labour 
practices, and the formation of workers committees (Sachikonye, 1995, p. 135). 
Mugabe encouraged the formation of an umbrella movement, the Zimbabwe Congress 
of Trade Unions, in February 1981. Skalnes argues that the formation of the ZCTU 
was designed to counter the influence of trade unions affiliated to other parties and to 
undermine their attempts to merge into an independent national umbrella organisation 
in the United Trade Unions of Zimbabwe (UTUZ) (Skalnes, 1993, p. 423). 
The government was however extremely intolerant of striking civil servants, as was 
demonstrated when teachers and nurses went on strike in October 1981. This action 
was seen by Mugabe as an ‘unjustifiable negligence of duty and disloyalty to the state’ 
(Nordlund, 1995, p. 142). Throughout the 1980s strikes by teachers and nurses as well 
as miners and railway workers were quelled under the Industrial Conciliation Act and 
the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, both remnants of the colonial era and the Smith 
Regime. Intervention by the government in the actions of the central labour union, the 
ZCTU, took the form of ‘benevolent paternalism’ under the guise of socialism and a 
government of national unity (Nordlund, 1995, p. 143). 
Herbst’s observation of the ZCTU in the 1980s was that its analytical, research and 
organisational capabilities were poor. He also noted that the government’s control of 
the entire wage process undermined the unions and prevented them from developing 
more capable organisational structures as they had no functional mechanism for the 
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mobilisation of workers. Labour was strongest when there was no institutionalised 
procedure to set wages and when workers could pressure the government directly by 
taking to the streets. He continues that: 
wage policy is another instance of the government’s not strengthening itself by constructing 
elaborate, centralised institutions to consider every aspect of public policy. The government 
was much more autonomous, especially in its relations with the employers, when national 
minimum-wage policy was being made without formal procedures by a few civil servants who 
considered only some- back of the envelope calculations (Herbst, 1990, p. 219). 
 
Herbst makes a comparison of extremes in the ZCTU and Commercial Farmers Union, 
noting that these organisations: 
 
… had contrasting experiences in their relationship with the government. Even though both 
lobbied with the government on an issue which recurred annually. The key to determining 
whether an interest group will be able to take advantage of an iterated process is in its 
organisational ability. For instance, while the CFU and the ZCTU faced exactly the same kind 
of issues in terms of the number of decisions to be made, the CFU had the organisational 
wherewithal to take advantage of the iterated process of producer price setting and to learn 
how to influence the government. In contrast, the ZCTU’s ability to learn was so poor that the 
iterated process of minimum wage setting actually weakened because its demands were 
constantly viewed by the government as unrealistic (Herbst, 1990, p.220). 
 
Herbst’s analysis is interesting though it would be difficult to conclude whether it was 
the institution’s comparative ability to learn rather than the extent to which the 
government valued their interests and influence which determined how the state 
interacted with each group. If the difference in the manner in which the government 
related to the CFU and the ZCTU were a reflection of their relative importance and 
value, then certainly the government appears to have valued commercial interests more 
than those of labour. This became even more evident in the negotiations leading to the 




This chapter has sought to trace the establishment of and consolidation of Zanu-PF 
hegemony in post-independence Zimbabwe. In order to do this, it has been necessary 
to situate the nationalist movement and its principal constituting class , Zimbabwe’s 
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black petit bourgeoisie, in the political economy of colonialism and the modes of 
production in which it was formed and ascended. The chapter therefore began with the 
historical political economy of the settler state and the formation of African classes 
through the partial proletarianisation of a peasant population by means of taxes and 
forced labour. Zimbabwe’s ruling class arose out of this engagement with 
proletarianisation and through the limited potential for mission education in early 
colonisation. The chapter has traced the formation of African nationalist organisations 
in the decade following the end of the Second World War, and the multiple iterations 
of these organisations as they were banned under successive laws. The chapter also 
notes the entry into the political arena of specific individuals, particularly Robert 
Mugabe, who would become synonymous with ZANU’s construction of hegemony 
and indeed its defence. This will be explored in the forthcoming chapters.By the 1990s, 
the contradictions of the post-white settler state in which the governing class (the 
Zimbabwean black petit bourgeoisie) sought to balance the interests of national 
(white) and international capital while also fulfilling the aspirations of the working 
and peasant masses became increasingly difficult to manage. The outcome was that 
after a gradual embourgeoisement this class failed to fulfil the hopes of the working 
masses. Ultimately, the working class anger could only be kept in check through 
coercion. When protecting the interests of white capital at the expense of the peasantry 
and black working classes became too costly the governing class conveniently chose 
to vilify the white capital and land owners. This marked a predatory turn in the 
Zimbabwean governing class, in which they began to rely increasingly on coercion to 
maintain power. In relation to Zanu-PF’s balance of coercion and consent in the first 
decade of independence, outside the context of Gukurahundi, where violence was 
conducted in mostly rural areas (and however disproportionate and brutal it was), the 
party did not need to use coercion against large sections of the population as a means 
of maintaining hegemony. Indeed, the violence of Gukurahundi would not have been 
intended as a response to a perceived threat to Zanu-PF hegemony but rather as 
punitive violence. During periods of weak opposition there was no recourse to 
violence, and coercion instead focused on individuals who dared to oppose, as with 
Patrick Kombayi, Edgar Tekere, or Margaret Dongo. This violence would spread to 
students in their protests against the one-party state. Even in these cases the violence 
was punitive rather than as a response to a real perceived threat to Zanu-PFs 
vs ’preemptive’ almost. Worth further 
consideration.  
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hegemony. As a credible counter-hegemonic challenge began to emerge the party 
began to mobilise its coercive and ideological machinery to aggressively maintain its 
hegemony as the following chapters will show. 
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Chapter 4 
ESAP, the Neo-liberal Historical Bloc and the roots of 
organic crisis 
 
Chapter 4 focuses on the Zimbabwe’s experiment with neo-liberal economic reforms 
driven by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank between 1990 and 
1997. The chapter considers this Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) 
phase as a distinct historical bloc. This phase would ultimately bring about the organic 
crisi historical bloc organic which would characterise Zimbabwean politics after 2000. 
The chapter elaborates on the decisions to implement the Structural Adjustment 
Programme and its impact on the national modes of production. This period of immense 
economic change took place in a context of relative political freedom following the 
abandonment of the one-party state idea in the global context of “the end of history”. 
The bloc’s combination of economic pressures and increasing political dissent led to the 
coalescence of a counter-hegemonic movement combining labour, students, and an 
increasingly relevant organised civil society. Having outlined the base superstructure 
dynamics of the ESAP bloc the chapter breaks down the various components of 
Zimbabwe’s opposition civil society as they coalesced to form the National 
Constitutional Assembly and the Movement for Democratic Change political party. This 
outline addresses one of Gramsci’s key questions in analysing counter- hegemonic 
movements: what is the social content of the mass following of the counter- hegemonic 
movement? This section begins with an outline of the labour movement as the core, 
organised, membership-based force in the opposition. The history of the labour 
movement in Zimbabwe, the Congress of Trade Union structures and leadership, 
internal dynamics and core grievances in the lead-up to the food strikes of 1997 and 
1998 will be explained through interviews with leaders of the congress of trade unions 
during this period. The second core group to be analysed will be the student movement. 
Students would be the only other mass membership based group that would form a 
central part of the opposition in Zimbabwe after 1997. The chapter will show the 
differences in strategies, ideologies and interests between labour and students as this 
was a central theme of the data collected during interviews. The differences between 
labour and students would become a core cleavage point in the 
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leadership battles of the MDC after 2008 as well as after the death of Morgan 
Tsvangirai in 2018. Associated with the student groups were academics and 
intellectuals at the nation’s tertiary education institutions. Their individual ideological 
persuasions and emphases would influence segments of students, labour and the 
movement as a whole in often contradictory directions from the formative stages of 
the counter-hegemonic movement. 
The chapter then analyses the roles of other core groups, which, unlike the labour 
unions and students, were represented mostly by individuals in leadership rather than 
membership-based power. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) would become 
central to the counter-hegemonic movement in Zimbabwe. From a space dominated 
by church groups such as the Zimbabwe Council of Churches, this segment would 
begin to draw from the student movements and by the mid-1990s became entirely 
dependent on western donor funding. These new NGOs and their leadership would be 
central to the drive for democratisation through their focus on both constitutional and 
electoral reform and human rights monitoring. This section of the opposition would 
generate important dynamics in how it related to the labour movement, its reliance on 
donor funding and the complications that this would cause, as well as its relatively 
shallow membership base. Based on interview data and reviews of other secondary 
data such as blog posts, newspaper articles and books on the history of Zimbabwe’s 
opposition, the chapter will explain the core role of these NGOs and their leadership 
as well as the often overlapping and interpenetration of their leadership with those of 
student movements, donor agencies and the main opposition political party. 
The chapter then outlines other influential, though weakly represented groups in the 
counter-hegemonic movement. Among these are lawyers, farmers and business 
leaders, and the national staff of donor agencies. The chapter then concludes by 
returning to a chronological narrative which outlines the conjunctural roots of the 
opposition movement in the formation of the National Constitutional Assembly in 
1997 and the Movement for Democratic Change in 1999. 
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Economic Structural Adjustment Programme 
 
Despite Zanu-PF’s pledge at independence to create ‘a socialist state based on Marxist 
Leninist principles’ by the end of the 1980s, it was clear that transformation of the 
country’s economy had been far from radical. Rather, Zimbabwe’s economic policy 
regime continued the corporatist structure that had been introduced by the UDI 
government to counter the effects of sanctions in 1965. This was principally because 
of the entrenched protection of property rights for the first ten years after 
independence, contained in the Lancaster House Agreement. To a large extent this 
corporatist structure protected white minority economic interests, while growth and 
increased resources fitted with Zanu-PF’s efforts at redressing inequality under the 
policy of ‘growth with equity’. As previously noted, the increases in public 
expenditure on health and education were among a number of redistributive measures, 
and also meant that the interdependence between government and industry was a major 
factor in Zanu-PF’s political legitimacy and stability within the state. However, as the 
decade proceeded, it became increasingly evident that the redistributive efforts could 
no longer be supported by the growth in resources. The overly controlled economic 
model undermined long-term economic sustainability as it failed to generate sustained 
economic growth or to attract investment. Another major concern was unemployment, 
as 10 000 jobs were created per year and not the projected 14 000 per year, and the 
education system produced vast numbers of high school graduates who would not find 
employment (Brett, 2005, p. 10). 
 
These concerns made the necessity for reform evident. However, it has been widely 
acknowledged that Zimbabwe was not undergoing an immediate crisis when it adopted 
ESAP, or at least one that required the drastic reforms of structural adjustment. Growth 
had averaged 4.7% in the first four years of independence despite a crippling drought 
in 1982, and 4% between 1985 and 1990. Nor was the country in danger of default as 
external debt service ratio had fallen to about 23% from about 34- 40% in the mid-80s 
(Andreasson, 2003, p. 385; Brett, 2005, p. 4). 
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The adoption of a neo-liberal approach at this point can be understood in the context 
in which structural adjustment programmes were being imposed by international 
financial institutions throughout sub-Saharan African, as a remedy to perceived 
political and economic crises (Dansereau, 2003, p. 174; Moyo, 2002). In Zimbabwe a 
shift to a more corporatist and technocratic view of the economy became apparent 
from around 1987. It was spearheaded by the Minister for Finance, Bernard Chidzero, 
though this neo-liberal shift may not have been the consensus of the ministry as a 
whole at the time (Andreasson, 2003, p. 394). Intense lobbying for trade liberalisation 
came from the powerful interest groups that represented white-dominated economic 
interests such as the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries, the Commercial Farmers 
Union and the Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce. They lobbied behind 
closed doors for trade liberalisation, a relaxation of controls on prices, wages, 




The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions condemned the reforms which would entail 
scrapping the minimum wage and the withdrawal of price regulations and welfare 
measures in health and education, which threatened the living standards of the working 
class. Reform was also criticised within the ruling party. Notably, Mugabe criticised 
the application of ESAP on the pressures from ‘a very powerful bourgeois group’ 
within Zanu-PF that championed the cause of the international financial institutions 
and national private capital. He argued that these interests ‘[were] opposed to the 
development of a socialist and egalitarian society in Zimbabwe’ (Andreasson, 2003, 
p. 394). However, he evidently did nothing to prevent the application of these policies. 
Zimbabwe’s adoption of a neo-liberal model of macro-economic management seems 
therefore to have been a response to pressure from internal interest groups with support 
from international financial institutions, the IMF and the World Bank. There was little 
or no consultation with the majority of the population, least of all small farmers and 
small businesses (Moyo, S. , 2002, p. 4). 
 
When ESAP was instituted in 1990, it was claimed that employment would rise to 100 
000 new jobs per year, growth would rise to 5% year, and budget deficits would be 
significantly reduced (Sachikonye, 2002, p. 14). It was furthermore argued that 
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structural adjustment would increase the autonomy and freedom of manoeuvre for 
civil society in general and labour unions in particular, as collective bargaining would 
replace government-imposed wage settlement (Skalnes, 1993). Zimbabwe’s Structural 
Adjustment Programme consisted of a process of currency devaluation, major 
reductions in the size of the civil service and cutbacks in subsidies to parastatals 
companies and food subsidies, while the minimum wage was scrapped. The first stage 
of reform began in October 1990 with trade liberalisation, the removal of import 
controls, and financial-sector liberalisation which were introduced rapidly, while tax 
and public expenditure reform saw little progress. Zimbabwe’s government failed to 
reduce the budget deficit which was double the proposed target of 14% of GDP in 
1994-1995 (Brett, 2005; Jenkins, 1997, p. 600). The failure to reduce the deficit 
resulted in the suspension of IMF support, and other donors also withheld aid until 
IMF and World Bank conditions were met. 
 
While there were some positive results such as capital formation, and a rise in the 
percentage of exports in GDP, the benefits of ESAP were certainly limited. Growth 
contracted and Zimbabwe’s foreign debt rose from 45% to 75% in the first four years 
of ESAP (Brett, 2005, p.5). A number of industrial firms, particularly in textiles, 
closed in response to increased competition and high interest rates. Unemployment 
rose from 30-50% which translated to 26 000 jobs in the public sector and 20 000 in 
the private sector (Sachikonye, 1995, p. 143). The restructuring measures effectively 
reversed most of the social gains made in the 1980s. The impact was most evident in 
the cutbacks in the civil service, subsidies to parastatal companies and social services 
and food subsidies (Dansereau, 2003). The period of liberalisation resulted in a 
dramatic increase in inflation which combined with a decline of 36% in real wages 
between 1990 and 1996. The government of Zimbabwe itself acknowledged that by 
1995 the cost of food had increased by 516%, while education, health care, and 
transportation costs all rose by 300% (Dansereau, 2003, p. 181). 
 
The economic failures of ESAP had significant political and social costs for the Zanu- 
PF government. The cutbacks to public expenditure on education and healthcare were 
very unpopular, while the rise in unemployment and decline in real wages created 
resistance to the government as larger industrial actions began to appear in reaction to 
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the massive increases in the cost of living. Clashes between the state and students 
became commonplace as students jokingly referred to ESAP as ‘Especially Students 
Are Prone to Suffering’ (Nordlund, 1996, p. 162). As in the 1980s, the government 
viewed strikes and demonstrations as a betrayal. The increasingly heavy-handed 
response to strikes and demonstration during the ESAP period served only to galvanise 





Roots of organic crisis and the counter-hegemonic bloc 
 
As the previous section has shown, civil society in the first decade and a half of 
independence had been largely depoliticised and fragmented. Jonah Gokova, a 
prominent civil society activist, explains the atmosphere of the 1990s in Zimbabwean 
civil society as follows: 
 
the students at universities were doing their own thing. The workers ZCTU were doing their 
own thing, women, lawyers for human rights even some elements within the churches etc. all 
these initiatives were seeking an engagement with the government of the day. (Gokova, 2011) 
 
The tendency by Zimbabwe’s civil society to seek engagement with the government 
has been documented by Sara Rich Dorman (2001) and reflects the remnant of a period 
of optimism in which the government was considered to be responsive and legitimately 
concerned with engaging with civil society and their concerns. A notable characteristic 
of the early 1990s was the extent to which regular engagement and political 
discussions were taking place in Zimbabwean society, not only among members of 
civil society but also with the government. By the middle of the 1990s growing 
disenchantment in a context of relative political freedom of association and speech 
created the environment for the formation of a counter-hegemonic movement. 
Interviews with key informants active during this period reflect an atmosphere of 
freedom as well as a hunger to discuss the issues affecting the country, as people met 
formally and informally at venues such as the Quill Club in Harare. Indeed, in a 
testament to the conjunctural momentum towards constitutional reform that had begun 
in the 1990s, David Coltart, a lawyer who would become a pivotal figure in the 
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opposition party, describes in his memoirs that he made 26 speeches in 1997 to 
‘churches, women’s groups, the Law society, the media, estate agents and insurance 
institutes on the need for constitutional reform’ (2016, p. 252). The fact that Coltart 
also notes that in a number of these meetings he had shared panels with senior 
government ministers in discussing topics which would be considered extremely 
sensitive, including the Gukurahundi and Public Order Security Bill, certainly reflects 
a high level of engagement on political issues by civil society as well as the relative 
freedom of engagement and dissent. In an interview for this thesis Jonah Gokova also 
describes this period of transition in civil society: 
 
at that time our society was coming from a situation where it very depoliticised, so engagement 
on these issues was exciting. So, for a long period of time people were silent but feeling the 
pinch of the problems, all of a sudden, they realised that we can develop some articulation, 
some engagement on the way forward and I think that excited a lot of people. The excitement 
was coming out of the realisation of the discovery of the space that could be occupied by civil 
society. Space that was shut before but all of a sudden there were openings here and there, but 
also, we were relying on state-controlled media for a long time but the public debates became 
an alternative source of information. So, there was a lot of excitement about that as well the 
realisation that we can actually create our own alternative sources of information that we can 
control. Sources of information that allow and encourage feedback, immediate feedback, those 
are some of the reasons that got people excited about these meetings (Gokova, 2011). 
 
The politicisation of the labour movement under the ZCTU accelerated in 1996 when 
public sector workers, particularly teachers, staged a walkout which escalated into a 
general strike as tertiary students joined in solidarity. A more precipitous economic 
meltdown began in 1997 following the government’s decision to pay Z$50 000 to 
individual liberation war veterans, which came to an estimated total of Z$4 billion; 
and the decision to engage in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(Sachinkonye, 2002, p. 15). The growing strength and national credibility of urban 
civil society manifested itself in 1997 in a series of general strikes. The ZCTU, through 
Tsvangirai’s speeches at May Day rallies, began to articulate the linkages between the 
economic crisis and the problems of governance. Protests began to address issues of 
governance and the economy and to decry the pronounced authoritarianism of the 
government. Even in these early stages the increase in politicisation of labour and other 
sections of civil society was not without repercussions. In December 1997 
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Morgan Tsvangirai was attacked after protesting against the war veteran’s levy. In 
March 1998 the ZCTU’s regional offices in Bulawayo were set on fire following the 
national strike in March 1998 (Dorman, 2001; Matibenga, 2011). The government 
began to accuse the ZCTU of ‘playing politics’ after the series of strikes in 1998. At 
that year’s Zanu-PF congress in Masvingo, the challenge was laid down: ‘aiwa 
vakomana musavanda neTrade Union, vanoda kuforma party formaiyi tibhakerane!’ 







The freedom to discuss these issues noted above also coincided with a keen interest 
by a section of the population who were young recent graduates. Some of them had 
spent time at universities in the west and were concerned and frustrated by the seeming 
de-politicisation of the country. The criticisms against the Lancaster House Agreement 
had emanated to some degree from within Zanu-PF, as outspoken Member of the 
Politburo and Minister of Justice Edson Zvobgo had cited the Independence 
Constitution as an obstacle to the achievement of the country’s goals in development 
and democracy. Pockets of concerned individuals began to convene to discuss issues 
relating to governance and specifically to the Constitution. Like Coltart above, the 
civil society activist Jonah Gokova points to this conjunctural convergence on the 
constitution: 
 
We were beginning to express dissatisfaction with the way the then government was behaving. 
It was very clear that for us to begin to find a way forward we had to find a way to come 
together and we had to confront the regime from a common united platform. Specifically 
dealing with the question of the constitution but in that, we realised that in addressing issues 
to do with the need for a new constitution we were also dealing directly with issues of opening 
of the democratic space, freedom of assembly, freedom of speech and all the other freedoms. 
(Gokova, 2011) 
 
The National Constitutional Assembly arose in 1996 as the convergence of a number 
of common pre-occupations by individuals who were interested in issues of 
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governance. While there are a number of varying accounts of the origins of the 
formation of the National Constitutional Assembly, all interviews highlight the 
centrality of Deprose Muchena, Tawanda Mutasa and Brian Kagoro. These young men 
were recent university graduates and had passed through the International Socialist 
Organisation and Students Representative Council at the University of Zimbabwe, 
which were by then rites of passage for aspiring intellectuals and national leaders. 
Muchena and Mutasa had been working for the Zimbabwe Council of Churches, which 
at the time had been largely apolitical though concerned with the impact of 
government policy on the society as a whole. Gokova interprets the influence of 
Mutasa, Muchena and Kagoro as that of young and ambitious operators ‘who managed 
to understand the weaknesses of the churches and to take advantage of them to get 
them to take advantage of themselves’ (Gokova, 2011). 
He elaborates: 
 
…the church was also never an initiator, and it didn’t want to be antagonistic. So, they found 
a way of relating this idea to the church leaders and got them to support it because they saw it 
as something that was not antagonistic. But as time went on the church discovered that the 
NCA was becoming antagonistic to the state. In fact, that’s the reason that they gave when 
they (the Zimbabwe Council of Churches) withdrew, they said you are too confrontational. 
 
 
Lovemore Madhuku, a legal scholar and eventually the longstanding chairperson of 
the NCA who was employed by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, recounts the formation 
of the NCA as follows: 
 
The first formal meeting of these people that then formed the NCA which was on 20 May 1997 
was in the board room at the offices of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung at number 6 Ross Avenue. 
It was attended by about eleven people: Tsvangirai was there; Tawanda Mutasah, Chiminhi 
from Zimrights at the time, Mike Auret from the CCJP. We were actually recognising people 
who were at different organisations, you had the CCJP, you had ZIMRIGHTS, you had the 
ZCTU, there was someone from the Students Union (Learnmore Jongwe), I don’t know 
whether they came on that first day but they had been recognised. Then there were individuals 
that were identified as experts because it’s going to be a constitutional thing. People like 
(Professor Welshman) Ncube, (Tendai) Biti, Brian Kagoro, Priscilla Misihairambwi didn’t 
attend the foundational meeting…they were brought in as experts later. (Madhuku, 2011) 
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It is clear that the NCA’s role as the nucleus of the new counter-hegemonic force 
originated from this group. When the Movement for Democratic Change was formed 
as a political party two years later all those in attendance at the formation of the NCA 
meeting would be central players. What is interesting is the difference in their 
respective roles, as Tsvangirai, Biti, Auret, Misihairambwi and Ncube would be part 
of the party’s leadership. All of the above except for Tsvangirai would eventually 
become MDC Members of Parliament in 2000. However, the young initiators of the 
meeting, Mutasah, Muchena and Kagoro, would not take overt leadership roles in the 
party. Instead they went into careers within the sphere of international donors and 
would gain reputations as behind-the-scenes king-makers in the party. 
 
The NCA’s foundational meeting was essentially a grouping of active individuals; 
however, the ‘Assembly’ and the movement that it spurred have always self- 
consciously referred to their representation of ‘constituencies’. Thus, despite the fact 
that the ZCTU was really the only membership-based organisation with a 
representative at the meeting, reference is often12 made to the ‘churches, human rights 
NGOs, labour, women’s groups, and youth groups’ rather than Muchena and Auret, 
Chimhini, Tsvangirai, Misihairambwi and Jongwe, as was the case. These dynamics 
will be elaborated upon in the following chapter. 
 
It is evident that Morgan Tsvangirai’s selection as the NCA’s first chairperson was 
central to its strategy for a broader appeal. As Gwiyo points out from his perspective 
as a labour leader, the NCA was an ‘elite institution (which) then decided to create 
relevance by co-opting in Morgan Tsvangirai’ (Gwiyo, 2011). Gwisayi is more blunt, 
arguing that Tsvangirai was selected as chairperson ‘to hoodwink the masses that such 
a body represented them’ (quoted in Dorman, 2000). 
 
The seed funding for the NCA was provided by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) 
between 1997 and 1998. This was eventually supplemented by Oxfam, HIVOS, 
Friedrich Naumann Foundation, and the embassies of Denmark, the Netherlands, 
 
12 This tendency to refer to individuals as representative s of a wider constituency is evident in virtually all 
the l i terature and all my interviews o n Zimbabwe’s civil society and opposition. Even more critical 
interviewees l ike Lovemore Madhuku, Munyaradzi Gwisayi, and Timothy Kondo refer to individuals in 
collective terms. 
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Canada, Australia and Sweden (Dorman, 2000). The above indicates the extent to 
which opposition in Zimbabwe was inextricably linked with donor funding from its 
inception. The following sections departs from the chronological structure of this 
chapter to address one of Gramsci’s key questions in analysing counter-hegemonic 
movements: what is the social content of the mass following of the counter-hegemonic 
movement? 
 
Social Content of the Movement. 
Labour Unions 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, for most of the first decade of independence 
the relationship between the Zanu-PF government and the Zimbabwe Congress of 
Trade Unions had been cooperative. This period of cooperation had seen the 
government backing the ZCTU over the alternative umbrella body, the United Trade 
Unions of Zimbabwe (UTUZ) (Skalnes, 1993, p.423). The consolidation of the 
disparate unions in a single national congress had arguably served to counteract the  
influence of trade unions affiliated to other parties, particularly the UANC, and to 
undermine potential opposition (Kondo,2011). In an interview with the author of this 
thesis Timothy Kondo, a trade unionist and researcher at the Labour Economic and 
Development Research Institute of Zimbabwe (LEDRIZ) explained the dynamics of 
the labour movement at independence: 
 
Because the Smith regime considered trade unions to be the trouble makers, most trade unions 
were unregistered and operated underground. Most of them affiliated to Zanu-PF and the 
militant trade unionists. So, come 1980, these unions now come to the surface. In 1978 black 
trade unions that existed in this country were less than 20, but by end of 1980 when we 
inaugurated ZCTU in February 1981, 52 unions formed ZCTU. These were the unregistered 
trade unions, and the political trade unions aligned more to ZANU, took the ZCTU 
leadership… [with] Makwarimba as president, coming from an unregistered commercial 
workers trade union against the registered trade union which had been made up of mostly 
UANC members. Albert Mugabe coming from an unregistered transportion workers trade 
union, against a registered trade union led by people like Makanda and Manomano who were 
associated with the UANC. 
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Kondo and other trade unionists from the period have underlined the experience of 
close cooperation between the ZCTU and Zanu-PF, citing trade union slogans such as 
‘ZCTU and ZANU are one’ (Matibenga, 2011). The period of cooperation between 
the labour unions and the government had been significant in repealing the Industrial 
Conciliation Act and passing the Labour Relations Act in 1985. As Lucia Matibenga, 
a long-term trade unionist and eventual MDC MP, noted in an interview: ‘I can tell 
you that the greatest achievement of that collaboration was in 1985: the promulgation 
of the Labour Act of 1985, which was very pro-worker and for us we celebrated our 
collaboration with the government in achieving that labour act’ (Matibenga, 2011). 
 
The law represented ‘a comprehensive code of regulations relating to employment, 
remuneration, collective bargaining, the settlement of disputes, the registration and 
certification of trade unions and employers’ organisations’ (Sachikonye, 1989, p. 259). 
The law defined the fundamental rights of workers as well as unfair labour practices, 
safeguarding worker’s rights to fair labour standards in relation to minimum wages, 
maximum daily work hours and occupational health and safety (Sachikonye, 1989, p. 
259; Matibenga, 2011). 
 
However, by 1988 the relationship between labour and government began to sour. This 
was initially after the government had published the Emergency Powers Acts 
following a spate of strikes by the affiliate unions for the National Railways and the 
Post and Telecommunications Corporation. The Emergency Powers Act, a remnant of 
the Smith regime, empowered the President ‘to make such regulations as appear to 
him to be necessary or expedient for, among other things, the maintenance of essential 
services’ (Emergency Powers Act, 1989). In essence, the law permitted the 
management of parastatals such as the Post and Telecommunications Corporation and 
the National Railways of Zimbabwe to suspend working rules and summarily dismiss 
or suspend any worker who took part in or encouraged other workers to engage in 
strikes, thereby stripping workers of all collective bargaining rights. As the ZCTU’s 
newly appointed Secretary-General, Morgan Tsvangirai lamented, the new law 
nationalised labour as a commodity while ‘severely curtailing the power of labour to 
struggle for its improvement’. He continued that: ‘it must be recognised that the 
working class has been marginalised both politically and economically by both capital 
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and the state’ (Tsvangirai, 1990, p. 31). The relationship between the labour unions 
and the government would be irreparably damaged as negotiations around the 
Economic Structural Adjustment Programme collapsed as the results of the 
programme affected the living conditions of workers. The fact that the ZCTU were 
left out of these discussions led to a confrontation between the unions and the 
government which culminated in clashes. The public-sector workers strike in 1996 had 
been followed by several instances of industrial action in 1997. Workers emphasised 
rapidly deteriorating economic conditions as well as the government’s increasing 
reluctance to confront the reality of this deterioration through dialogue with organised 
labour (Saunders, 2001, p. 148). 
 
From its formation, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions has assembled 25 
affiliate trade unions composed largely of blue-collar workers. Apart from the 
Zimbabwe Banks and Allied Union Workers Union, the Zimbabwe Union of 
Journalists, the Zimbabwe Educational Scientific, Social & Cultural Workers’ Union 
(ZESSCWU) and the National Engineering Workers Union, the majority of ZCTU 
affiliates represent blue-collar workers. Lucia Matibenga was former president of the 
largest affiliate of the ZCTU, the Commercial Workers Union, and later became an 
MDC MP. She noted that: ‘the Commercial Workers Union is a union of very poorly 
paid and lowly qualified people. If you were to go on strike and you are working in a 
shop all the shop owner does is to stand on the street and get someone to replace you’ 
(Matibenga, 2011). 
 
The Labour Law (2003) together with its previous incarnation in the 1985 Labour 
Relations Act, prevents workers deemed ‘managerial employees’13 from joining 
worker’s committees or unions. This would produce difficulties in coalition formation 
as well the lines of fragmentation along class which typified the opposition movement 
and had its mark on the movement that arose from 1997 onwards. In 1990, membership 
of labour unions stood at 200 000 (Dashwood, 2000, p. 89). However, by the end of 
the decade union membership had increased with the Zimbabwe Post and 
 
13 According to the Labour Law (1985 ) ‘Managerial employee’ means an employee who by virtue of his contract 
of employment or of his seniority in an organisation, may be required or  permitted  to  hire, transfer, promote, 
suspend, lay off, dismiss, reward, discipline or adjudge the grievances of other employees.  
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Telecommunications Union (ZPTWU) expanding by 25% from 7 600 to 10 500; the 
Commercial Workers Union enlarging by over 600% from 3 000 workers to 20 000, 
while the Zimbabwe Banks and Allied Workers Union grew from 1 200 to 3 800 
(Saunders, 2001; Sachikonye, 1989). The considerable growth in membership and 
institutional structures of trade unions can be attributed to the recruitment successes 
of organising secretaries’ departments (Gwiyo, 2011). The impact of organising 
secretaries and recruitment was notable given the decline in membership of other 
unions which had been affected by the collapse of their specific sectors as a result of 
ESAP. This was particularly true of the clothing and textiles unions which saw their 
combined membership drop from 51 000 in 1990 to 32 000 in 1999 (Saunders, 2001, 
p. 95). While union membership consisted mainly of urban industrial workers, union 
structures were also present in rural areas in the form of the General Agricultural and 
Plantation Workers Union which had 150 000 members prior to the land reform 
programme in 2000; the Zimbabwe Tobacco Industrial Workers Union, as well as 
branches of the Commercial Workers Union and Urban Councils Workers Union in 
small towns. 
 
The ZCTU’s administrative structure is made up of eight departments: the department 
of health and social welfare, the department of information, the legal department, the 
department of organising women and gender, the education and training department, 
an informal economy department and a parliamentary affairs and advocacy 
department. The education and training department, the organising department and the 
advocacy department would ultimately have the most significant impact on the 
counter-hegemonic movement. These departments clustered those union members 
who self-consciously constituted the ‘left of the union’ due to both their specific 
training in Marxist political economy and also their roles in the education department 
(Gwiyo, 2011; Kondo, 2011). In the late 1980s and the early 1990s the education 
department, under the leadership of Andrew Ganya, Trust Ngirande, Ignatius 
Makonese, Gift Chibatwa Mushayabasa and Collen Gwiyo had produced and 
disseminated a book entitled Learn to struggle and struggle to learn, as well as 
handbooks on collective bargaining, legislation, organising techniques and grievance 
handling (Gwiyo, 2011). 
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The role of worker-educators became more central as the ZCTU became the core of 
the counter-hegemonic movement. Certainly, as Gwiyo notes, in ‘all the six regions 
the first group that led to the establishment of ZCTU regional structures are the same 
activist[s] who became the first chairpersons of the Movement for Democratic 
Change’ and that ‘in one way or the other, three quarters of those that were active at 
mobilising for the formation of the party had undergone our education programmes’ 
(Gwiyo, 2011). By the early 1990s the ZCTU was conducting legal training for labour 
union leadership. This was done with the support of academics from the University of 
Zimbabwe including Lovemore Madhuku and Munyaradzi Gwisayi and funded by the 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Foundation. These trainings cascaded throughout the 
structures of the affiliate unions and reached a large number of individual members. 
Tabitha Khumalo noted that the legal training received in the union turned all the union 
members into ‘bush lawyers’ with competence in a number of social mobilisation 
skills which would be useful in the counter-hegemonic movement. Khumalo (2011) 
explains how the various training courses within the ZCTU equipped leadership with 
legal, social, cultural and political skills which were key to their engagement as 
political leaders in the opposition: 
 
In the labour movement you are trained to be a lawyer. In some quarters we are called "bush 
lawyers" but the advantage is you are taught the nitty gritty of the law and how to translate it into a 
case and go and defend that case and win. Three quarters of the time trade unionists won their cases 
because we were specialising in the law itself and the problem on the ground that we were facing 
on a daily basis. Economic literacy is one of our training programmes within the labour movement. 
Where you understand the basics of economics which when you then translate to the so-called 





On the political arena, we deal with bread-and-butter issues which are politics, which sometimes I 
don’t understand when we are told that trade unions should not involve themselves in politics, 
because the moment I don’t have a living wage – that’s politics. The moment I don’t get a plate of 
food, that’s politics, the moment I go to the hospital and don’t get drugs that’s politics, the moment 
my child doesn’t go to school, that’s politics and those are the issues that we deal with as a labour 
movement. And on the cultural front, we have a women's advisory council where we deal with 
women's issues. The issue of our periods    come 1999 we ran out of sanitary towels; culturally it’s 
taboo to talk about my vagina, but at the same time I'm being told I have the right to be a woman, 
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get my periods and use hygienic affordable sanitary towels. But in the labour movement I have the 
right to stand up and talk about my vagina and demand those hygienic affordable sanitary towels. 
(ibid.) 
 
Khumalo’s description of the intellectual role of leadership in the trade union 
movement corresponds with Gramsci’s definition of organic intellectuals. In addition 
to this ‘organic’ role, the ZCTU also adopted a more traditional approach to research 
through its Research and Advocacy Department. In 1995 the ZCTU’s Research and 
Advocacy Department produced the report entitled ‘Beyond ESAP: a framework for 
a long-term development strategy in Zimbabwe beyond the Economic Structural 
Adjustment Programme’. This ‘Beyond ESAP’ document tacitly accepted the 
necessity for structural adjustment. It was initially a platform to facilitate discussions 
with the state and industry on the implementation of international financial 
institutions’ reforms to cushion their impact on the working class, rather than have 
them abandoned entirely (Kondo, 2011; Bond, 2001). As the previous chapter has 
shown, ‘Beyond ESAP’ and the ‘Raw Data’ reports became the first steps in 
transforming the ZCTU ‘from a largely vociferous organisation that no one seemed to 
listen to, into a viable political force to be reckoned with’ (Alexander, 2001, p. 387). 
‘Beyond ESAP’ and the mass actions that followed represented a consolidation of 
strategy rather than a shift in ideology, demonstrating the ZCTU leadership’s attempts 
to openly challenge the regime and offer an alternative policy. 
 
Morgan Tsvangirai’s role as leader of the ZCTU during this transition towards broader 
political engagements is critical, not only as he became the leader of the movement 
but also because he embodied the cross-cutting nature of the movement. While he had 
risen through the ranks of the labour movement, he had also been a member of a 
number of the other CSOs in the country including ZIMRIGHTS and the National 
Constitutional Assembly. His personal membership of these last two made him the 
bridge between the labour movement and the human rights and governance NGOs that 
would together form the opposition party. Tsvangirai’s personal approach to the 
leadership, in which he built relationships with other sectors of civil society, was 
probably instrumental in the direction the ZCTU took towards the formation of the 
NCA and the MDC. Kondo described Tsvangirai’s personality and his ability to build 
broader coalitions as follows: 
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he is a person who can relate to almost everybody. He has very good public relations, that’s why 
you could get the employers the farmers the workers, and everybody on board. It’s his skill. He has 
a very powerful skill of good public relations. But sometimes good public relations compromise 
decisiveness and that seems to be the problem in the party (Kondo 2011). 
 
Tsvangirai’s personal membership of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Organisation put 
him in regular contact with members of the country’s growing liberal democratic civil 
society and would certainly have influenced his politics. When the idea arose to form 
the National Constitutional Assembly, Tsvangirai’s role as secretary-general meant 
that once the ZCTU had approved its membership in the NCA, he would then represent 
the unions. As an ‘organic intellectual’ in the ZCTU and its membership structures, 
Tsvangirai was the ideal candidate for leadership of the National Constitutional 
Assembly. By virtue of being the largest organised mass movement in the country, the 
labour movement and its secretary- general’s connection to other segments of the 
growing counter-hegemonic movement became the central vehicle for organised 
opposition. 
 
Jacob Mafume, a student activist who would eventually work for the crisis in 
Zimbabwe coalition, and as a national advisor for the US Agency for International 
Development, certainly sees Tsvangirai’s ascension to leadership as organic rather 
than as a cynical strategy by elite groups: 
 
you had the intellectuals and the academics, identifying a pulling force in Morgan Tsvangirai within 
workers. They stary gravitating towards him identifying a figure and isolating and convincing him 
to create a political party. 
 
Mafume (2011) however notes that even at the earliest stages there were indications 
of the sectional cleavages that would plague the party: 
 
With him (Tsvangirai) at the apex, the rest of the leadership you can trace their roots in academia 
and students. So even up to now he has got after him, there is Khupe when you go to the secretary 
general, to the other position you will then find that a lot of those guys were then student leaders, 
Tendai Biti, Nelson Chamisa, Judah Jongwe, Douglas Mwonzora, even before then Priscilla 
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Misihairambwi, these were all academics who sort of combined with the workers to be able to create 
this thing. 
 
As this section has shown, labour formed the single largest organised section of civil 
society. The labour movement was composed largely of the urban population, with the 
Industrial Workers Union forming the largest body in the Zimbabwe Congress of 
Trade Unions. In Gramscian terms labour union leadership was therefore organic to 
the country’s urban and rural mining and commercial farming working class. Through 
active engagement with global trade unionism, particularly during the period of the 
1980s, the Union’s leadership made use of skills and training from both the Soviet 
Union and social democratic states which played the role of organic intellectuals, as 
Khumalo’s interview (cited above) has shown. It was Morgan Tsvangirai’s leadership 
which allowed the ZCTU to broaden its leadership by his forming personal 
relationships with other segments of civil society, particularly students, university 




When the crisis of the late 1990s began, the second level counter-hegemonic bloc 
(apart from the trade unions) were those whom Gramsci would define as traditional 
intellectuals. As shown in Chapter 3, through their ‘monopoly of a number of 
important services: religious ideology, that is the philosophy and science of the age, 
together with schools, education, morality, justice, charity, good works’ (Gramsci, 
2000, p. 301), traditional intellectuals produce the ‘common sense’ of the age. In 
Gramsci’s assessment of Europe in the early 20th century, traditional intellectuals often 
maintain this conservative position; however, Zimbabwe’s academics have tended to 
be relatively independent and critical of power. Zimbabwe’s intellectuals were 
traditionally clustered around the University of Zimbabwe either as academics or as 
students who would then move into other sectors of the multifaceted counter- 
hegemonic movement as academics, lawyers, journalists and the church organisations. 
Equally, they frequently became employees and activists in the NGO sphere as well 
as in the national staff for donors who funded the NGOs. From the moment of 
independence in 1980 the University of Zimbabwe has been a bastion of socialist 
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scholarship. The departments of history and political science had worked largely in 
the school of Marxist political economy, often analysing the country’s progress in 
terms of the achievement of socialist goals, as was the case in Mandaza’s (1986) 
Zimbabwe: Political Economy of Transition. The university had included among its 
part- time and full-time staff prominent Marxist scholars such as Tandon, Nabudere 
and Shivji. They had all engaged vigorously in the Dar es Salaam debates on the nature 
of the African state, as mentioned in the literature review chapter. Mandaza has 
remained one of Zimbabwe’s most visible public intellectuals, having been the 
owner/editor of the country’s largest private newspaper in the 1990s and also through 
his Southern Africa Political Economy Series (SAPES) Trust think-tank. This institute 
has continued to hold policy dialogues which are able to bring together members of 
the opposition as well as representatives and supporters of the ruling party. Mandaza’s 
personal history in the liberation struggle, his presence at the negotiations at Lancaster 
House and his role as the first permanent secretary of the Ministry of Manpower 
Development place him in the unique position of being able to critique Zanu-PF from 
relative proximity and with a degree of license not often afforded to other critics. 
Mandaza’s position as a prominent intellectual in Zimbabwe is clearly evident in an 
exchange between Stephen Chan and Morgan Tsvangirai in which Tsvangirai cites 
Mandaza in particular as representing Zimbabwe’s traditional intellectuals. Tsvangirai 
however accuses Mandaza of being an apologist for Zanu-PF through his and other 
traditional intellectuals’ overemphasis (in Tsvangirai’s assessment) on the historical 
injustices of colonialism. 
 
Among the intellectuals who had formed an organic relationship with the trade unions 
were Renee Lowenson, Kempton Makamure and Shadrack Gutto. These were often 
cited by labour unions as being ‘the elite of the left’ (in interviews with Kondo, 
Kanyenze and Gwiyo). Makamure and Gutto in particular had been involved in 
articulating a socialist ideology and incorporating it with the interests of the trade 
union movement through engagement and discussion with the union structures. 
Shadrack Gutto, an exile from Kenya and a professor in the Law Department at the 
University of Zimbabwe, had supported student protests against the curtailing of 
academic freedom in 1988 and was threatened with deportation and ultimately forced 
to leave the country. Kempton Makamure was detained for four weeks for criticising 
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the implementation of ESAP in a radio interview in 1992. Together with former Zanu- 
PF MP Margaret Dongo, Makamure would eventually form a short-lived political 
party, the Zimbabwe Union of Democrats, to compete in the 2000 elections. 
 
Another important public intellectual who took the role of critiquing the state, Brian 
Raftopulous, would go on to play a central opposition role in forming NGOs which 
openly criticised the rising authoritarianism in the country. Along with Lloyd 
Sachikonye, Raftopulous edited two volumes on the labour movement in Zimbabwe. 
The first Keep on Knocking: A History of the Labour Movement in Zimbabwe covered 
the history of Zimbabwean labour between 1900 and 1997 while the second, Striking 
Back, covered the labour movement in the post-colonial state between 1980 and 2000. 
These books were funded by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and included chapters by 
national and international academics who played the role of traditional intellectuals in 
Zimbabwean civil society. Among these were Patrick Bond, Patrick Yeros, Blair 
Rutherford, Yash Tandon and Suzanne Dansereau. 
 
There were certainly some academics who did not fit the Marxist mould in 
Zimbabwean universities. Prior to his engagement in Zanu-PF politics Jonathan Moyo 
had been a vocal liberal critic of the centralisation of power in the executive presidency 
in the one-party state debate. John Makumbe, a professor of political science at the 
University of Zimbabwe, was another vitriolic critic of the regime. Makumbe lent his 
intellectual support to the MDC and stood as an MP for the party in 2000 though he 
did not manage to secure a seat. He had also been involved with counter-hegemonic 
NGOs and civil society, having been the chairman of Transparency International 
Zimbabwe and the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition. Also among these liberal public 
intellectuals, Welshman Ncube had been a law lecturer at the University of Zimbabwe 
and had therefore represented academic and intellectual influence in the opposition 
movement. Ncube, more than any other actor, would embody the schism between 
workers and intellectuals that took place in the opposition movement in 2005 and split 
it into two factions, one led by Morgan Tsvangirai and the other by Welshman Ncube. 
 
It is important to note that a sizeable proportion of Zimbabwe’s intellectuals supported 
Zanu-PF. Once Zimbabwe entered the phase of organic crisis following 1997, these 
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academics who would come to represent what Norma Kriger and Terence Ranger have 
termed patriotic history. The following chapter will outline some of the positions of 
this patriotic history and its main proponents such as Mararike, Chivaura, and 





In addition to the faculty at the University of Zimbabwe, students from the country’s 
tertiary institutions would become a central plank of the opposition movement. Among 
the leading student activists in the mid-1980s were Briggs Zano who would become 
president of the Law Society and Tinoziva Bere who would chair the Zimbabwe 
Lawyers for Human Rights and the Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network. Among the 
most prominent member of the movement would be Tendai Biti who would become 
vice-president of the MDC and finance minister under the Government of National 
Unity. Gwisayi cites Biti as ‘the leading red tie in the student's movement’. Gwisayi 
attributes the foundations to the movement that he and Arthur Mutambara inherited 
and ‘picked up the baton in the sense of openly resisting the state in a manner that had 
not been done before’ to Biti (Gwisayi, 2011). Arthur Mutambara’s leadership of the 
University of Zimbabwe’s Student Representative Council between 1988 and 1989 
saw a more assertive and politically engaged organisation as it militated more 
vociferously against the one-party state. Mutambara would go on to pursue his PhD in 
robotics at Oxford University as a Rhodes scholar, only returning to Zimbabwe in 
2005 to lead the new faction of the MDC. Mutambara was unable to win a 
parliamentary seat in Zengeza (a small constituency in Harare) though he went on to 
become a signatory to the Global Political Agreement and held the post of deputy 
prime minister throughout the Government of National Unity. 
 
Students in Zimbabwe in the first decades of independence could be classed as 
traditional intellectuals as well as being organic to the working classes, in that they 
often came from working class families and were training for careers that would define 
 
14 Blessing Miles Tendi’ s Making History in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe is a comprehensive treatment of intellectuals who were 
proponents of this patriotic history, including Mahoso, Chivaura and Mararike, 
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them as traditional intellectuals. Hopewell Gumbo’s story of his entry into student 
politics and his motives for engagement is as enlightening as it is representative of the 
trajectories of student leadership: 
 
My orientation in reading at University was with the society for Modern Scientific Thought which 
ultimately was the International Socialist Organisation. So they had study circles, reading hard 
politics and engaged in a lot of political activities which I would say linked up with the labour 
movement because I know that after lectures and during weekends I would go for newspaper sales 
for the ISO paper and we would also develop leaflets that we would circulate about common issues 
on campus. 
 
I had my own perception of issues and I found that the ISO was an interesting group to link up with. 
For one I had written a story about the oppression of workers in Triangle sugar estates after a strike 
and it was published in the ISO newspaper. There was a strike in Triangle Ltd and they burned 
down some sugar cane fields and I said the struggle must continue and it must be linked up with the 
whole nation and solidarity with the workers of Triangle. That was the area I grew up in and I hated 
to see the kind of oppression that I continued to see (Gumbo, 2011). 
 
Gumbo’s story highlights the importance of the International Socialist Organisation as 
an ideological school for most of the student leadership in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. Munyaradzi Gwisayi, a former student activist, lawyer and long-time leader of 
the International Socialist Organisation, explains the centrality of the ISO to the 
formation of the ideological consciousness of students (Gwisayi, 2011): 
 
What is interesting about the response at the UZ is its class character in its conscious dimensions. 
Leading figures in that movement would have been very left-inclined students who viewed 
themselves as Marxists and they would have been under the heavy influence of Marxian academics 
notably Kempton Makamure and Shadrack Gutto. A number of key student activists throughout the 
late 1980s until the mid-1990s were members of the ISO. 
 
Zelig (2011) has also referred to the fact that prominent student leaders like Arthur 
Mutambara, Brian Kagoro and Tinoziva Bere had all come through the membership 
of the ISO. Jacob Mafume, another former student activist described this shifting 
identity as follows: 
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If you trace some of these guys who are in the MDC people like Mwonzora, Jameson Timba. They 
were students at that time who had been members of ZUM. So you will find that they were proud 
that they were contra to Zanu-PF and pro-workers. There were socialist trappings, most of the 
student leaders at one point or the other joined the International Socialist Organisation led by 
Munyaradzi Gwisai, and tried to find explanation in a view that because Zanu-PF had betrayed the 
socialist struggle it had become a lumpen party and therefore was no longer a liberator but an 
oppressor (Mafume, 2011). 
 
It is notable that due to the country’s economic structure at the time, the relationship 
between the interests of labour and students would evaporate once students graduated 
(Gwiyo, 2001). As noted above, the relationship between students and labour had not 
been particularly strong until the formation of the NCA and ultimately the MDC. This 
was certainly true once students left university and joined the workforce as managers 
as a result of the definition of ‘managerial staff’ noted above. Nevertheless, there had 
been some connections between students and workers. Tsvangirai’s arrest in 1989 in 
support of student protests against the one-party state was one such moment of unity. 
 
The mid-1990s saw the formation of the Zimbabwe National Student’s Union which 
combined the student’s representative councils of the country’s tertiary education 
institutions. At that time these included only the University of Zimbabwe, the newly- 
opened National University of Science and Technology in Bulawayo and the 
Polytechnic Colleges in Harare and Bulawayo. This period coincided with the growth 
in opposition sentiment throughout the country’s civil society. Opposition grew 
towards to the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme and government brutality 
which students experienced during brutal police crackdowns on student protests. The 
first leadership of this ZINASU consisted of actors who would become key youth 
figures in the NCA and the MDC. As leader of the UZ SRC, Learnmore Jongwe was 
instrumental in the revival of the national students’ mother body (ZINASU). In March 
1997 Jongwe was elected as national president of the ZINASU executive which also 
included Daniel Molokele as the vice president, Charlton Hwende as secretary-general 
and Job Sikhala as information and publicity secretary. Learnmore Jongwe was the 
most prominent of these activists and served as ZINASU president from 1997 to 1999. 
During the 1998 food riots, Jongwe led countrywide student protests against the rising 
cost of living in Zimbabwe. This charismatic law student joined the MDC immediately 
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after the National Working Peoples convention and would become one of the party’s 
first members of parliament15. Takura Zhangazha, Jongwe’s deputy in ZINASU, was 
seconded to the National Constitutional Assembly as a strategic choice to have the 
leadership of the students’ union covering both flanks of the opposition movement, 
that is on the civil society and the political fronts. Job Sikhala would also become a 
prominent youth leader in the MDC and eventually became an MP for the St Mary’s 
constituency in Harare. 
 
Once the cohort of students who had been present at the formation of the MDC and 
NCA had set out a path, subsequent generations of students sought to follow the same 
trajectory. Being a student leader became a clear route to a professional position in 
civil society, donor organisations or indeed as a leader within the opposition party. By 
the first decade of the 2000s the economic crisis had reduced the employment 
prospects for students in the private sector and had also narrowed career options for 
student leaders in the civil service; thus, a career in politics or in an NGO would 
become their best employment option. 
 
Takura Zhangazha, a founding deputy president ZINASU and a member of the NCA 
board, describes the vital experience that student leadership provided: 
 
we learned how to write minutes after a meeting, we learned how to read statutory instruments and 
how to report back to our national executives, and how to report to our student's unions via a general 
meeting. We learned how to formally put things down on paper and write to the ministry, try and 
go to court and do a court petition etc, that sort of stuff. We learned how to deal with exclusion from 
campuses, suspension, how to cope, survival tactics and strategies. (Zhangazha, 2011) 
 
Regarding their approach to collective action, student politics was characterised by a 
degree of boldness in the face of authority but also with violence towards internal 
opponents. The radical phase of student politics under Mutambara, Biti and Gwisayi 
had also created the phenomenon of the UBA, the University Bachelor Association, 
which referred to the heavy- drinking, macho student culture (Zelig 2006). Zelig 
 
 
15 Jongwe’s rise would end in tragedy as he would commit suicide under police  custody  for  having 
murdered his wife in July 2002 
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(2006) and Hodgkinson (2013) have documented this self-proclaimed ‘hooliganism’ 
on the part of students who, in the early 1990s would not shy away from violence 
against public property in their protests. This capacity for violence would often turn 
on opposing factions in student movements. The phenomenon of the UBA would take 
different forms such as the ‘hardcore activist’ and the ‘Revolutionary Command 
Council’. The ‘Revolutionary Command Council’ was a moniker for a group of 
particularly resolute student activists known for attacking police during student riots 
at the university. Among these were Nixon Nykadzino and McDonald Lewanika, Joy 
Mabenge and Itai Zimunya. These and other members of the RCC would become 
leaders in the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, a civil society movement that became a 
prominent opponent to the government. This connection of students also stood at the 
intersection of the cross-pollination between the MDC, professionalised civil society 
and the donors. Jacob Mafume, in an interview in 2011, provides this insight into the 
Revolutionary Command Council: 
 
Well it was something that the students had, it was sort of like a wing of activists within the 
collective group of activists. It was a response to the oppression of the system at that time. You 
needed to have invisible enforcers, people who understood the broad objective of what you were 
trying to do. Be able to mobilise toward that action because you can’t just call a demonstration then 
go and say to people ‘we are going to demonstrate tomorrow, then go back and sit down’. So, if 
somebody talks about the Arab uprisings, the press, the leaders of the uprising want to give you the 
impression that there was an awakening and people went into the streets at this particular point in 
time. no, it’s not an accident. You had to have people who you sit with weeks or months before 
any action. So these were people who were very active, brave is mild, reckless who ran towards 
danger. 
 
Asked about the trajectories of those who were in the Revolutionary Command 
Council, Mafume adds: 
 
What happened is that most of us who became student leaders, you would start being in the 
revolutionary command council. For you to get elected you were not going to come from nowhere. 
What would happen is that among yourselves you would recognise a person who would make it as 
a leader, who is both brave and presentable enough but also charismatic to attract the following of 
the broader students. So what you would see is that people like Takura (Zhangazha), like myself 
like Mao (Nixon Nyikadzino). Mao who was actually the chairman of the RCC, went into the 
leadership. Gabriel Shumba, Job Sikhala, so most of the student MPs and the guys who are leading 
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civil society now were part of that active student core. You were sort of underground, if you looked 
at this period, the oppression is too much, we need to give back as good as we are getting, we need 
to throw stones, we need to burn something, we need to do something like that, you would then be 
able to call upon that network and say ‘look comrades, tomorrow we are going to do this’ and it 




Some interviewees related the prevalence of violence in internal campaigns for student 
leadership, as members of civil society organisations (now comrades) would openly 
recall how they had attacked each other, in some instances recounting examples of 
grave violence in students’ union elections at the University of Zimbabwe (Katema, 
2011; Bere, 2011). This recourse to violence may have transferred to their activities 
within the opposition movement. The violence endemic in student union politics was 
particularly evident in 2010 when the Zimbabwe National Student’s Union split into 
two factions; one was led by Clever Bere, the previous incumbent who had sought to 
extend his term as ZINASU president and the other by Joshua Chinyerere (2011) who 
had been voted in at a national congress. The split union gathered divergent support 
from different sectors of civil society. At the time civil society was divided over 
whether or not to support or oppose the constitution-making process; in this case the 
NCA, which supported Bere, was opposed to what it saw as a politician-driven 
political process. Interviewed in 2011, Chinyere highlighted the omnipresence of 
violent student politics but also how the country’s economic crisis had affected the 
capacity for student activists to engage in political activities, as well as the greater 
risks of repression which made street protests less feasible. Chinyere also noted the 
fact that the ultimate goal of student leadership would have been to seek political 
office, and the source of the conflict in student union politics was seeking political 
patronage and positions within the MDC, and at the time what was anticipated as 




Another segment in the leadership of the mass movement is the lawyers who formed 
a cross-section of other segments of the movement. Virtually all lawyers had been 
educated at the University of Zimbabwe and would therefore have been involved in 
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student activism. They often started in the International Socialist Organisation, then 
cut their political teeth in the student representative councils or in the Zimbabwe 
National Students Union after its establishment in 1999. After leaving university 
lawyers would often remain involved in the political discussions that were taking place 
in the late 1990s, as well as through their professional engagements. Hence individuals 
such Brian Kagoro who had been prominent law students would be critical actors in 
the Zimbabwe Council of Churches as the primary drivers of the formation of the NCA 
and the MDC. Another ways in which lawyers engaged in the counter-hegemonic 
movement was to defend activists in court while working for private firms or the 
Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights. Individuals such as Paul Themba Nyathi 
would have played an important role in the formation of the NCA and civil society 
organisations. Gwisayi from the ISO was a lawyer trained in the United States at 
Columbia University as were Madhuku and Kagoro. David Coltart, a lawyer who 
would become an MDC MP for Bulawayo South, had represented the families of 
victims of the Gukurahundi massacres. 
 
Among the key student leaders who joined the opposition party, Learnmore Jongwe, 
Thoko Matshe, Tendai Biti, Priscilla Misihairambwi and Jessie Majome had all been 
law students. The heavy representation of lawyers in the movement certainly had an 
impact on the issues the movement prioritised as well as the route the movement chose 
to confront power. The focus on constitutional reform through the NCA and afterwards 
reflects this legalistic emphasis. The MDC’s constant legal battles with the 
government made legal training a useful tool as the party was regularly under attack 
from the government while also using the courts as an arena for contesting government 
arbitrariness and heavy-handedness. The fact that Nelson Chamisa went on to study 
for a law degree while serving in the cabinet of the Government of National Unity may 
reflect the perceived importance of a legal education for counter-hegemonic 
leadership. The intellectual and symbolic role of lawyers was evidently important to 
Morgan Tsvangirai, who emphasised in an interview with Stephen Chan in 2005 that 
the MDC had eight lawyers among its MPs (Chan, 2005). 
 
Professionalised NGO leadership and activists 
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The period following the introduction of ESAP in 1990 coincided with the burgeoning 
of national non-governmental organisations in Zimbabwe. The sprouting of NGOs in 
Zimbabwe was in response to a growing national awareness of the concepts of human 
rights and parallel to the international aspirations of civil society as a counterweight 
to authoritarian government as outlined in the literature review. 
 
Certainly some organisations such as the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace 
had played an important role documenting cases of human rights abuses since before 
independence. The CCJP played a central role in bringing to light the atrocities in 
Matabeleland during the Gukurahundi period in the early 1980s. Apart from the CCJP, 
associational life in Zimbabwe had largely steered clear of political controversy, let 
alone opposition politics. The CCJP, however, had had a history of activism against 
the Rhodesian state and had built quite strong connections with the nationalist 
movement. Its reporting on the Matabeland atrocities gave this organisation a degree 
of objectivity that Zanu-PF could not easily deny. Leaders in the CCJP included Mike 
Auret, who became an MDC MP once the party was formed and contested its first 
elections in 2000. 
 
By the early 1990s International organisations such as Transparency International also 
began to have chapters in Zimbabwe. This organisation attracted luminaries into their 
leadership such as Professor John Makumbe, who had become a notable liberal 
democratic critic of the Zimbabwean government and would stand as an MDC 
candidate in the 2000 elections. 
 
The first prominent donor funded NGO in Zimbabwe was the Zimbabwe Human 
Rights Association, ZIMRIGHTS. This organisation was formed in 1992 with the 
purpose of ensuring that the Zimbabwean citizens were informed about human rights 
would have the tools to defend these. The organisation was led from its inception by 
Dr Reginald Matchaba Hove who came to be a central actor in the formation of a 
number of other key human rights and observation organisations and contained in its 
advisory board the former Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, Sir Garfield Todd, 
former chief justice Enoch Dumbutshena, the prominent author Chenjerai Hove, 
Morgan Tsvangirai, the secretary general of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions 
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(Dorman, 2004). The organisation estimated that it had a membership of 14000 in 
1996. However, ZIMRIGHTS was among the first organisations to receive donor 
funding for its activities. The introduction of donor funding definitively resulted in the 
organisation’s transformation into a professionalisation and erosion of its membership 
base. ZIMRIGHTS came into direct conflict with the government on numerous 
occasions in the 1990s as it conducted research into the Gukurahundi, supported 
strikes by nurses and doctors in 1997 and criticised the heavy-handedness of the police 
in response to food riots in 1997. Dorman (2001) notes that while ZIMRIGHTS 
certainly came under attack from the state and may have been infiltrated by agents 
from the Central Intelligence Organisation “it suffered more grievously from internal, 
personalized conflicts arising from the blurred distinction between members and staff” 
as well as from a series of incidents of financial mismanagement which led to the 
organisation’s abandonment by donors and collapse in 2000. While the organisation 
would be resuscitated in the mid 2000s it would never have the same level of 
prominence. Importantly key leadership of ZIMRIGHTS in the 1990s reflected the 
trajectories which NGO leadership would take as Reginald Matchaba-Hove would 
occupy the chairmanship of a number of boards of NGOs including the Zimbabwe 
Election Support Network before being employed by the donors Open Society 
International and the National Endowment for Democracy. The organisation’s 
Executive Director between 1995 and 1999, David Chimhini would become a founder 
Member of the MDC and Member of Parliament for Mutasa North despite his exit 
from the organisation in a cloud of suspicion over financial mismanagement (Dorman, 
2004) 
 
Out of ZIRIGHTS a number of other professionalised governance and Human Rights 
NGOs sprouted and came to constitute Zimbabwe’s NGO civil society space. These 
include the Zimbabwe Election Support Network, the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO 
Forum, Zimbabwe Women Lawyers Association and the Crisis in Zimbabwe 
Coalition. These organisations were also often opposed to the government and as such 
came to be a training ground for the country’s would-be opposition. The increase in 
potential funding had a commensurate influence on the formation of NGOs that dealt 
with a range of democratisation and human rights issues. 
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A notable factor about the donor funded NGO space is the narrowness of the 
organisation’s membership. It is important to note that as donor funding increased, and 
freedom of expression in Zimbabwe’s societal space was shrinking, the membership 
organisations in Zimbabwe decreased as the number of NGOs that respond to donor-
driven priorities grew. A notable trait of these organisations is the fact that a very 
narrow space of individuals comprises their leadership. Often the board of an 
organisation is made up of the executive directors of the handful of other organisations 
in the country. Hence in effect the leadership of organisations draws from a very small 
pool of organisations, few of which can actually claim to have a membership beyond 
the staff that work for them. Writing in 2003, Trudy Stevenson, a former member of 
the Harare Residents Association and then an MDC member of Parliament, ascribed 
the weakness in civil society to its politicisation and partisanship in a polarised 
environment. She noted then: 
 
This politicisation of civil society does not go unnoticed, nor is it likely to strengthen civil society. 
Indeed, it is already causing disaffection. More seriously, it has become such a widespread 
incestuous relationship that instead of civil society organising itself more widely, its organised 
members are actually dwindling, since the same person holds positions in several organisations at 
the same time! Furthermore, someone will chair one organisation one year and then move to another 
a year or so later, round and round the circuit. Board leadership incest has certainly become a worse 
problem since then as a few leaders sit on the boards of directors for numerous civil society 
organizations (theindependent.co.zw, May 30, 2003). 
 
In an interview in 2011 Jonah Gokova, who had been a prominent civil society activist 
since the 1990s, described his own affiliation to multiple civil society organisations. 
These included his directorship of the Ecumenical Support Services, his previous 
membership of the National Constitutional Assembly, the Harare Resident's 
Association for which he was deputy chair, the Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and 
Development and Padare/Enkundhleni Men's Forum on Gender, all while serving as 
the chairman of the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, the Popular Education Centre, and 
being on the Board of Trustees of the Women's Action Group. Gokova is in this sense 
no outlier. The incestuous nature of Zimbabwean CSO boards means in reality that 
there are only a handful of actors in the space constituting civil society. Gokova 





I [Gokova] think it’s to do with the environment in which we are living and working. It’s a 
demanding environment. It’s a struggle for democracy that requires a multifaceted approach. So 
sometimes an individual ends up getting involved in different, it’s a question of strategy. That you 
need that multi-faceted approach so that your intervention is not just coming from one corner, but 
from different corners. It’s also to do largely with a hostile environment where you expect some of 
these engagements to be blocked. So if two organisations are shut down at least you still have one 
or two others that are still ongoing. So it was largely a question of strategy. 
 
There is no question that leadership in Zimbabwe’s civil society comes with 
tremendous personal risk. Among the leaders of the country’s most prominent 
democratisation and human rights organisations from the early 2000s were women 
like Jestina Mukoko, who has led the Zimbabwe Peace Project since 2000, Irene Petras 
and Beatrice Mtetwa of the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, and Rindai 
Chifunde Vava at the Zimbabwe Election Support Network, all of whom have shown 
considerable courage in performing their roles. Mukoko in particular underwent brutal 
treatment when she was kidnapped by the Central Intelligence Organisation during the 
period between the two rounds of the 2008 elections. Apart from individual women, 
women’s’ organisations in Zimbabwe have always played an important role in 
opposing the government. For example, Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) has 
become notorious for its annual Valentine’s Day protest against the lack of democracy 




Donor requirements might best account for the structures of a number of the country’s 
new NGOs. They were generally formed in keeping with structures that allowed for 
greater accountability to donors; these included a board, an executive director and a 
number of staff. The respect for democratic values in these organisations was probably 
a combination of accord with donor requirements as much as an innate democracy 
within the associational sphere, as de Tocqueville or any of his descendants may have 
imagined. There is no question that the NGO sphere offers an attractive career path for 
Zimbabweans. This was the case in the 1990s when the effects of ESAP were first 
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felt and both the private and public sector were beginning to wither. By the middle of 
the first decade of the 2000s, when hyperinflation and unemployment had become 
rampant, the option of being paid in foreign currency certainly made a number of 
people working in civil society comparatively wealthy. There were also some notable 
cases of corruption and mismanagement of funds within these organisations, such as 
the collapse of the Transparency International board as well as that of the 




While international donors do not qualify as part of the movement’s mass base, the 
opposition movement in Zimbabwe has been almost entirely dependent on 
international donor funding and support throughout its existence. Indeed, a number of 
the organisations have arisen as much out of demand from donors as from a home- 
grown impetus to fill a need. This was often as a result of changing patterns of 
international engagement, as the spread of human rights monitoring organisations and 
election observation organisations would not necessarily have been domestic. An 
example of this dynamic between donors and national NGOs is the formation of the 
Zimbabwe Election Support Network in 2000. This organisation arose when Rindai 
Chipfunde-Vava, then a programme officer at ZIMRIGHTS, became aware of the field 
of citizen election observation after a trip to Malawi in 2000. In informal discussions 
with donor representatives Chipfunde-Vava put together a proposal to form the 
Zimbabwe Election Support Network in anticipation of the 2000 parliamentary 
elections. The need for a national observation group had become particularly evident 
after the violence and farm invasions which had followed the rejection of the 
constitutional draft in the February 2000 referendum. Vava notes how eager donors 
were as the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Sweden all rushed 
to fund the new organisation. 
 
The fact that the drive for new organisations or for new areas of activities came in 
response to donors is also reflected in the overlap of organisations with the same 
objectives. This competition for donor funding has produced the older coalition of the 
Zimbabwe Election Support Network and the Zimbabwe Election Resource Centre. 
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Similarly, the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition arose out of a need to fund a different 
organisation from the National Constitutional Assembly as relationships with donors 
began to suffer. There are also separate organisations dealing with questions of human 
rights and media monitoring, and the market is often saturated with competition over 
donor resources. This dependence on often-limited donor resources explains the NGO 
space in Zimbabwe. With limited opportunities for advancement in the opposition 
movement and civil society, individuals would often form their own organisations. 
This split by a form of mitosis is similar to the division of a living cell, in that an 
organisation might form in relation to a new need, but more often in relation to 
disgruntlement within an organisation or donor requests. Thus, staff from an existing 
organisation would form a new organisation with a board composed of executive 
directors or staff from other organisations in the same space. 
 
The vicissitudes of NGOs in Zimbabwe depended largely on their relationship with 
international donors. Where donors were no longer impressed with an organisation’s 
leadership the leadership would have to change or the organisation would collapse. 
Ibbo Mandaza cites his refusal to join the MDC as a reason why his institute stopped 
receiving support from the donors (Mandaza interviews, 2011, 2017). A similar 
relationship occurred with the NCA following the formation of the MDC, as Madhuku 
cites in an interview in 2011. The CEO of the National Association of NGOs, Cephas 
Zinhumwe, also gave examples of explicit threats of funding cuts from donors where 
his approach diverged from their expectations. Where threats are not explicit, there is 
the implication that should an organisation fall foul of the donor, funding would be cut 
or a rival organisation would be funded to conduct similar governance and 
democratisation activities. An example of this is the competition in election 
observation organisations. Initially the Zimbabwe Election Support Network had been 
formed in the run-up to the 2000 elections and had been the country’s most prominent 
citizen observation network. The organisation’s executive director Rindai Chipfunde- 
Vava, has cited pressure from donors to use more condemnatory language in the 
organisation’s observer reports on elections in 2005 and in 2013. She underlined her 
organisation’s resistance to using more critical language as the reason for donor 




Donors also hired staff members who were visible leaders in civil society. Arguably 
the first such example of a key Zimbabwean civil society leader moving into the donor 
sphere was when ZIMRIGHTS founder Reginald Matchaba Hove went to work for 
the National Endowment for Democracy in Washington DC. This transition has 
become commonplace, with prominent and talented student leaders moving from 
student leadership up the ladder into positions with international organisations such as 
the Open Society Foundation (as was the case with Deprose Muchena, Itai Zimunya, 
Washington Katema and Otto Saki). When one individual left an NGO his or her 
successor would follow, shifting up from the previous organisation in the chain. 
 
Collen Gwiyo (2011) emphasises the importance of this network and how it was 
perceived by MDC representatives: 
 
When Tawanda Mutasah left USAID, he went to OSISA. Then Deprose [Muchena] went to USAID, 
and then when Deprose left USAID to join Tawanda Mutasah, Jacob Mafume then joined USAID. 
When Jacob left USAID, was it Itai [Zimunya] or the one who was at ZLHR, Otto [Saki] is there, 
Katema is there. So it is very clear to say the pool for recruitment is from the student activists you 
can see the chain yourself and that would obviously have an influence because the ordinary person 
who was a general secretary at ZCTU while Zimunya was finishing his studies and at the same time 
was a member of ZINASU, if you put them side by side, the trade unionist would actually be funded 
by the student, which then means [the boy] now has more of an opportunity of getting elected. The 
table has turned the people in the union had the resources in 2000 to campaign. 
 
The relationship between local donor staff and the NGOs they funded has not been 
without controversy as questions of favouritism bordering on patronage and corruption 
often arise (www.zimbabweonlinenews.com) 
 
Certainly, dependence on donor funding might indicate the necessity to serve the 
interests of the funding nation. The funding of governance, democratisation and 
human rights support internationally is not unique to Zimbabwe, though the system of 
donor support for governance is not without controversy, as mentioned in the literature 
review. International donor support for democratisation in Zimbabwe, particularly by 
the United Kingdom and the United States, left the democratisation movement open 
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to the accusation, particularly from Mugabe, of NGOs working in governance being 
puppets of the west. These accusations, however cynical, nevertheless stuck as is 
evident in the chapter on the means to the proposed ends. The UK’s position on land 
reform in Zimbabwe as well as the nature of international aid policy on questions of 
development and the route towards development meant that all organisations, certainly 
any organisation that sought donor funding, would have to adopt a neo-liberal stance 
in as much as this related to economic policy. This has often been cited as the reason 





Farmers and Businessmen 
 
Finally, it is important to include farmers and business leaders in the analysis of the 
counter-hegemonic movement. This is not because of their numerical presence but for 
the influence they have or are perceived to have in the trajectory and policies of the 
opposition. Two particular actors, Roy Bennet and Eddie Cross, represent these 
interests and would be controversial as much for their class backgrounds as for their 
race in the Zimbabwean context. Roy Bennet had been a commercial farmer in 
Chimanimani and had served as the Chairman of the Commercial Farmers Union. 
Given the looming land reform policy and the fact that the government had gazetted 
farms for seizure and resettlement in 1997, representation by farmers against this 
policy had driven farmers into political action. Other white commercial farmers would 
become more politically engaged following the appropriation of white-owned farms 
between 2000 and 2002. These included Iain Kay, who would become an MP for the 
MDC from 2000 onwards, and Ben Freeth who would launch a campaign against the 
government which included bringing a case against the Zimbabwean Government to 
the SADC Tribunal. Eddie Cross had been chief executive of the Dairy Board and the 
Cold Storage Commission and vice president of the Zimbabwe Confederation of 
Industries before joining the MDC and becoming the party’s secretary for economics 
in 2000. The fact that Bennet and Cross would become the MDC’s key spokespeople 
on farming and economic issues certainly diminished the party’s claims of being a 
worker’s party. The fact that the MDC’s policy became deeply intertwined with white 
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commercial farmers and business people would leave the party vulnerable to being 
cast as sell-outs in the revolutionary rhetoric of Zanu-PF, as the ruling party sought to 









Parallel to the formation of the NCA, the Research and Advocacy Department of the 
ZCTU under the leadership of Timothy Kondo had in June of 1996 begun conducting 
public outreach meetings. This was done in conjunction with the Organisation for 
Rural Associations for Progress (ORAP) in all the country’s provinces’, as a follow 
up to the Beyond ESAP document. Kondo explains the root of the ‘Worker Driven’ 
and ‘People-Centred’ Development Process for Zimbabwe, which ran between 1996 
and February 2000 and culminated in the ‘Raw Data’ report which traces the genesis 
of the MDC as follows: 
 
our weakness was that even if we are lobbying and influencing and engaging, we are not guided 
by some policy guidelines of where we are going. Here (in the Raw Data interviews) we were 
creating possibility within the trade union of forming a political party because we could not 
have done it before without policy guidelines. I was employed to lobby government. So we 
tried to engage them with a questionnaire for every MP, we put in their pigeon holes then 
followed with appointments; one to one, and I managed to speak to eight of them, the rest were 
all avoiding. 
 
Then this has failed to work, in 1997 we started local pre-convention, consultation process 
questionnaire. That’s where we went out to the civic society. We are trying to engage these 
people over these ideas. The idea here was to now formulate a broader voice, and we were 





If government had responded favourably to these initiatives of ZCTU that 1997 food riot would 
not have occurred, even the formation of the MDC may not have occurred. The agenda not of 
Morgan and a few individuals but of the masses of people and civic society organisations was to 
call the attention of government to address issues that were problematic, and we believed they 
have the capacity to address these problems if they are willing and then they did not show 
willingness to engage with the ZCTU. What people were looking for was a government that is 
accountable, transparent, and gives them space and government in itself failed, they cannot 
blame anybody for this development yekuzoformerwa a mass party (of having a mass party 
formed against them). They have no one to blame other than themselves. They didn’t want to 
listen.16 
 
Following the public outreach meetings across the country the ZCTU’s process 
culminated in a meeting to be held in Harare. Between 26 and 28 February 1999 over 
400 individuals representing 40 organisations met at the National Working People’s 
Convention held at the women’s bureau in Harare. This was to ‘seriously discuss the 
current social, economic, and political environment that the civil society in Zimbabwe 
finds itself in’ (ZCTU, 2000). The participants to the convention discussed an ‘Agenda 
for Action’ in relation to the economy and the labour market, education, health and 
social security as well as the country’s political system and governance. The 
declaration on the third day of the convention noted: 
that the inability to implement any meaningful steps to redress these basic economic and social 
problems emanates from a crisis of governance within the nation. This crisis expresses itself 
as a failure of government to observe the separation of powers between the executive 
legislature and judiciary, to obey basic rules of accountability and transparency to respect 
human rights and decentralise power in ways that enable meaningful participation of people 
in public institutions. (ZCTU, 2000) 
The declaration concluded with the statement that ’the convention thus resolved to 
take these issues to the people across the country, to mobilise them towards the 
working people’s agenda, and to implement a vigorous and democratic political 





16 Interestingly, while Kondo was central to  the formation of the MDC he emphasises that he  never became  a 
card-carrying member and that because of his l iberation war experience he would  always  consider himself a 
member of ZANU: ‘Look, comrade. I don’t know how many t imes I can emphasize that I am   ZANU myself  
and I cannot leave my party and I expect my fellow comrades to bury me when I die’. 
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The movement described in the declaration was inaugurated exactly a year after the 
end of the NWPC as the Movement for Democratic Change, at an inaugural congress 
attended by over 3 000 people. The MDC’s manifesto adopted at the inaugural 
congress concluded with a call to action to change the country’s political culture within 
‘the next five years’. The means to this change were spelled out as being ‘in our wise 





Chapter 4 focuses on the Zimbabwe’s experiment with neo-liberal economic reforms 
driven by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank between 1990 and 
1997. The chapter considers this Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) 
phase as a distinct historical bloc. This phase would ultimately bring about the organic 
crisis historical bloc which would characterise Zimbabwean politics after 2000. The 
chapter elaborates on the decisions to implement the Structural Adjustment 
Programme and its impact on the national modes of production. This period of 
immense economic change took place in a context of relative political freedom 
following the abandonment of the one-party state idea in the global context of “the end 
of history”. The blocs combination of economic pressures and increasing political 
dissent led to the coalescence of a counter-hegemonic movement combining labour, 
students, and an increasingly relevant organised civil society. 
Having outlined the base superstructure dynamics of the ESAP bloc the chapter breaks 
down the various components of Zimbabwe’s opposition civil society as they 
coalesced to form the National Constitutional Assembly and the Movement for 
Democratic Change political party. This outline addresses one of Gramsci’s key 
questions in analysing counter-hegemonic movements: what is the social content of 
the mass following of the counter-hegemonic movement? This section begins with an 
outline of the labour movement as the core, organised, membership-based force in the 
opposition. The history of the labour movement in Zimbabwe, the Congress of Trade 
Union structures and leadership, internal dynamics and core grievances in the lead-up 
to the food strikes of 1997 and 1998 will be explained through interviews with leaders 
of the congress of trade unions during this period. The second core group to be 
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analysed will be the student movement. Students would be the only other mass 
membership based group that would form a central part of the opposition in Zimbabwe 
after 1997. The chapter will show the differences in strategies, ideologies and interests 
between labour and students as this was a central theme of the data collected during 
interviews. The differences between labour and students would become a core 
cleavage point in the leadership battles of the MDC after 2008 as well as after the 
death of Morgan Tsvangirai in 2018. Associated with the student groups were 
academics and intellectuals at the nation’s tertiary education institutions. Their 
individual ideological persuasions and emphases would influence segments of 
students, labour and the movement as a whole in often contradictory directions from 
the formative stages of the counter-hegemonic movement. 
The chapter then analyses the roles of other core groups, which, unlike the labour 
unions and students, were represented mostly by individuals in leadership rather than 
membership-based power. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) would become 
central to the counter-hegemonic movement in Zimbabwe. From a space dominated 
by church groups such as the Zimbabwe Council of Churches, this segment would 
begin to draw from the student movements and by the mid-1990s became entirely 
dependent on western donor funding. These new NGOs and their leadership would be 
central to the drive for democratisation through their focus on both constitutional and 
electoral reform and human rights monitoring. This section of the opposition would 
generate important dynamics in how it related to the labour movement, its reliance on 
donor funding and the complications that this would cause, as well as its relatively 
shallow membership base. Based on interview data and reviews of other secondary 
data such as blog posts, newspaper articles and books on the history of Zimbabwe’s 
opposition, the chapter will explain the core role of these NGOs and their leadership 
as well as the often overlapping and interpenetration of their leadership with those of 
student movements, donor agencies and the main opposition political party. 
The chapter then outlines other influential, though weakly represented groups in the 
counter-hegemonic movement. Among these are lawyers, farmers and business 
leaders, and the national staff of donor agencies. The chapter concludes by returning 
to a chronological narrative which outlines the conjunctural roots of the opposition 
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movement in the formation of the National Constitutional Assembly in 1997 and the 






























Counter-hegemonic confrontation 2000-2008 
 
From the time that the opposition party Movement for Democratic Change (the MDC) 
was formed, the counter-hegemonic movement consisted of two overlapping sectors, 
counter-hegemonic civil society and this political party. The political party sought to 
bring about change overtly by winning elections and thereby changing the rules of the 
game. Civil society on the other hand sought to bring about changes in the rules 
through advocating for reforms or holding actors accountable for not following the 
rules. The actions, strategies and sometimes the individuals in political parties and 
counter-hegemonic civil society have often overlapped in Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, 
both these elements (that is, the counter-hegemonic movement in the political party 
and counter-hegemonic civil society) were caught in the dilemma of electoral 
authoritarianism which has been underlined in the introduction to this thesis. This was 
particularly the case with the political party because in order to change the rules they 
needed to gain adequate power; however, without a change of rules or the means to 
ensure that Zanu-PF abided by the rules they were unlikely to gain power. The chapter 
therefore outlines the methods by which both the political party and counter- 
hegemonic civil society sought to bring about hegemonic change. These methods 
include participation in elections, advocacy for electoral reform, protests and stay- 
aways as well as technical activities such as election observation and cataloguing 
human rights violations. Having established the social content of the movement’s 
leadership in the previous chapter, this chapter focuses primarily on Gramsci’s 
concepts of hegemony and strategies for counter-hegemony in the war of position and 
the war of manoeuvre, as noted in chapter 3. The distinction between these two 
strategies draws from Gramsci’s analysis of the approach to successful counter- 
hegemonic opposition. The war of position constitutes an indirect confrontation with 
the hegemonic force that takes place in the arena of civil society. It is therefore 
primarily an ideological and superstructural conflict. The war of manoeuvre, or the 
frontal attack, takes place in the arena of the state. This is where the counter- 
hegemonic force seeks to assume state power, whether through a coercive struggle to 
remove the hegemonic power or through other mechanisms and routes – which 
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elections would ostensibly be in a democracy. The chapter will analyse the MDC’s 
war of manoeuvre through its attempts to gain power through the ballot box, assessing 
the MDC’s strategies for electoral victory in a context of violence, and in an 
institutional setting built to maintain the prevailing political authority. The chapter 
outlines how the opposing civil society in Zimbabwe used a combination of civil and 
ideological tools and weapons to overcome Zanu-PF hegemony in the space of civil 
society, which is understood here not only as the organised space of associations, but 
also the arena for ideological and hegemonic contestation that lies outside of the realm 
of the state. The chapter sheds light on how the frontal attack on Zanu-PF hegemony 
in the state triggered a reaction from the authorities that was of both a coercive and 
ideological nature. The chapter also deals with the potential weaknesses in the 
movement’s war of position. The reasons for this weakness in the ideological realm 
stem not so much from the movement’s inaccurate reading of the priority areas and 
ability to make a convincing argument to the polity as a whole, but rather their neglect 
of key areas of economic redistribution such as land reform. In assessing the counter- 
hegemonic movement’s strategy we will apply Gramsci’s framework for the analysis 
of ‘relations of forces’ which must be distinguished on three levels or moments. The 
first of these relations is that of economic forces, the mode of accumulation and 
production, and the development of material forces. The second moment is the degree 
of ‘homogeneity, self- awareness and organisation attained by the various social 
groups’. The third is the relation of military forces. This last moment encapsulates not 
only brute coercive power, but also ideological consent (2000, p. 202). 
 
 
Organic crisis and counter-hegemonic contestation 
 
As we concluded in chapter 3, in Gramscian terms the end of the first two decades of 
independence had been characterised by policies of state corporatism in which the petit 
bourgeois nationalist leadership that had come to power through armed struggle had 
compromised with the dominant economic interests of white capital. In the second 
decade of independence the governing class, which had undergone significant 
embourgeoisement, had then applied disastrous liberalisation policies that resulted in 
de-industrialisation, decreases in living wages and increased unemployment. The 
128  
superstructure, understood as both the political institutions of the state and its 
ideological frameworks, had undergone a period of hegemonic stability and euphoria 
in early independence. However, the hegemonic leadership of the nationalist and 
increasingly state-dependent bourgeoisie had been stretched to breaking point as the 
party began to exhibit signs of corruption. It also made unpopular attempts at creating 
a one-party state while demonstrating increasing brutality towards the opposition. By 
1998 the beginnings of an organic crisis began to reach a crescendo as counter- 
hegemonic forces coalesced around the National Constitutional Assembly and the 
Movement for Democratic Change. 
The period immediately following the formation of the NCA and the MDC afforded 
the new movement several important conjunctural opportunities while also posing 
some key challenges. The first of these conjunctural moments was when, faced with 
pressure from the National Constitutional Assembly as well as its own grievances over 
achieving its agenda with the Lancaster House Constitution, Zanu-PF had formed the 
Zimbabwe Constitutional Commission in 1999. The Commission was composed of 
400 prominent Zimbabweans chaired by Supreme Court Justice Chidyausiku and 
directed by Professor Jonathan Moyo, then a lecturer at the University of the 
Witwatersrand in South Africa. The commission was tasked with conducting public 
outreach on the key constitutional issues and creating a draft to be voted on by 
referendum in early 2000. In addition, the country’s parliamentary elections were set 
for June of the same year. 
The first strategic dilemma for the counter-hegemonic force was therefore whether or 
not to participate in the Zimbabwe Constitutional Commission Process. The NCA 
resolved that it would not participate in the Constitutional Commission’s outreach and 
tried to discourage NCA members from participating as constitutional commissioners. 
The NCA’s main criticism of the Zimbabwe Constitutional Commission process was 
that the Commission of Enquiries Act, which established the ZCC, gave the president 
powers to intervene in the process, to alter the commission’s findings and ultimately 
to dissolve the commission at his discretion. The NCA was also opposed to the 
composition of the commission which would in theory be dominated by ruling party 
members, half of whom would be members of parliament. 
129  
However, despite the NCA’s opposition a number of high-profile individuals who had 
previously been associated with the NCA did choose to become commissioners. 
Among these key individuals were law lecturer Ben Hlatshwayo and prominent critical 
journalist Lupi Mushayakarara (Dorman, 2000; McCandless, 2003). The dilemma of 
coordinating a coherent counter-hegemonic strategy was most evident in the 
relationship between the ZCTU and the broader movement. Collen Gwiyo underlines 
the decision by the ZCTU general council to participate in the constitutional 
commission: 
 
Morgan [Tsvangirai] had great difficulty in convincing the general council (of the ZCTU) not 
to participate in the Constitutional Commission and the resolution there was; we don’t care 
whether they will cheat us or not; what we are interested in is let’s have the draft constitution. 
So, we said, let’s have that draft, people should get in to groups, let’s make our input from the 
preamble to the last page. We said this is what we are going to submit to the Constitutional 
Commission. 
 
Gwiyo elaborates on the efforts by the NCA to convince the ZCTU to abstain from the 
Constitutional Commission process by recounting that Brian Kagoro flew to the ZCTU 
general congress in Matopos to sway the position of the general council. ‘I think when 
Morgan [Tsvangirai] realised that it’s not going to work because we were already 
suspicious to say no, you as NCA, we are cousins but you cannot tell the general 
council what to do’ (Gwiyo, 2011). 
 
As a result, two ZCTU representatives (Tapuwa Mashakada and Ignatius Makonese) 
would become commissioners in the ZCC process (Gwiyo, 2011; Dorman, 2000). This 
initial incoherence reflects the fact that the counter-hegemonic movement was never, 
even at these early stages, a monolith. It also indicates that Tsvangirai’s membership 
of the NCA and ultimately the MDC were not an organic part of the entire trade union 
movement, but rather a personal connection in which he stood at the intersection of 




Zimbabwe Constitutional Commission: draft process and content 
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The Commission conducted public meetings across the country and gathered both oral 
and written contributions to the constitution. Commissioners were aggregated into 100 
teams and the four-member teams were deployed to hold meetings in allocated wards 
throughout the country wards (Hatchard, 2001))17. After the collection of data, ten 
provincial reports were circulated to the plenary, a process shown on television and 
listened to on national radio. A drafting committee then prepared and submitted a draft 
to the president who had the choice of accepting the report, amending it or rejecting it. 
As the NCA had proposed, the final draft was to be put to the people through a 
referendum, and if accepted would be made into law. 
However, it became evident that the NCA’s concern about the process being hijacked 
by the executive would indeed be well founded. As observers of this process both 
McCandless (2003) and Dorman (2000) recount the perceived divergence between 
what some commissioners felt had been the overwhelming opinion of most of the 
participants of the meetings, and the Zanu-PF representatives on the Commission. The 
process of drafting therefore generated a great deal of internal conflict as the president 
used the powers of the Commission of Inquiry Act to amend the draft. This was 
particularly in areas relating to limitations on the powers of the executive and 
separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches, proportional 
representation, the concurrent holding of parliamentary and presidential elections as 
well as the appointment of the attorney general (Coltart, 2016; Dorman, 2000; 
McCandless, 2003). In theory, the new constitution would have made at least one key 
reform in that it would have placed term limits on the office of the president, 
notwithstanding the fact that the presidential terms would only have been counted from 
the promulgation of the new constitution. 
While the Constitutional Commission went about its public outreach and drafting 
process, the NCA began its counter process of public outreach and campaigning 
against the ZCC draft. Lucia Matibenga, a trade union activist who was among the 
ZCTU leadership that formed the NCA, discussed the NCA public outreach and No 
campaign in an interview in 2011: 
 
17 This researcher attended one such meeting in November 1999 at the Bulaw ayo Sun Hotel. The meeting 
degenerated into chaos and was eventually cancelled as the chairman of the Constitutional Commission, 
Jonathan Moyo, was shouted down by  the  audience which included a sizeable number of  members of  a new 
party, ZAPU 2000 . 
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I found the leadership in the constitutional movement were very motivating, Lovemore 
Madhuku, Brian Kagoro, you know those are very educated men, but I will tell you when we 
were campaigning for the No vote in 99 towards 2000. We spent Christmas time in the bush 
with Brian Kagoro, Lovemore Madhuku campaigning in my province in the midlands province 
from Gokwe to Mberengwa with those two guys, shouting on loud hailers "ten reasons why 
we should go out and vote no" and so on. We found them very down to earth and I know here 
in the labour movement we then had a term for them: "Progressive Intellectuals". That’s what 
really brought this whole activism in this. It was like now bringing a new culture to 
Zimbabweans where they realised that there were really people who were out there pushing 
for things to happen. 
 
The referendum was interpreted by many voters as a referendum on the rule of Robert 
Mugabe and Zanu-PF, and the fledgling opposition party formed only four months 
prior to the referendum sought to capitalise on the discontent. The No campaign won 
the February 2000 vote by 55%. The No vote in the 2000 constitutional referendum 
marked the return of mass violence as a mode to achieving the ends of Zanu-PF in 
elections as immediately after the rejection of the constitution, mobs of Zimbabwe 
Liberation War Veterans and Zanu-PF supporters began the farm invasions of 2000. 
 
 
Workers Party Ndizvo! Yes, to the Workers Party! 
 
In addition to the strategic question of whether to engage in the Constitutional 
Commission process or to oppose it, the counter-hegemonic movement faced a more 
fundamental dilemma: would the MDC be a worker's party? Given the centrality of 
the ZCTU in convening the NWPC and following the resolution of the National 
Working People’s Convention ‘to mobilise towards the working people’s agenda, and 
to implement a vigorous and democratic political movement for change’, it was logical 
to expect the party about to be formed to have a labour focus (ZCTU, 2000). 
There was however evidence that Tsvangirai in particular envisioned a more 
expansive focus which included more of the other sections of the counter-hegemonic 
movement, as outlined in the previous chapter. 
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The International Socialist Organisation’s Socialist Worker newspaper for May and 
June of 1999 led with the headline ‘Worker’s Party Ndizvo’ which translates to ‘Yes, 
to the worker’s party’. Articles in these editions argued for why the ZCTU must form 
a worker’s party and a political movement. A political movement, the paper argues 
means [that]: 
Everyone is included, such as the business people and the middle classes from the NGO’s. In 
such a party the ZCTU will have a minority bloc vote while the rest of the leadership would 
be filled by representatives of the middle classes just like with the executive of the National 
Constitutional Assembly executive committee where there is only one workers’ leader in a 
committee of 19; Morgan Tsvangirai. 
 
Such a movement is one that is supported by the middle-class intellectuals who attended the 
convention. It is also favoured by the local bosses, international NGOs and western embassies 
– especially Germany, USA, UK and Scandinavia, who now affect to support the workers and 
the ZCTU. ‘What friends - who do not want peasants to be given land and insist that our 
country follow ESAP’ (Socialist Worker, May-June2000). ‘ 
 
 
Munyaradzi Gwisayi indicates that hostility to the concept of a purely workers party 
was evident even at the NWPC as the International Socialist Organisation was 
officially blocked from participating: 
So now with the NWPC it’s a situation where Tsvangirai has been to move with the base, 
which is the ZCTU which has demonstrated its power. We are specifically and explicitly 
excluded as the ISO. We are the only civic society which was rejected from attending officially 
because we are a nuisance, and we obviously were going against what Tsvangirai was trying 
to achieve. So, we got in our comrades with a bundle of leaflets which said reject the formation 
of an MMD kind of party, build a workers’ party. We were outside with a socialist worker and 
leaflets, it was done at Hillside, so they put guards there to stop us from going there, but they 
couldn’t stop us from being on the road. So, myself and other comrades like Tafadzwa stood 





When the MDC was launched in September 1999 to a crowd of 15 000 people at 
Rufaro stadium, the party announced a provisional National Executive Council which 
included Tsvangirai and Gibson Sibanda, the ZCTU’s secretary general. For the rest 
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it was stacked with middle class intellectuals, NGO leadership, and business people. 
Adrienne Le Bas’s 2011 analysis of the formation of the party points to fact that 12 of 
the 34 interim National Executive Council posts were occupied by labour leadership. 
The majority of posts were held by other (middle class) leaders of civil society 
ostensibly because of their skills and expertise and the constituencies they brought 
along. Among these were individuals who had built relationships with the ZCTU (or 
possibly just Morgan Tsvangirai) through the civil society struggles of the 1990s. 
Among these were lawyers such David Coltart, Paul Themba-Nyathi, Tendai Biti and 
Learnmore Jongwe. These last two had been student leaders and attracted a 
constituency of engaged young students from tertiary institutions. Another expert was 
Eddie Cross, appointed as the party’s spokesperson for economic affairs. As the vice 
president of the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries, Cross could hardly have been 
viewed as an ally of the workers. The inclusion of industrialists like Cross and 
commercial farmers like Roy Bennet, Elliot Pfebve and Iain Kay was downplayed by 
some, including Gibson Sibanda, as a question of resources, implying that the MDC 
was using these white industrialists and farmers for their money. Quoted by Peter 
Alexander in 2000 Sibanda argued: ‘What is wrong with us accepting donations from 
well-wishers who see the same view as us? The real issue is whether they make any 
meaningful decisions in the MDC — the answer is “no”’. 
Sibanda’s assertion is not necessarily borne out by the MDC’s proposed policies or 
the statements of their leadership, as the MDCs economic policies were certainly in 
step with the priorities of the IMF and certainly not in contradiction to the interests 
of national capital. 
 
One possible justification for this broad approach would have been that the MDC was 
not the product of labour alone but was the result of a combination of multiple sectors 
of civil society, as Tsvangirai would have argued. This does not hold up to scrutiny, 
as the fact that the NWPC was convened by the ZCTU after a year of research, indeed 
the fact that the resolution of the MDC, the party’s first minutes and manifesto are 
compiled in a report by the ZCTU for its donor, the Fredrich Ebert Stiftung, probably 
indicates the real drivers for decisions in the formation of the party. They also give 
credence to the idea that the party was using ZCTU structures to establish what 
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Gwisayi saw as a ‘Blairite’ party. In interviews, Collen Gwiyo, Tabitha Khumalo and 
Lucia Matibenga all echoed the observation that labour leaders were side-lined at the 
expense of opportunist business people, academics and lawyers whose interests and 
ideology were in line with those of capital in Zimbabwe. 
Another possible reason for this seemingly incongruous accommodation was that the 
MDC was confident that the party would win the majority of seats in the parliamentary 
elections. Leaked US embassy cables from before the 2000 election noted that the 
MDC were bullish about garnering more than 80 seats in parliament (Wikileaks, 
2008). Hypothetically, the accommodation of conflicting interests was based on the 
expectation that access to power would be easy and that there would be enough to go 
around once Zanu-PF were out or sufficiently weakened. As such any possible 
reservations over having to deal with even the most unlikely of allies may have been 
repressed. 
While leadership of the party may have become more middle class, the party’s 
mobilisation structures were indistinguishable from those of the ZCTU. As Le Bas 
highlights and as interviews with Gwiyo and Matibenga have corroborated, trade 
union district committees were central in the recruitment of branch members and the 
organisation of rallies with some selling MDC membership cards from their desks 
(2011). Gwiyo emphasises that in ‘all the six regions in one way or the other, the first 
group that led to the establishment of ZCTU regional structures are the same activists 
who became the first chairpersons of the Movement for Democratic Change’ and that 
‘in one way or the other, three quarters of those that were active at mobilising for the 
formation of the party had undergone our education programmes’ (Gwiyo, 2011). 
 
 
June 2000 parliamentary elections 
 
The formal process of candidate selection by the MDC took place at the provincial 
level through strategic consensus rather than an open primary. While contention over 
candidacy never boiled over into public conflict, competition reflected the cleavages 
within the counter-hegemonic movement and the outcomes may also reflect the party’s 
priorities in candidacy selection (Le Bas, 2011). 
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Gwisayi recounts the contention around Harare Central seat and how he eventually 
ran for a seat in the working-class suburb of Highfields instead: 
We build the MDC here in city centre, in places like High Fields, Glenview and Glen Norah, 
we're big players there as the ISO and I run as a candidate in the primaries. I was going to 
stand in Harare central, because we had built the structures of the MDC in Harare central as 
the ISO, completely; the structures were loyal to us. So, I got a call from comrades and they 
say you have to come back because the local Harare MDC is saying you can’t stand in Harare 
central. I urgently rescheduled my flight18 then we had a meeting with the Harare MDC 
leadership. And they said comrade Gwisayi, we want you to move to Highfields. And we said 
no, we have been campaigning in the MDC for a long time saying you must not allow people 
who don’t live in your suburb to become MPs. I don’t live in Highfields. I live in town, in my 
flat. 
So, the ZCTU say we have decided that we can’t defend you adequately in Harare central, it’s 
the suburb of the rich, it’s a suburb of the middle classes, we would rather take you to 
Highfields, where we can defend you. That is class consciousness my friend. This is the 
consequence of two or three years of constant work between a small revolutionary organisation 
with sections of the working class, and it was the correct argument and that’s how I went into 




The MDC would eventually run candidates in all 120 constituencies. The party 
provided the following description of their backgrounds: six involved in agriculture 
(including farmers), eight in executive positions in companies, seven self-employed, 
nine in the transport industry, nine in technical fields, one ordained minister, one 
environmentalist, two employed by NGOs, three in the medical professions, eight 
working for government in legal and administrative fields, five lawyers, nine 
academics, 19 educators, 18 in other professions, and 16 trade unionists. 
In the three months between the referendum and the June parliamentary elections 
incidents of violence increased as Zanu-PF mobilised in a manner it had never had to 
do in period of weak opposition. In the months between February and June 37 people, 
mostly MDC supporters, had been murdered, 2 466 were injured and 27 people were 
raped; 617 people were abducted and a further 10 000 people internally displaced 
 
 
18 Gwisayi’s flight from New York where he had been studying at Columbia University 
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(Commonwealth EOM report 2000, ZCTU 2000). Apart from the violence, opposition 
parties accused the Boundary Delimitation Commission of gerrymandering the 
constituency boundaries in favour of Zanu-PF citing incorporation of parts of a number 
of rural constituencies into urban ones. This was allegedly so as to dilute the opposition 
vote, which is stronger in the urban centres. They also pointed to the fact that Harare 
and Bulawayo, which were both likely to vote for the new opposition, each lost a seat 
while the rural province of Mashonaland East gained an extra seat (Commonwealth 
EOM report, 2000). 
Zanu-PF would gain 62 parliamentary seats in the June 2000 elections while the MDC 
won 57 seats and ZANU Ndonga won 1 seat. Bearing in mind that Mugabe had the 
power to appoint an additional 30 members of parliament Zanu-PF was able to secure 
a reasonably large majority. The outcome was nevertheless a shock for the ruling party 
whose dominance had been largely unthreatened for the previous 20 years. Certainly, 
the MDC attracted overwhelming support in urban middle-class constituencies such 
as Harare East, Harare South and Bulawayo South. The majority of people in the 
Harare and Bulawayo provinces live in working-class constituencies, and here the 
MDC vote ranged between 70 to 86 per cent of the total (Alexander, 2000). 
Predictably, Zanu-PF won most of the vote in rural areas which made up 69% of the 
national population according to the 1992 census. This was particularly the case in the 
three Mashonaland provinces. However, reflecting the long-standing resentment in 
Matabeleland provinces, the MDC won all but two seats, securing between 35% and 
86% support (Alexander, 2000). The MDC brought a number of contentious seats to 
court though found no recourse, potentially due to an increasingly biased judiciary. 
 
Of the 57 MDC candidates who were elected as MPs, only 12 were trade unionists 
(including Sibanda, now the MDC parliamentary leader). Lucia Matibenga, who lost 
a rural race in Shurugwi, links the decision to have Morgan Tsvangirai run for a rural 
seat in his home of Buhera rather than in Harare to strategic miscalculation about MDC 
appeal in rural areas. 
 
There was nobody wanting to stand in rural areas. Actually, for me the obvious constituency 
was Gweru urban but because we had vowed we were going to put candidates in all the 120 
constituencies, Tsvangirai instead of running in Harare went home, even myself I went home, 
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you also find people like Chimanikire Gift they went home. Also, people like Mudzengerere, 
all the big trade unionists we went to our rural homes to give room to those of us who didn’t 
have links anywhere. So, I opted for Shurugwi because then we would put one guy in Gweru 
urban who came from elsewhere and not from the Midlands . I think we the Trade Unionists 
were naive. We really thought that we could win. We really thought that these sacrifices needed 
to be made to go and stand in a rural constituency where you know you have no vehicle. I had no 
vehicle of my own then but I sought to campaign in that vast constituency and simply said I am 
going there. We were not in it for personal gain, we really looked at the global picture. ‘Is our 
organisation going to challenge ZANU-PF in every constituency? Is our Organisation going 
to be represented in the whole country so that ZANU will not think that we are just an urban 




Matibenga cites Tsvangirai’s absence from parliament throughout his tenure in the 
struggle as a weakness and potential fracturing point within the party as division would 
occur between the party’s members of parliament and those outside parliament. 
 
 
Fast track land reform programme 
 
The elections signalled the inception of a situation in which, to use Gramscian phraseology, 
an “equlibrium of forces”had been reached. In such a scenario, Gramsci has noted, power can 
become increasingly personalised, as “a great personality is entrusted with the task of 
arbitration” (Gramsci, 2000, p. 270). In the Zimbabawean setting “arbitration” would hardly 
be conciliatory. Essentially, to rebuild its political support against emerging counter- 
hegeomonic forces, leadership would have tio exercise its power in an increasingly extra- 
institutional manner. The conditions developing in Zimbabwe at this conjuncture constituted 
a recipe for the expression of Caesarism. The increasing exercise of Caesarist predisposition 
within the regime was especially evident in the progress of land reform. 
 
 
Land reform had been precipitated by pressure from within Zanu-PF, by the war 
veterans and landless peasants from about 1996. Sporadic invasions of commercial 
farms had been taking place across the country since the mid-1990s showing the 
heightening impatience with the rate of land reform in the country. The sporadic farm 
invasions had culminated in June 1998 the Svosve peasants in Marondera and Wedza 
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invaded large commercial farms, including property owned by prominent Zanu-PF 
leaders. 
In November 1997 the government gazetted a list of 1 471 commercial farms 
designated for acquisition and resettlement. The list would be shortened to 846 once 
those owned by black people, the sole properties of land owners, and those that could 
prove their developmental and social impact were removed (Moyo, 1999). The 
gazetting of these properties could have been interpreted as a gambit to force the 
British Government to negotiate over compensation for land appropriation. The British 
Government had already provided £44 million pounds during the 1980s (Laurie, 2013).  
British contributions then effectively ended partly because by the end of the decade 
the Zimbabweans had appeared to have lost interest (Bowyer-Bower and Stoneman, 
2000).  In 1997, a new Labour government in 1997 began to more assertively renege 
on commitments made at Lancaster House in 197919. In a letter to the Minister of 
Lands and Agriculture, Kumbirai Kangai, the new British Minister for Overseas 
Development declared: 
I should make it clear that we do not accept that Britain has a special responsibility to meet the 
costs of Land Purchase in Zimbabwe. We are a new government from diverse backgrounds 
without links to former colonial interests. My own origins are Irish, and as you know, we are 




Short’s letter enraged the Zimbabwean government and would come to symbolise the 
break-down in negotiations between the UK and Zimbabwe around the issue of land 
reform. In November 1999 clauses which would have legislated for the appropriation 
of land without compensation were added to the constitutional draft. When the draft 
was rejected in February 2000, invasions of white-owned farms led by war veterans 
began to take place across the country. The invasions after February 2000 were 
orchestrated by Chenjerai Hunzvi, the chairman of the Zimbabwe Liberation War 
Veterans Association, with the collusion of the Zanu-PF and the government. In an 
interview, Mandaza argues that the farm invasions were in fact ordered by Mugabe in 
19 The United Kingdom’s Africa All Party Parliamentary Group (AAPPG) undertook an evaluation of the 
commitments made at Lancaster House in 2009 . It showed that “ while no specific sums were agreed at 
Lancaster House, the Patriotic Front harboured expectations th at the British and American governments would 
support land redistribution” According to the AAPPG: ‘What they had received was  assurances  from the 
British and American governments that funds would be committed to assist with land reform…. Land 
resettlement could only occur through the willing buyer – willing seller scheme, which Britain had pledged to 
Boyer-Bowyer you will see that the 44 
million stopped in the mid-1980s, 
partly due to the Zimbabweans 
losing interest  
 .......................................................  
partly.  
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support’. Laurie, Charles. The Land Reform Deception: Political Opportunism in Zimbabwe' s Land Seizure 
Era (Kindle Locations 720 -730 ). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition. 
 
a rage over the white farmers’ role in rejecting the Constitution. Mugabe would state 
in an interview with the ZBC’s Reuben Barwe: 
For them to have banded together to a man in opposition to government, to have gone much 
farther in mobilising their labour forces on the farms, to support the one position opposed to 
government, has exposed them as not our friends, but our enemies. Our present state of mind 
is - you are now our enemies, because you have behaved as enemies of Zimbabwe and we are 
full of anger. (in Coltart, 2016, p. 279) 
Note how the language of the interview, with its conflation of individual selfhood 
(“our present state of mind”) with national interest is very much within the verbal 
idiom of Caesarism. 
With government support the farm invasions became a key mechanism to breaking 
MDC  support  in  the  farming  areas,  as  the  country’s  200 farm  labourers 
represented a significant voting threat to Zanu-PF in the rural areas. The invasions 
would from this point be framed as the Third Chimurenga. The framing of the Third 
Chimurenga would be a powerful hegemonic tool in that it tied elements of coercion, 
including farm invasions and election related violence, within the ideological 
legitimacy of liberation struggle. In terms of the base-superstructure continuum the 
Third Chimurenga framed white-owned property as a public resource to which patriots 
were therefore entitled. Norma Kriger explains that the definition of patriots served 
this hegemonic purpose: 
Patriots included not only the liberation war veterans who spearheaded the land occupations 
but also the youth militia whom the ruling party began to mobilise in late 2001 ahead of the 
presidential election. The ruling party referred to these youths as “war veterans” in recognition 
of their contribution to what it labelled the “Third Chimurenga”— the fight for the land. ZANU 
PF thus linked its violence after 2000 to earlier episodes of violent resistance— the First 
Chimurenga in the late 19th century and the Second Chimurenga, the liberation war. 
Emphasising a shared history of racism, colonialism and imperialism, the ruling party also 
appealed to pan-African sentiment. 
 
 
In June 2000, having secured a majority in parliament sufficient to alter the 
constitution and with the 2000 ZCC draft rejected in the referendum, Zanu-PF then set 
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about implementing the Fast Track Land Reform Programme. The constitution of 
Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 16 of 2000) Act (no. 5 of 2000), and amendments to the 
Land Acquisition Act (No. 15 of 2000) gave the state the right to compulsorily acquire 
land compensating only for improvements. 
The structural economic and political changes which resulted from the Fast Track 
Land Reform Programme would forever alter Zimbabwe’s political economy, 
changing the patterns of land tenure and class structures that had obtained from before 
independence. In structural terms the Fast Track Land Reform Programme would 
decimate Zimbabwe’s white commercial farming class and the formal rural working 
class as 200 000 commercial farm workers (more than 50% of workers in the sector) 
lost their jobs in the first wave of the FTLR programme (Sachikonye, 2003). 
The combination of the economic and human rights issues resulting from the 2000 
elections, land invasions, fast track land reform policies, and attacks on the judiciary 
solicited a forceful reaction from the United Kingdom, Europe and the United States. 
The United States Congress passed the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic 
Recovery Act in 2001 citing in its statement of policy that ‘It is the policy of the United 
States to support the people of Zimbabwe in their struggle to effect peaceful, 
democratic change, achieve broad-based and equitable economic growth, and restore 
the rule of law.’ The United States was joined by the United Kingdom and the 
European Union which imposed targeted sanctions on 163 Zanu-PF officials and 31 
government-related companies. 
The fact that the MDC had lobbied western governments for sanctions led to Mugabe 
and Zanu-PF leadership accusing the MDC of ‘treason and treachery for appealing to 
a foreign power to remove the Government by force’. These statements would become 
the refrain of the arguments which would define Zanu-PF’s ideological position for 





Patriotic history as hegemonic ideological superstructure 
 
What in Gramscian terms can be understood as the post-2000 historical bloc’s 
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hegemonic ideological superstructures corresponds directly with what Terence Ranger 
has termed ‘patriotic history’. As Blessing Miles (2010) emphasises, patriotichistory 
asserts the centrality of Zimbabwe’s radical revolutionary tradition and is premised on 
four themes: land, race, a dichotomy between ‘sell outs’ and ‘patriots’; and the 
rejection of Western interference based on what are perceived as Western ideals such 
as human rights. It is specifically the connection between land tenure, a material 
reality, and the superstructure of Zimbabwean state and political institutions and the 
ideological superstructures of Zanu-PF hegemony. 
From 2000 onwards Zanu-PF, with Mugabe as the party’s chief public intellectual and 
increasingly Caesarist-type authority, implemented patriotic history. This was done by 
making full use of the institutional weaponry of state-controlled broadcast and print 
media as well as laws such as the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, 
which shrank the available space for critical coverage in the independent media. The 
use of these institutional tools to manage the ideological content to which citizens had 
access was coupled with the constant threat of violence, as the country’s main 
independent newspaper the Daily News was bombed in January 2001 and banned in 
2002. In order to further shrink the ideological counter-hegemonic space the 
Zimbabwean Government expelled western media outlets reporting from Zimbabwe. 
Jonathan Moyo, now recast as the country’s new Minister for Information and chief 
propagandist, justified the decision as follows: 
We believe that information is a strategic issue which is critical in maintaining a country’s 
sovereignty and you cannot claim to be sovereign if you do not own the means of disseminating 
information […] This is why we removed CNN from ZBC when we came in, in the year 2000 
and we will never have it again as long as we are still around. We want to use the media to put 
across our national views and not those of the United States or Britain or the Voice of America. 




Tendi describes a ‘blitzkrieg of Patriotic History’ from 2000 onwards as the state-run 
ZBC repetitively broadcast liberation war documentaries that presented Zanu-PF ‘as 
the sole deliverer of independence, justified the land seizures as a means to redressing 
a colonial inheritance of racially-biased land distribution, highlighted colonial 
atrocities, and wrote out personalities and historical events inimical to Zanu-PF’s quest 
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to maintain political power’(Tendi, 2010, p. 4-5). At the same time the Zimbabwe 
Broadcasting Corporation’s Radio and Television channels moved to a majority local 
content, possibly out of an inability to pay for royalties. As a consequence, a great deal 
of the content on the radio became patriotic history-type jingles such as rambai 
makashinga (stay strong), an undeniably catchy tune which was written by Jonathan 
Moyo himself presenting Zimbabwean hardship as the result of western sanctions. In 
his discussions with Stephen Chan, Tsvangirai noted this particular weakness on the 
counter-hegemonic side (Chan, 2005). Interestingly, musicians in Zimbabwe had 
hardly ever used their music to oppose the government. Only the country’s most 
established and most famous musicians could openly criticise. Oliver Mutukudzi could 
make music that questioned Zanu-PF and Mugabe through songs like Bvuma 
Wasakara (admit you’re old) and Murimi Munhu (the farmer is a human being). 
In practice this manufacturing of ideological consent took the form of speeches by 
Mugabe which with increasing regularity focused on issues of land, race, patriotism 
and western hypocrisy. Some of these issues were simply distilled into Zanu-PF 
slogans including ‘The Land is the Economy; the Economy is the Land’ and the 
memetic repetition of Mugabe’s catchphrases such as ‘Zimbabwe will never be a 
colony again’. Mugabe’s speeches regular speeches at national commemorations such 
as Independence Day and Defence Forces Day as well as his annual speech at the 
United Nations General Assembly began to be the most evident examples of Mugabe’s 
broadcasting of is ideological dogma. State funerals which always provided a captive 
audience of Western diplomats became a preferred occasion for Mugabe’s railing 
against the West and traitors as the definition of national heroes was loosened to more 
regularly provide the president with the pulpit at the National Heroes Acre. 
The rhetoric in relation to opposition became cast yet again in terms of Chimurenga 
or armed struggle, the term first applied to the uprisings against British colonial rule 
in the late 1800’s and subsequently to the liberation war beginning in 1960. Zanu-PF’s 
conception of the Third Chimurenga corresponds with the Gramscian concept of the 
hegemonic historical bloc, in that the base was encapsulated in the fast-track land 
reform process. The ruling party enforced its hegemony through a coercive machinery 
while the ideological narrative was cast in the vein of struggle against a western- 
backed opposition intent on selling the country back to white people. Reflecting the 
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conceptual overlap between modes of production and ideology on the one hand, and 
the consent coercion continuum on the other, David Moore proposed that ‘until the 
structural conditions brought into being when capitalism arrived in Zimbabwe’s space 
and failed to transform it fully are solved with an acceptable and productive tenure 
system, hegemony will be but an unevenly articulated dream’ (2008, p. 35) 
 
 
2002 presidential elections 
 
By the build-up to the 2002 presidential elections the mechanisms and methods for 
intimidation and violence established in the 2000 parliamentary elections had become 
standard. Certainly, the stakes of the presidential elections were much higher. The 
charismatic power of Robert Mugabe and his centrality to the rule of his party meant 
that his loss would have translated to a collapse in the party’s hegemony. 
The elections were deemed ‘not credible’ by observation missions from the 
Commonwealth, the SADC Parliamentary Forum, observers from the Norwegian 
Embassy and the citizen observation group the Zimbabwe Election Support Network 
(Kettaneh, 2008). As was the case in the 2000 election, areas of contention centred 
around the legal framework, voter registration, impartial application of the law and the 
use of violence by political parties as well as state security agents. 
The key legal instrument that threatened to affect these elections was the attempts to 
pass the General Laws Amendment Act (GLAA) which was intended to amend the 
Electoral Act with respect to allowing the registrar-general to modify the voters’ roll. 
The Supreme Court of Zimbabwe ruled that the GLAA was unconstitutional; however, 
some elements of the nullified law were later promulgated by the minister of justice, 
legal and parliamentary affairs in a statutory instrument of the Electoral Act a month 
before the election (ZESN, 2002). 
Observers noted that of the three election management bodies (the Electoral 
Supervisory Commission, the Registrar General and the Elections Directorate) none 
carried out their functions in a transparent and accountable way, either publishing 
information late or not at all. The foregoing resulted in confusion and uncertainty on 
the part of the public (Commonwealth Observer Group 2002, Norwegian Embassy 
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2002). The South African Government Observation Mission noted that ‘the Registrar- 
General enjoyed the discretion to remove or add names to the Voters’ Roll without 
informing the affected persons’. The Zimbabwe Election Support Network observed 
that in addition to the lack of transparency in voter registration deadlines, the legal 
wrangles which ensued during the pre-election period resulted in a number of voters 
being disenfranchised for lack of knowledge of updated information on the whole 
electoral process 
Further, and more crucial than the technical issues noted above, was the systematic 
violence and intimidation applied by Zanu-PF and the state security forces. Members 
of the National Youth Service or ‘Green Bombers’ became the main militia of the 
ruling party. Some territories in the country, particularly Mashonaland East and 
Mashonaland Central, effectively became no-go areas for opposition campaigning. In 
the rural districts of Masvingo and Manicaland, the level of intimidation displaced 
MDC supporters who sought refuge in urban areas (ZESN, 2002). The headquarters 
of the MDC in Harare were stoned by Zanu-PF supporters and by April of 2002 at 
least 19 MDC supporters had been killed in political violence in the months preceding 
the election. A cumulative toll of 107 documented cases of politically-motivated 
killings had taken place between 2000 and 2002 (AFP). The police and other security 
forces took no action to investigate reported cases of violence and intimidation, 
especially against known or suspected supporters of the MDC and in fact continued to 
be very heavy-handed against the opposition. 
The simmering tensions between the Zimbabwean government and the governments 
of the EU and in particular the government of the United Kingdom, intensified 
following the expulsion of the head of the EU election mission to Zimbabwe. The EU 
responded by imposing targeted sanctions against Mugabe and 19 other members of 
his administration. 
The official results of the 2002 presidential elections were announced as Mugabe 
having garnered 52% of the vote while Tsvangirai of the MDC had won 46% of the 
vote, with three candidates, Wilson Khumbula, Shakespeare Maya and Paul Siwela 




Prior to the elections held on 31 March 2005, the government instituted reforms to the 
management of elections. These were the establishment of an independent Zimbabwe 
Electoral Commission to replace the three election management bodies, the Electoral 
Supervisory Council, the Directorate of Elections and the Registrar General. The latter, 
however, maintained the management of the voter’s roll and voter registration. An 
electoral disputes court was also established. These institutions were put in place only 
two months before the elections, resulting in the election being managed yet again by 
the patently partisan institutions noted above. 
The 2005 elections also saw the rejection of accreditation for election observer 
missions from a number of important institutions which included the Carter Center, 
the Congress of South African Trade Unions, The Commonwealth, the European 
Union, the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa and the governments of the USA, 
Australia and Japan. One consortium which received accreditation was made up of 
South African civil society organisations including the South African Council of 
Churches, the Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference, SANGOCO, IDASA, 
the Centre for Policy Studies and the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. This 
mission noted that politically motivated violence had diminished rapidly in the run up 
to the election, a fact which is quite common to instances of election related violence 
globally. The observation mission inferred that this confirmed that ‘it is possible to 
“turn it off” and it is not merely a factor of internecine community strife or party- 
political intolerance’ (Zimbabwe Observer Mission Report, 2005, p.5). While the 
week leading up to the election was peaceful, reports were made of widespread threats 
to those perceived to have voted for the MDC, and sporadic violence erupted in the 
weeks following the elections. David Coltart notes that a likely reason for the decline 
in the use of violence was that in the context of a regional drought and the collapse in 
commercial farming it was just as easy to use the threat of starvation as open coercion 
(Coltart, 2016, Interview with UN OCHA director 2018). 
The parliamentary elections of 2005 resulted in Zanu-PF garnering 78 seats while the 
MDC won 42 seats, or 39% of the available seats. Under the Constitution the president 
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would appoint an additional 30 non-constituency members of parliament, of which 10 










Although the 2005 elections themselves were conducted in a largely peaceful 
atmosphere, on 19 May 2005 the national government-appointed Harare Commission 
announced ‘a programme to enforce bylaws to stop all forms of illegal activity’, 
warning the people in the Greater Harare area that persons who had erected illegal 
structures should demolish them by 20 June 2005. Dubbed Murambatsvina, the Shona 
world for a whirlwind which also means ‘reject the rubbish’, the operation was 
ostensibly an urban clean-up operation which resulted in the destruction of informal 
settlements and unlicensed premises and shacks in the urban centres. On 25 May, a 
month before its own announced deadline, the government began a mass eviction and 
the destruction of dwellings took place in Harare, Bulawayo and urban centres. The 
military style operation targeted vendors’ markets, flea markets, other informal market 
premises and ‘illegal’ housing structures. The UN reported that twenty thousand 
vendors countrywide were reported to have been arrested within a week of the 
operation. The UN report of the operation estimated that 700 000 people in cities 
across the country had lost their homes or their livelihoods or both. The report 
concluded that ‘although a case for crime against humanity under Article 7 of the 
Rome Statute might be difficult to sustain, the Government of Zimbabwe clearly 
caused large sections of its population serious suffering’ (Tibaijuka, 2005). 
The effects and motives of Murambatsvina notwithstanding, by 2005 the general 
standard of living had continued to deteriorate since 2000. In 1990 Zimbabwean life 
expectancy had been calculated at 61 but by 2005 it stood at 37, as over 1.6 million 
Zimbabweans under the age of 50 were estimated to be living with HIV/AIDS, with 
over 761 000 children who had lost one or both parents to the epidemic (UNDP, 2005). 
Rural poverty calculated by the UNDP had increased by 14% between 1995 and 2003 
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to 71% in 2003, while urban poverty sat at 61% in 2003 (UNDP, 2005, p. 5). An IMF 
mission to Zimbabwe in 2005 had indicated that the economy would decline by a 
further 7% that year and that it was likely that inflation, which stood at 140%, would 
continue to rise (Tibaijuka, 2005). 
This collapse in urban living standards as well as the forced displacement that 
Murambatsvina brought about translated to the destruction of both formal and informal 
social structures of the urban working class. Murambatsvina revealed the degree of 
brutality with which Zanu-PF was willing to act in order to maintain its hegemony, as 
well as the impunity the system would afford them. Murambatsvina also clearly showed 
that the targets were the urban working poor and informal sector. The episode also 
reflected the extent to which Zanu-PF’s strategies in its hegemonic maintenance were 
largely dependent on coercion rather than consent, and the use of the state’s legal 
machinery (however supra-legally) and coercive branches in being able to do so. 
David Moore, who views hegemony as the degree to which consent can be generated 
and as distinct from dominance (rather than as a consent-coercion continuum as this 
thesis does), notes that Zanu-PF ‘held very little in the way of hegemony (consent) and 
slipped into dominance’ (in Vambe (ed.), 2008, p. 34). Moore observes that the naked 
dominance employed during Murambatsvina (as with other previous episodes of 






MDC split over Senate 
 
2005 saw the re-introduction of the Senate, the upper house of parliament. The official 
justification for this was the necessity for greater accountability and oversight, though 
it was more likely that Zanu-PF were widening the goalposts for patronage after the 
opposition had begun to occupy some of the seats in the lower house. The adoption of 
a bi-cameral system, however, triggered a split of the opposition MDC into two 
factions; those led by Professor Welshman Ncube who ostensibly supported the idea 
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of running for Senate, and those opposed to competing for upper house seats, led by 
Morgan Tsvangirai. 
Collen Gwiyo, a ZCTU leader and MDC MP argues that disagreement over fielding 
candidates for the Senate was a ruse disguising issues arising from the class cleavages 
within the party: 
The introduction of the Senate in 2005 happened before the MDC congress where the 
structures had been manipulated so that Morgan would lose an election. The introduction of 
the Senate and the split pre-empted the possible loss. Capital had a part to play in the split as 
sections of international capital are of the view that Morgan played his part and they want 




Takura Zhangazha echoes the class cleavage argument as the reason for the split: 
 
I think it’s more of an attitude of the educated versus the uneducated, knowledgeable versus 
not knowledgeable and disdain for popular democracy. Which is one of the big problems in 
this country. People think you get a degree and it’s amazing that our politics is always going 
back to how many degrees you have. and how many certificates you can produce most of the 




While Gwiyo blames the split on pressure from capital and middle-class elements in 
the party, the outcome did not produce two homogenous groups with labour on one 
side and the middle classes and capital on the other. Former labour leaders including 
Gibson Sibanda, Gift Chimanikire, and Blessing Chebundo crossed to the Ncube 
camp. Also, some intellectuals stayed with Tsvangirai, including Tendai Biti and 
Nelson Chamisa; though Gwiyo argues that these two had also planned on leaving and 
only returned back to the Tsvangirai fold after strategically judging it to be the stronger 
of the two: 
…it was Job Sikhala and some others who said that it wouldn’t work that Welshman be 
president and that it would be worth looking for someone else more attractive to the mass base, 
because Welshman doesn’t have a history of a mass base. Chamisa had almost also gone but 
Chamisa and Tendai Biti jumped back in. Because when they were gone it was Morgan, 
Mashakada, and Mai Matibenga and then Chamisa. Those are the ones who worked tirelessly 
for the party up to the holding of the congress. (Gwiyo, 2011) 
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In addition to the class cleavage there was no question that a critical perception issue 
would arise regarding Welshman Ncube’s leadership. It was unlikely that he would 
ever be a viable presidential candidate given the significance of tribe in driving 
political identities in Zimbabwe. MDC Ncube faction would eventually seek to resolve 




Opposition disunity and the Save Zimbabwe Campaign 
 
Zimbabwe’s opposition remained fractured after the 2005 elections. Indeed, the 
conflict between the MDC factions had erupted into violence on a number of occasions 
in 2006. One of the most evident examples of violence between these factions was 
when Trudy Stephenson, MDC Mutambara-faction MP for Harare South and seven 
other MDC-Mutambara members were attacked by members of the Tsvangirai faction. 
They accused a well-known youth activist Tonderai Ndira of having instigated the 
attack20. No charges were laid against Ndira or any others, supposedly due to a lack of 
evidence. 
The fractured opposition did manage to come together in 2006 to organise a protest 
movement that created an umbrella for the various political parties and the civil society 
organisations in a single concerted effort against the government. As with the 
formation of the NCA in 1998, it was deemed prudent to couch the movement within 
the churches, on the assumption that this might circumvent the reaction of security 
forces and the Public Order Security Act (POSA) and would elicit a less brutal reaction 
from the government. 
Jonah Gokova (2011), the director of the Ecumenical Support Services explains the 
Save Zimbabwe Campaign as a tenuous unification: 
The Save Zimbabwe campaign came about because we realised that at that time we needed to 
create a unifying platform from which we can engage ZANU-PF. We wanted to create a 
platform that would involve everyone and be clear that we were engaged in a struggle and this 
struggle was lacking that united front. The NCA was a united front but for a specific issue 




20 Ndira was eventually murdered by Zanu-PF militia during the political violence of 2008 . 
 
of interest. Broadly we were saying now is the time to increase our political pressure, so we 
needed all civil society organisations all the political parties to come together for that purpose. 
It served its purpose. It was a campaign, it was not going to be a long-lasting campaign, it 
needed clear time frame. Though we did not agree, we did not determine the end. I think we 
left it to the political dynamics and when we got to the end we decided the campaign had 




On March 11 2017 the leaders of the two MDC factions joined civil society activists 
for a prayer meeting in the Highfields suburb of Harare and Tsvangirai, Tendai Biti, 
Lovemore Madhuku and fifty other civic society members were arrested and tortured. 
Save Zimbabwe was another reflection of the disproportionate balance of coercion 
between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces. In the aftermath of the March 11 
rally, the photographs of Tsvangirai, Madhuku and others who had been badly beaten 
became the symbol of Zanu-PF brutality. 
Takura Zhangazha provides a critical analysis of the Save Zimbabwe Campaign: 
 
The truth is people came together not necessarily out of conviction. The Save Zimbabwe 
campaign in part was the politics of default. The interactions were not organic, you have 
comrades that were beaten up together in March 2007 and they ignore each other straight away. 
And it basically indicates to you that they never planned together, and some of these things 
were done primarily with commitment but not necessarily for the long term. They were done 
for the short term and for individuated political interests, because the NCA leadership was 
there, was beaten up, the main MDC leadership was beaten up, the MDC then - M was also 
assaulted or arrested, a whole host of other civil society activists from crisis coalition, from 
the youth movements arrested you know disappeared for a week, two weeks came out, 
bandages, press conferences were held. Two weeks later the MDC-T went on its own to meet 
the SADC leadership and no feedback; and as time went on civil society then decided to hold 
a stakeholder’s conference in Bulawayo, in August/September of 2007 and the [civil society 
was saying] the MDC had come up, had been talking with ZANU and had talked with civil 
society individually. They never came back to the whole Save Zimbabwe structure proper. 
 
One clear outcome of the Save Zimbabwe campaign was that it drove the Southern 
African Development Community to intervene in the Zimbabwean crisis. The 
community called an extraordinary summit on 28 March 2007 in Dar es Salaam, 
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Tanzania and appointed South African President Thabo Mbeki as its mediator in 
Zimbabwe. Following the violence of March 2007, the MDC had threatened to 
boycottthe 2008 elections unless electoral reforms were put in place. A deadline was 
set for Mbeki to report to the regional economic community by the end of June 2007. 
The negotiations, led by South African Minister of Foreign Affairs Sidney Mufamadi, 
resulted in the introduction of the two-round electoral system and the framework for 
the Global Political Agreement and a transitional constitution which came to be known 
as the Kariba Draft. The negotiations paved the way to elections in 2008 which would 
represent a crucial turning point in the balance between hegemonic and counter- 







By 2008 Zimbabwe’s economic and humanitarian crises had reached catastrophic 
proportions, formal employment stood at less than 20%, and more than a quarter of 
the country’s 12 million people had emigrated, most of them to South Africa. Inflation 
had risen from 1 593% per year in early 2007 and had reached over 8000% in 2008.  
In 2006 the  World  Health Organisation calculated that Zimbabwe’s life expectancy 
was the lowest in the world at 34 for women and 37 for men. To individual citizens 
these realities meant food shortages, queuing outside banks for entire days to have 
access to a currency that was rapidly losing value as notes began to take on hundreds 
of trillion-dollar denominations. As a result of hyperinflation, the bus fare to go to 
work was more than an income on a given day. Hospitals lacked drugs and provisions 
normally taken for granted such as blood for transfusions. The economic nightmare 
would ultimately define the run-up to the 2008 elections. 
The period before Zimbabwe’s 2008 general election had been largely peaceful. 
Certainly, in comparison with the elections of 2005, the lack of incidence prior to as 
well as on polling days was notable. The combined or harmonised parliamentary and 
presidential elections were held on the 29 March 2008. The mediation of President 
Thabo Mbeki had been successful in moderating tensions between Zanu-PF and the 
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MDC, while confidence-building measures such as the posting of election 
resultsoutside polling stations had gone a long way in assuaging suspicions of fraud as 
parliamentary poll results were presented. 
However, the announcement of the results of the dparliamentary election would trigger 
a wave of violence that surpassed all the previous elections and force an intervention 
by the regional economic community. For the first time in the history of Zimbabwe, 
Zanu-PF lost its majority in parliament, garnering 99 seats of 210 in the House of 
Assembly, while the Morgan Tsvangirai-led formation of the MDC had 100 seats and 
the faction led by Arthur Mutambara gained 10 seats. In the Senate elections, which 
had been reintroduced in November 2005, Zanu-PF won 30 of the 60 contested seats 
while the MDC-T and MDC-M received 24 and 6 seats respectively. Delays in 
announcing the results of the presidential polls sent the first indication of the tensions 
that were to ensue. The presidential poll had three major candidates; President Robert 
Mugabe, Morgan Tsvangirai and Simba Makoni, who stood in his newly formed 
Mavambo Kusile Dawn party. In all, the delay in announcing the results of the first 
round of the presidential election was more than a month, only being made on 2 May 
2008. 
Overall incidences of violence were concentrated in provinces that remained 
strongholds of Zanu-PF, mainly Mashonaland East, Mashonaland Central and 
Mashonaland West21. It would be reasonable to infer that these attacks were reprisals 
for those who had campaigned for or were seen to support the MDC parties. As with 
all elections since 2000, the violence was largely one-sided. Data on the political 
violence compiled by the Zimbabwe Peace Project and Sokwanele, two human rights 
NGOs in Zimbabwe found that of 2 168 incidents of violence recorded between 29 
March and September 2008, 1 473 incidents  had been perpetrated by Zanu-PF youth 
militia, 451 ZANU supporters and 262 by war veterans. Most attacks were perpetrated 
by combinations of the above groups. It is also significant that hundreds of incidents 
were committed by the National Army as well as the different branches of the Police 





21 Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN op cit ): Report on 2008 Harmonized elections, Harare; Sokwanele. com. 
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reported that 257 people had been tortured, 17 people burned, 222 abducted and over 
a thousand attacked with weapons (ZESN, 2008; Zimbabwe Peace Project, 2008). 
One particularly brutal episode during the violence of 2008 was the kidnap and torture 
of Jestina Mukoko and other members of staff from the Zimbabwe Peace Project. 
Mukoko’s torture may have been retributive, as brutality does not necessarily need to 
have a logical purpose. It may also be an indicator that Zanu-PF and the state security 
branches were fearful that the data which Mukoko and her organisation had been able 
to accumulate would be used to bring charges at the International Criminal Court, 
bearing in mind the charges brought against Kenyan political leaders in the aftermath 
of election-related violence in 2007. 
 
 
Conclusion: relations of force 2000-2008 
 
This chapter has addressed the first phase of open contestation in Zimbabwe between 
the hegemonic power in the form of the Zanu-PF governing class and the counter- 
hegemonic force which was a broad coalition of labour, sections of the middle class 
and some representatives of national white industry and farming. In concluding it 
would be necessary to summarise this period within the conceptual bounds of 
Gramsci’s balance of forces. As was outlined in Chapter 3 the relations of forces must 
be distinguished on three levels or moments. The first of these relations is the relation 
of economic forces, the mode of accumulation and production, and the development 
of material forces. The second moment is the degree of homogeneity, self- awareness 
and organisation attained by the various social groups. The third is the relation of 
military forces. This last moment encapsulates not only brute coercive power, but also 
ideological consent (2000, p. 202). 
 
 
Mode of accumulation and production 
 
The political economy of Zimbabwe after 2000 is the political economy of a state in 
crisis as the formal economy collapsed. The Fast Track Land Reform Programme 
effectively put an end to the existence of a white land-owning class in the country. 
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This class was replaced by a new black land-owning class under the A1 and A2 
structures of the FTLRP. The latter are essentially high-ranking military officials and 
Zanu-PF loyalists creating a state-based bureaucratic bourgeoisie. By 2008 the number 
of beneficiaries in this class would be approximately 16 000. The class of A1 farmers 
who each received plots of approximately 12 acres comprised about 145 000 
individuals. Given that neither of these classes holds title deeds to the plots they 
occupied they are entirely beholden to the whims of Zanu-PF leadership and could 
have their 99-year leases revoked with little notice. 
Apart from the land grab in the land reform programme, the governing class essentially 
became a kleptocratic class using access to the state to buttress their predatory 
accumulation. This class capitalised on the collapse of the economy to further enrich 
themselves. Where access to foreign currency, mines and agriculture was entirely 
dependent on access to the state these individuals were able to leverage their access to 
great profit as shortages of commodities such as fuel and food led to the governing 
class monopolising supply chains. Targeted international sanctions may have affected 
the governing class’s ability to externalise funds to Europe or the United States but did 
not prevent a collapse into a more blatant kleptocracy or ‘predatory accumulation’. 
The urban working class became a dispersed urban poor, reliant on informal trading for 
their economic existence. Labour structures would be severely weakened. 
Membership in the ZCTU declined from 1.7 million in 1998 to 700 000 in 2007 and 
to 350 000 in 2011 (Kanyenze, 2011). The effects of Murambatsvina would exacerbate 
this as the work force moved towards an informal basis. 
 
 
Homogeneity, self- awareness and organisation 
 
Throughout this period Zanu-PF’s notorious party discipline had been able to maintain 
the hegemon’s structural and organisational integrity. The party had consolidated its 
structures in 2000 following its loss in the constitutional referendum and called on old 
allies in the National Liberation War Veterans. With new organisational strength from 
charismatic young leaders such as Border Gezi who were able to drum up a degree of 
organisational self-awareness coupled with an increased capacity for violence against 
the new opposition. 
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While the centre was able to hold within Zanu-PF, internal rifts were never far below 
the surface. Intrigue within the party was revealed with the 2004 Tsholotsho plot in 
which Emmerson Mnangagwa, Jacob Mudenda and Jonathan Moyo were apparently 
exposed as planning a coup to place Mnangagwa, then speaker of parliament, as vice 
president and therefore in direct line of the presidency. Other camps were forming 
with Joice Mujuru (then vice president) appearing to be the most likely candidate in 
line with the support of her estranged husband General Solomon Mujuru. Zanu-PF’s 
internal disciplinary force held the plot in check. 
The fact that the MDC was a broad coalition meant there would always be the potential 
for fractures. By 2005 the MDC had begun to fracture, apparently due to principles of 
strategy. However, the split took a regional (ethnic) and to some degrees class nature 
as Sibanda, a labour leader, joined his fellow Ndebele intellectual Ncube to form their 
own faction of the MDC. The lack of coherent strategy in the counter-hegemonic 
movement was also triggered by competition for donor funding, as the opportunity to 
secure a significant salary when other opportunities for employment are diminished 
becomes an important motivational factor in engaging in the counter-hegemonic 
struggle. There was also the additional pull of access to power in engaging in the 
counter-hegemonic movement. This shift to politics also weakened civil society and 
labour as prominent leaders were leaving the labour movement and civil society to 
join the other sections of the movement in the MDC, as well as towards well-paid jobs 
in the donor agencies. 
 
 
Military forces, coercive power, ideological consent 
 
Given that the party and state had been fused since independence, Zanu-PF used 
coercive power and both legal and institutional superstructures to maintain its 
hegemony. The police, army, and Central Intelligence Organisation provided 
overwhelming coercive power to Zanu-PF which was supplemented by the war 
veterans during the land invasion and election periods. 
For its part, the MDC continued to focus its counter-hegemonic strategy on elections. 
Bearing in mind the Zanu-PF’s overwhelming capacity for coercion and its ability to 
compromise legal and electoral institutions, and by 2008 its ability to ignore the results 
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of the election and refuse to leave power, the strategy of gaining power through 
elections was ultimately proving ineffective. 
Apart from the institutional and coercive capacity of Zanu-PF the party also used its 
ideological weaponry in the form of patriotic history on a largely captive audience. 
There is no question that notwithstanding Mugabe’s and Zanu-PF’s attraction based 
on fear of coercion or ever-diminishing sources of patronage, the party’s ideological 
positions within the framework of patriotic history and the Third Chimurenga were 
convincing to a great number of Zimbabweans. The extent to which patriotic history 
was convincing to a large section of Zimbabwe can be interpreted as that part of Zanu- 
PF’s hegemony which supplemented the coercion inflicted on sections of the 
population, and the patronage doled out to others. Mugabe and his intellectuals had 
compelling arguments blaming the West, white farmers and the opposition as their 
puppets. The resonance of these must wholly account for why citizens in urban areas  
who despite the evidence of their personal economic hardships, despite having their 
pensions obliterated or losing their jobs, would continue to vote for the party. Given 
that the majority of Zimbabweans only consumed media from sources owned by the 
government and managed by Zanu-PF propagandists, it is no surprise that such people 
do exist, and in no small numbers. By 2008 Zanu-PF’s production of patriotic ideology 
had become increasingly crude and caricatural, a Caesarist narrative in which greast 
personalities predominated. Aall national news and the state-owned press began to 
refer to Mugabe as ‘His Excellency The President and First Secretary of ZANU-PF, 
Commander in Chief of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces Cde. Robert Gabriel Mugabe’, 
or ‘Our Vanguard leader’. 
By 2008 the balance of forces in Zimbabwe between hegemony and counter- 
hegemony had reached a stalemate: violence could no longer maintain Zanu-PF’s grip 
on power, as the results of the party’s policies had crippled the economy and all 
consent mechanisms were beginning to ring hollow. The trajectory of hegemony in 
Zimbabwe from 2008 would be determined by the MDC’s strategic decision to enter 
into the Government of National Unity. The following chapter will analyse the period 
of the Government of National Unity as a period of ‘Passive Revolution’ in the 
Gramscian sense, as a tactical compromise made by the hegemonic power with the 
intention of reconsolidating its control over the historical bloc. Based on the outcome 
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of the 2013 election in which Zanu-PF again won a majority in parliament, and Robert 
Mugabe seemingly won a majority in the presidential election, the chapter argues that 
the MDC strategy within the Government of National Unity was a strategic 
miscalculation. The chapter will thus seek to understand why the counter-hegemonic 





Passive revolution and the resurgence of Zanu-PF hegemony 
 
This chapter addresses the period of the Government on National Unity between 2008 
and 2013. After the violence which accompanied the second round of the presidential 
elections in March 2008, a political settlement was negotiated between Zanu-PF and 
the two factions of the Movement for Democratic Change. The settlement known as 
the Global Political Agreement put in place a Government of National Unity which 
maintained Mugabe as president and appointed Morgan Tsvangirai as prime minister. 
The chapter uses the Gramscian concept of passive revolution in discussing the period 
from 2008 to 2013, echoing Brian Raftopulous’ assessment (2010). As noted in 
Chapter 3, Gramsci’s passive revolution refers to the coming to power of a new 
historical situation in which the social and economic relations remain static. Passive 
revolution is often the outcome of a war of position by the dominant classes after a 
war of manoeuvre by the dominated classes. It is important to reiterate that passive 
revolution should not be interpreted as a concept as historical defeatism. Instead, 
Gramsci proposes that the concept ‘postulates, as necessary a vigorous antithesis 
which can present intransigently all its potentialities for development’ (2000, p. 264). 
That is to say, even in situations of passive revolution the potential for a counter- 
hegemonic offensive remains. This chapter interprets the MDC’s decision to enter into 
a Government of National Unity with Zanu-PF in 2008 as falling into the realm of a 
war of manoeuvre. MDC’s failure to capitalise on this apparent foothold in state power 
is explained by the movement’s weaknesses in both its ideological and its tactical 
power-political approaches. 
The chapter uses observation and interview data collected during 2010 and 2011 
during the constitution-making process of the GNU. The chapter highlights the 
shifting dynamics within the opposition movement as cracks began to widen between 
the varying ideological camps within the party and throughout opposition civil society. 
It will also be shown that once in power, members of the counter-hegemonic 
movement would show similar tendencies to the corruption of Zanu-PF. 
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The chapter concludes with an analysis of why Zanu-PF and Robert Mugabe won the 
2013 elections. Various theories have been proposed by Bratton (2017) and Chan and 
Gallaher (2017), among others, for why the MDC lost the 2013 elections despite the 
evident improvement in the economy during the GNU. This thesis will structure its 
analysis of the MDC’s loss in 2013 within the Gramscian framework. It will 
interrogate the extent to which this outcome was driven by economic or ideological 
factors, as well as the degree to which both the threat of violence, cheating and 
consent building account for Zanu-PF victoy. This is despite apparent evidence that 
Zanu-PF had led the  country to the disastrous economic hyperinflation of 2008, and 
that the MDC had theoretically changed this between 2008 and 2013. Gramscian 
analysis will also support a study of MDC strategies and allow for potential strategic 
errors in judgement in the counter- hegemonic battle against Zanu-PF in Zimbabwe. 
 
 
The Global Political Agreement 
 
The government’s brutal reaction to the March 2007 Save Zimbabwe prayer rally 
compelled the Southern African Development Community to intervene. The 
engagement by Thabo Mbeki as SADC’s appointed negotiator led to secret meetings 
in late 2007 in Kariba, in the north of Zimbabwe. The Kariba negotiations had initially 
sought to avoid potentially violent elections in 2008 by making concessions to the 
MDC, including appointing Tsvangirai as vice president (Mufamadi, 2015). The 
Kariba negotiations did not result in political settlement nor in avoiding elections in 
2008. When the elections degenerated into violence and it became clear that Zanu-PF 
– or at least the military – had no intention of relinquishing power, a negotiated 
political settlement became the only possible route to avoid further bloodshed. 
Following the example of Kenya following that country’s violent elections in 2007, 
the negotiations in Zimbabwe produced the Global Political Agreement which was 
signed in September 2008. The preamble to the agreement acknowledged the ‘recent 
challenges that we have faced as a country and the multiple threats to the wellbeing of 
our people and, therefore, determined to resolve these permanently’, and committed 
the parties to agree ‘to putting an end to the polarisation, divisions, conflict and 
intolerance that has characterised Zimbabwean politics and society in recent times’. 
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The agreement committed the parties to ending the multiple democratic, economic and 
human rights crises, through the formation of a Government of National of Unity. 
However, as Matyszak and Reeler have argued, apart from detailing the technicalities 
of how the government would be structured and composed, most of the 25 articles of 
the GPA were mere bombast or held only political relevance, while only a limited 
number of articles held legal traction (2011). In the midst of all the bombast and 
political irrelevance, reference was made to ‘justice, fairness, openness, tolerance’ and 
‘respect for democratic values’; however, the traces of ‘patriotic history’ were never 
too far. The agreement made reference to ‘Land Question [being] the core of the 
contestation in Zimbabwe’, ‘patriotism’ and ‘loyalty to Zimbabwe’, and the 
‘acknowledgement of the sacrifices made by thousands of Zimbabwe's gallant sons 
and daughters in the fight against colonialism and racial discrimination and determined 
to accept, cherish and recognise the significance of the Liberation Struggle as the 
foundation of our sovereign independence, freedoms and human rights’. 
 
 
Structure of the GNU 
 
The GNU would be headed by Mugabe as president and Tsvangirai as prime minister. 
In order to maintain the ethnic representation agreed upon between ZANU and ZAPU 
in the unity accord, two vice presidents were maintained. Two deputy prime ministers 
would be nominated by each MDC faction, with Thokozani Khupe appointed by 
Tsvangirai’s faction while Arthur Mutambara, who was signatory to the agreement, 
would be his party’s designated deputy prime minister. The cabinet would be 
composed of 31 ministers (15 nominated by Zanu-PF, 13 by the MDC-T and 3 by the 
MDC-M) and 15 deputy ministers. 
While the president would chair cabinet and the prime minister would chair the council 
of ministers, the agreement was particularly vague about the exact exercise of 
executive power. When the ministries were allocated Zanu-PF had crucially managed 
to maintain its control over both the ministry of defence and the ministry of justice, 
legal and parliamentary affairs, while the ministry of home affairs would be shared by 
co-ministers from Zanu-PF and the MDC-T. More importantly, Emmerson 
Mnangagwa would be minister of defence, while Patrick Chinamasa would be minister 
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of justice. Maintaining its grip on these key ministries meant that Mugabe would 
oversee the powerful National Security Council without any oversight from Tsvangirai 
or the MDC. 
Of the MDC’s 15 ministerial posts, the finance portfolio, which was taken by Tendai 
Biti, would prove to be the most important of the MDC’s cabinet positions, given the 
dire economic situation in 2008. Underlining the transition in the MDC’s class 
character once it came to power was the fact that, apart from Tsvangirai and Khupe as 
prime minister and deputy prime minister respectively, none of the party’s 15 cabinet 
ministers were previous trade unionists. The MDC nominated Roy Bennet as its 
deputy minister for agriculture, though he would never be sworn in as he was harassed 
throughout the period of the GNU in a series of trumped-up charges. Despite their 
majority in parliament, the MDC failed to successfully negotiate the allocation of 
ministries in the GNU due to Zanu-PF’s continued control of the state’s security 
structures, which were responsible for much of the post-poll violence. The reasons for 
the MDC’s compromises are a result of Zanu-PF’s intransigence as much as MDC 
naivety. 
Highlighting the latter, Takura Zhangazha argues that MDC leaders were mesmerised 
by their approaching access to power: 
The MDC leaders were getting that close to regional power and they were a bit naive. They 
forgot the politics. When you negotiate with anyone the politics [it] is not only in the 
boardroom it also remains with your stakeholders and they were in parts overawed at the rate 





The GNU: maintaining a tenuous coalition 
 
The Government of National Unity came into effect on 11 February 2009. From its 
inception the GNU would be plagued by issues on which the negotiating parties had 
delayed reaching an agreement. Among the most important of these outstanding 
issues, from the MDC point of view, were Mugabe’s re-appointment of Gideon Gono 
as Reserve Bank governor and Johannes Tomana as attorney-general, as well as the 
appointment of the country’s ten provincial governors. Gono had overseen the 
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unbridled printing of currency which had caused devastating hyperinflation, while 
Tomana had built a reputation as a prosecutor by tormenting opposition activists. In 
addition, the MDC continued to press for Roy Bennet to be sworn in as its nominee 
for the position of deputy minister of agriculture. For their part, Zanu-PF’s outstanding 
issues centred on revoking sanctions and ending pirate radio broadcasts into the 
country, two issues over which the MDC ultimately had little control. 
These outstanding issues would continue to haunt the GNU throughout its tenure while 
also reflecting the extent of Zanu-PF bad faith in the agreement. This bad faith would 
manifest itself throughout the tenure of the GNU, as MDC members of parliament and 
ministers would be routinely harassed. Harassment included the arrests of Tendai Biti 
on multiple occasions (in 2009, 2011 and 2013), as well as the arrest of Welshman 
Ncube and other MDC-N members in 2011. Apart from the ongoing persecution of 
MDC MPs and leadership, the state continued to repress the activities of civil society 
in the country. During the events of the Arab Spring in 2011, members of the 
International Socialist Organisation screened a documentary analysing the protests in 
Tahrir Square. Forty-five members of the Organisation, including Munyaradzi 
Gwisayi and Hopewell Gumbo, were arrested and charged with treason. The offices 
of the Zimbabwe Election Support Network, the Zimbabwe Peace Project, and the 
General Agricultural Plantation Workers Union were also raided multiple times during 
the GNU. 
There were some official efforts at peace building and reconciliation, including the 
Zimbabwe National Healing and National Reconciliation Commission. National 
healing and reconciliation, with specific reference to 2008, had also been hindered by 
the terms of the Global Political Agreement. It was decided that the ambit of the Organ 
on National Healing and Reconciliation would include victims of the war of 
independence, the previously unrecognised Matabeleland conflict of the 1980s as well 
as other cases of election violence since 2000. While they were no less important, 
focusing on these conflicts at this in the aftermath of the 2008 violence might have 
appeared as a cynical attempt to dilute the relevance more recent brutalities. ‘I want to 
urge all of you to note that the process of reconciliation is national. It does not seek to 
ferret out supposed criminals for punishment but calls all of us to avoid the deadly 
snare of political conflict.’ (Mugabe, quoted on cnn.com, 9 August 2010)  
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For the most part, efforts at peace-building in Zimbabwe during the GNU were 
undertaken by NGOs, often in cooperation with the international NGOs and donor 
agencies upon which Zimbabwean civil society is almost totally reliant. The tasks of 
uncovering the truth through activities such as publicising and lobbying, was carried 
out entirely by NGOs in Zimbabwe, at considerable risk to those who exposed the 
human rights abuses of 2008 and afterwards. Prominent NGOs such as the Zimbabwe 
Peace Project took the task of reconciling communities affected by election violence 
through workshops and indabas. At the same time the Zimbabwe Election Support 
Network continued to monitor areas which were prone to violent outbreaks, noting 
cases of human rights abuses and general political violence. They also reported that 
throughout 2011 Zanu-PF members had been denying food and donations of 





Apart from introducing a degree of political stability the GNU’s primary task was to 
restore the collapsed economy. GPA under Article 3 1(a): 
the parties agree to give priority to the restoration of economic stability and growth in 
Zimbabwe. The Government will lead the process of developing and implementing an 
economic recovery strategy and plan. To that end, the Parties are committed to working 
together on a full and comprehensive economic programme to resuscitate Zimbabwe’s 
economy which will urgently address the issue of production, food security, poverty and 
unemployment and the challenges of high inflation, interest rates and the exchange rate. 
 
 
In January 2009 Patrick Chinamasa, as outgoing minister for finance, had announced 
the adoption of a multi-currency regime meaning the abandonment of the Zimbabwe 
dollar and permission granted by the government to use a number of foreign 
currencies, particularly the US dollar, the South African rand and the Botswana pula. 
The GNU’s Short Term Economic Recovery Programme (STERP) was presented by 
the new minister of finance, Tendai Biti, in March 2009, a month after the inauguration 
of the GNU. STERP outlined the multi-currency policy and designated the South 
African rand as the reference currency, citing ‘the future intention of SADC to adopt 
a common currency, which inevitably will have to be based on the rand given the 
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dominance of the South African economy in SADC’, and South Africa’s proximity 
and role as Zimbabwe’s leading trading partner (STERP, 2009). Without any formal 
agreements and despite the reasoning provided in the STERP, Zimbabwe’s 
dollarisation happened by default; less a policy shift as much as it was an admission 
of reality. As Biti acknowledged in his first midterm budget review, ‘since February 
this year, the Zimbabwe dollar is no longer a currency that the public and any trader 
will accept. Our national currency has, thus, become moribund’ (Noko, 2011). 
Dollarisation immediately arrested the almost incalculable hyperinflation. In the first 
quarter of 2009 the negative GDP growth rate rose to 3.7% from 14.4% at the end of 
2008, with the agricultural sector posting gains of 24.3% in productivity (Biti, 2009). 
Despite these positive developments dollarisation brought new complications. The 
adoption of the US dollar negatively affected the country’s beleaguered industrial 
sector as Zimbabwe ironically became a high-cost economy and industry could no 
longer compete with South African imports, due to the disparity between the rand and 
the dollar (Chakravati, 2015). During the early years of the GNU, low confidence in 
the financial institutions of the country based on the experience of the early 2000s 
meant that foreign currency transactions were largely maintained outside the financial 
system (Noko, 2011). Dollarisation brought about stability and regularity to the 
Zimbabwean economic base, which then allowed Zanu-PF’s control of access to the 
means of production in order to leverage its hegemony over the base and ultimately 
over the post-2008 historical bloc. 
 
 
Diamonds introduce a new structural factor 
 
In 2006 significant deposits of alluvial diamonds were discovered in the Chiadzwa 
chieftainship of Marange district in Manicaland. The legal title for the Chiadzwa claim 
had been held from April 2006 by African Consolidated Resources plc, ‘a British 
registered company led by mostly white Zimbabwean Nationals’. However, the 
company would have its control over the fields wrested through political manoeuvres 
by the overlapping elite state, security and administrative interests (Saunders et al. 
2016, p. 21). The discovery of fields which could easily be exploited by hand digging 
and panning precipitated a diamond rush in the district, attracting thousands of 
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informal miners who saw an opportunity to earn hard currency in the context of the 
collapsing economy. Saunders and Nyamunda outline how, by October 2006, as many 
as 20 000 informal miners had descended on the district creating a booming black 
market for stones. In November of that year the Zimbabwe Republic Police launched 
Operation Chikorokodza Chapera (the panning is over), arresting over 9 000 people in 
the district and creating a cordon around the diamond fields. By mid-2007 the 
extraction of diamonds from the Chiadzwa fields was conducted through a cartel that 
included officials from the ministry of mines, the Zimbabwe Mining Development 
Corporation, the Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe and the security forces 
(Saunders, 2016). 
When the violence broke out between the two rounds of the 2008 elections Chiadzwa 
would be central as a source of resources for funding the security forces and Zanu- 
PF’s militia. It was also a locus of partisan violence against Manicaland that had voted 
overwhelmingly for the MDC-T during the March elections. Following the signing of 
the GPA in October 2008, the state deployed three ZNA brigades to Chiadzwa, 
unleashing a campaign of violence against informal miners and the inhabitants of the 
area which reportedly resulted in the deaths of 214 individuals with multiple reports 
of rapes and beatings by the soldiers. Speaking as finance minister in the GNU, Tendai 
Biti cited the potential loss in revenue of $233 million. Saunders and Nyamunda 
estimate that between 2009 and 2012 Zimbabwe lost at least $2 billion in potential 
diamond revenues (Saunders, 2016, p. 42). 
A key outcome of the discovery of diamonds in Marange was the shift in the interests 
and policy of EU member states in relation to sanctions. Farai Maguwu, the activist 
founder of the Centre for Research and Development (CRD) based in Mutare, noted 
the shift in donor relations from when the Kimberly Process to certify Zimbabwean 
diamonds began in late 2010. Maguwu cites the ‘growing pressure from Belgium to 
lift sanctions on the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC) so that 
Zimbabwe’s gems could be accepted in Europe, and notably in the diamond cutting 
and polishing centre of Antwerp’ (in Saunders, 2016, p. 104, Interview 2012). 
Sanctions against the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation would be lifted in 
2013, while Maguwu claims he was informed by a European diplomat that the CRD 
had been ‘black-listed by donors because of the problems it was creating for those who 
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were seeking to normalise Kimberly Process Zimbabwe relations’ (Saunders, 2016). 
 
 
Constitution making under the GNU: COPAC 
 
The key political task of the Government of National Unity was the drafting of the 
new constitution. Article VI of the Global Political Agreement stipulated that ‘It is the 
fundamental right and duty of the Zimbabwean people to make a constitution by 
themselves and for themselves. That the process must be owned and driven by the 
people and must be inclusive and democratic.’ Accordingly, the National Unity 
Government passed the 19th amendment of Zimbabwe’s Constitution in order to set in 
motion a people-driven constitution-building process. 
Much like the Zimbabwe Constitutional Commission of 1999/2000, the process would 
be driven by members of parliament. However, unlike the 2000 commission which 
included a cross section of national civil society represented by 400 commissioners, 
the 2009 Parliamentary Select Committee was made up of 25 members of parliament 
led by three MPs from each of the GPA signatory parties. The co-chairs selected were 
Munyaradzi Paul Mangwana from Zanu-PF, Douglas Mwonzora for the MDC-T and 
Edward Mkhosi of the MDC-M. The Global Political Agreement had set a deadline 
for the approval of the new constitution 18 months after the inauguration of the GNU 
which was October 2010. The deadline would prove to be unreasonable for a process 
that would include the collection of submissions, collation of data, and drafting of a 
new constitution to be put before a referendum. International donors provided $US21 
million in a basket managed by the UNDP, while additional funds of up to $23 million 
were provided to additional elements of constitution-making, including civil society 
support (UNDP, 2013). 
Disagreements in approaches and strategies to the constitution-making process led to 
a fracture in counter-hegemonic civil society. The NCA and ZCTU opposed the 
process run by the Parliamentary Select Committee for the Constitution which became 
known as COPAC. The ZCTU and NCA called for civil society to take charge and 
advocate for a ‘people driven’ as opposed to a ‘politician driven’ constitution-making 
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process. The decision to oppose the COPAC process led to the NCA losing virtually 
all of its funding from donors who were supporting the constitution-making process. 
The remainder of civil society sought to secure funding to take part in the constitution- 
making process. Civil society’s role in constitution-making involved holding 
workshops to discuss contributions to the outreach process, as well observation of the 
outreach activities. Organisations including Bulawayo Agenda, Catholic Commission 
for Justice and Peace (CCJP), Centre for Community Development in Zimbabwe 
(CCDZ), Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition and Zimbabwe Election Support Network 
(ZESN), conducted civic education meetings across the country to provide citizens 
with more clarity on issues for which COPAC would be conducting its outreach 
(ZZZICOMP, 2010). NGOs were also provided with funding to observe the outreach 
process. These included The Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, Zimbabwe Lawyers for 
Human Rights, and a coalition of Zimbabwe Peace Project and Zimbabwe Election 
Support Network that conducted observation projects of the outreach. 
Throughout the delays NGO observers of the constitution-making process began to 
report that Zanu-PF were selecting and coaching individuals who would articulate 
their proposals at constitutional outreach meetings. An operation entitled ‘vara 
muromo’, or shut your mouth, by Zanu-PF youth militia and undertaken by the Central 
Intelligence Organisation was put in place to intimidate citizens who may have wanted 
to make independent contributions at the outreach meetings (ZZZICOMP, 2010). 
When the outreach meetings began in June 2010, the intimidation of the previous 
months had rendered the collection of personal opinions all but farcical. Outreach 
meetings in Harare and Bulawayo were postponed in June 2010 ostensibly because 
the World Cup would have affected attendance. In all, over 4 533 outreach meetings 
were held out of a planned 4 820 meetings across the country between July and 
October 2010 (ZZZICOMP, 2010). Afrobarometer data (2010) indicated that in a 
national sample 30% of respondents said that they had attended public outreach 
meetings. Some regions reflected higher attendance, such as Manicaland where 58% 
of respondents reported having been present at COPAC meetings and Mashonaland 
Central where 45% of Afrobarometer respondents attested to having attended an 
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outreach meeting (Afrobarometer, March 2011)22. COPAC’s data for the outreach 
indicated that average attendance at the meetings ranged from 86 people in 
Matabeleland North to 328 people in Mashonaland Central (COPAC, 2013). 
Substantive contributions to the outreach meetings were driven largely by party 
affiliation, as well as explicit coaching and directives from Zanu-PF and security 
structures in numerous cases. As such Zanu-PF insisted on the elements of the Kariba 
draft in guiding the substantive content of their contributions. The documentary film 
Democrats, which shadowed the COPAC principals Mangwana and Mwonzora, 
provides video evidence of the coaching, intimidation and manipulation of attendance 
at meetings across the country by Zanu-PF youths and CIO agents (Democrats, 2015). 
 
Civil society organisations such as the Zimbabwe Elections Support Network, Crisis 
in Zimbabwe Coalition and Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights continued to stress 
the necessity of electoral system reforms before any elections, insisting particularly on 
an overhaul of the national voter’s roll, biometric identification, and international 
observation. Among the recommendations made by prominent civil society 
organisations to the Constitutional Commission had been the introduction of a 
proportional representation system that would curb the conflictual zero-sum nature of 
Zimbabwean politics. It is important to note that all political parties continued to 
favour a simple majoritarian system for parliamentary elections. 
 
Following the outreach phase, the Commission began working on the constitutional 
draft by converting and collating the contributions collected in the outreach process in 
January 2011. The drafting process was also fraught with disagreement between the 
parties. Disagreements arose in relation to dual citizenship, devolution, the 
appointment of the attorney-general, the powers of the executive, age limits and 
whether term limits would apply retroactively, as well as the appointment of the 
National Prosecution Authority (Interview with UNDP consultant to constitution 
 
 
22 The Afrobarometer statistic of 58 % attendance rate at the public outreach meetings in Manicaland in interesting given the 
reports by other observer groups of harassment by security forces and the highest instances of meetings being cancelled due to 
violence occurring in this province (ZZZ ICOMP final report, 2010 ) 
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making process, 2018; COPAC, 2013). An initial draft of the constitution would only 
be made available in April 2012, and after fierce negotiations between the parties the 
COPAC draft constitution was adopted in July 2012 and brought before a second all- 
stakeholder’s conference in October 2012 (COPAC, 2013). A final draft agreed upon 
by all parties was tabled in parliament on 31 January 2013. 
The COPAC draft had made some substantial improvements on the Lancaster House 
Agreement. Firstly, the COPAC draft introduced a more comprehensive Bill of Rights 
which included civil and political rights and provided for more detailed economic 
rights, including the right to education, health, food and water, environment (Coltart, 
2016; Magaisa, 2013). The draft significantly curtailed executive power by curbing 
the president’s power to appoint judges and provincial governors as well as the 
president’s power to declare states of emergency. Crucially, the new draft introduced 
presidential term limits to two five-year terms; however, the application of this new 
restriction was not retroactive and would therefore allow for Mugabe to run for another 
two terms. The draft made significant strides in improving the rights of women in the 
country by specifying the rights of women to equal treatment, equal pay, at least three- 
months paid maternity leave, equal citizenship rights, protection against domestic 
violence, equal opportunities, custody and guardianship of children, and that all laws, 
customs and cultural practices that violate women’s rights would be unconstitutional. 
The draft also provided for 60 elected seats in parliament to be reserved exclusively 
for women. The granting of dual citizenship reflected a key victory by the MDC in 
their negotiation of the draft, while extending the definition of citizenship to include 
people born outside Zimbabwe to at least one Zimbabwean parent. A fundamental shift 
in the structure of government came about in the provisions relating to the devolution 
of power. 
David Coltart, minister for education in the GNU and an MDC-N MP who had 
campaigned for constitutional reform since the 1980s, called for a ‘yes’ vote despite 
some concerns, arguing 
for all of the obvious flaws in both the process and the content, the draft offered to the 
Zimbabwean electorate is an improvement of what we have. A no vote will result in Zimbabwe 
retaining its present constitution with all its objectionable clauses. That will mean that there 
will be no devolution of power, no dual citizen rights, no rights regarding children and in 
general the retention of the current deficient Bill of Rights. (Coltart, 2016) 
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Possibly more compelling than the fear of losing the potential improvement in the draft 
constitution was the fear of a return to violence rather than a negotiated political order. 
As Coltart warned: ‘A no vote will also plunge Zimbabwe into another period of 
uncertainty and possible political conflict. It will mean that our experiment in ending 
our penchant for settling our political differences using violence has failed’ (2016, p. 
558). 
The draft was put to referendum on 16 March 2013. The official results of the 
referendum indicated that 98.29% of the 3 079 966 votes counted cast yes for the new 
constitution. The turnout meant that 94.49% of the registered electorate had voted to 
ratify the constitution (ZESN, 2013). Bratton notes, however, that when calculated as 
a share of the voting-age population the turnout amounted to only 49%. This is 
somewhat low in comparison with other recent constitutional referendums on the 
continent such as Kenya in 2010, which had a 72% turnout and South Sudan in 2011 
which had a 98% turnout (Bratton, 2016, p. 161). 
Despite the peaceful conduct of the referendum, Zanu-PF continued to exercise its 
domination. An indication of this was the arrest of a prominent human rights lawyer, 
Beatrice Mthethwa, the day after the results were announced. She was charged with 






The threat of elections had loomed over the fragile unity government from its 
inception. Elections re-entered the rhetoric of both parties immediately after the 
formation of the GNU. To some extent this amounted to little more than political 
bravado by the leadership of both Zanu-PF and the Tsvangirai faction of the MDC. 
Both referred to early elections when impasses were reached in the functions of the 
government, particularly during the initial delays of the constitution-building process. 
Immediately after the announcement of the referendum results in March 2013, Zanu- 
PF began to make calls to hold elections before the end of the inclusive government’s 
term of office in parliament on 29 June 2013. On the basis of the 1980 Constitution, 
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elections could not legally have been held before the end of the parliamentary term, 
while a deadline of up to four months meant that necessary reforms and planning could 
have been conducted before October 2013 (Coltart, 2016, p. 563). For its part, the 
MDC vehemently opposed holding elections before the voter’s roll management was 
reformed and an adequate voter registration exercise was held. 
On 2 May 2013 a previously unknown citizen, Jealousy Mawarire, petitioned the 
Supreme Court. He claimed that the absence of the pronouncement of an election date 
violated his political rights as a voting citizen and requested that elections be held ‘no 
later than June 30 2013’ (ZESN, EOM, 2013). On 31 May 2013 the Supreme Court, 
newly stacked with partisan judges appointed by Mugabe in contravention of the GPA, 
ruled in favour of Mawarire and that elections were to be held no later than 31 July 
2013. Mugabe then used the Emergency Powers Act to amend the Electoral Act in 
order to make the necessary adjustments for the reforms outlined in the new 
Constitution, including proportional representation and reserved seats for women 
(Coltart, 2016, p.568). These supra-legal manoeuvres notwithstanding, the 42-day 
count-down to elections was set and the technical requirements for election 
preparations were significantly compromised. Having accepted donor funding 
managed through the UNDP and the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in 
Africa, the Government of Zimbabwe then announced that it would not be accepting 
foreign funding for the 2013 poll after the election date had been set (ZESN, 2013). 
The shortfall of funds would provide an excuse for technical shortcomings in voter 
registration. 
A seemingly reinvigorated 89-year-old Robert Mugabe set about campaigning across 
the country. His party presented a glossy manifesto and distributed party regalia, all 
of which was supposedly funded by expropriated diamond resources. Zanu-PF also 
launched American-style attack ads; using social media, these advertisements focused 
mainly on Morgan Tsvangirai’s complicated love life during the period of the GNU. 
In substance, the Zanu-PF manifesto was a 108-page document that covered the 
ideological refrain of independence, sovereignty, and the legacy of the war of 
independence. Zanu-PF’s message had, however, been rebranded and packaged in 
newer terms targeted at the country’s youth. These used catchy hashtags such as 
#TeamZanu-PF and slogans such as ‘Bhora Mughedi’, ‘ball in the goal’. The 
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manifesto called for the youth ‘to indigenise themselves’ and outlined an ‘ideology of 
indigenisation’: 
The ideological meaning of Indigenisation and People’s Empowerment arises from the 
historical fact of our independence and sovereignty as Zimbabweans, as an expression of our 
heroic liberation struggle that was waged by Zimbabweans to attain the freedom and 
democracy we all enjoy today. (ZANU-PF Election Manifesto, 2013) 
 
 
The party outlined how this ideology would translate into clear policy goals, stating: 
 
Zanu-PF’s ideological thrust to indigenise the ownership of Zimbabwe’s natural and economic 
resources that fell into foreign hands as a consequence of colonialism or racist Rhodesian rule 
is based on the law to ensure fairness, transparency, accountability and predictability in its 
policy implementation. The relevant law in this regard is the Indigenisation and Economic 
Empowerment Act (Chapter 14:33) as read with the Indigenisation and Economic 
Empowerment (General Regulations, 2010). (ZANU-PF Election Manifesto, 2013) 
The explicit argument from the Zanu-PF manifesto was that the Indigenisation through 
Economic Empowerment Act would result in a bonanza of ‘at least US$7,3 billion 
worth of assets projected from the indigenisation of 1,138 foreign companies in 12 key 
sectors of the economy’ (Zanu-PF Election Manifesto 2013). The party claimed that 
this US$7, 3 billion would be used: 
to grow the economy by recapitalising and capacitating Agribank to stimulate agricultural 
productivity and safeguard food security; the Infrastructure Development Bank of Zimbabwe 
to rehabilitate physical and social infrastructure to revive the country’s key economic enablers; 
and the Small Enterprises Development Corporation to finance innovative youth and women’s 
projects to promote financial inclusion on the formal sector. 
 
 
The party claimed that the key to economic growth lay in activating ‘idle assets’ and 
that: Like parastatals that are fully owned by the State, all local authorities have idle 
assets, including land, from which real value can be unlocked to capacitate 
development banks’. The manifesto estimated that a “reservoir” of idle assets valued 
at US$1,357,010,326 lay in the hands of national local authorities. (Zanu-PF, 2013, p. 
84) 
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The fact that Zanu-PF was able to deliver on an effective and focused election 
campaign would indicate that the party had been planning for the eventuality of an 
election throughout the GNU period. The party’s continued focus on Mugabe as its 
vanguard leader implied that the period of the GNU had been used to rehabilitate 
Mugabe’s image as father of the nation and to reinvent his cult of personality. 
Other key proposals in the manifesto were: 
 
to improve provision of urban housing by regularising the tenure of urban dwellers that were 
allocated housing and commercial stands on peri–urban farms under the Land Reform 
Programme, giving bankable leasehold security of tenure to all agricultural beneficiaries of the 
Land Reform Programme and the legalisation [of] artisanal mining. (Zanu-PF, 2013) 
 
 
Finally, Zanu-PF made reference to polling data, presumably from the Mass Public 
Opinion Institute and the Freedom House Foundation which had reflected a resurgence 
in support for indigenisation policies. Zanu-PF argued that: 
Even the public polls have said it. The verdict of all opinion surveys by national and 
international polling organisations published since July 2012 have shown that Zanu-PF is 
winning the 2013 elections because the Party’s Indigenisation and Empowerment programme 
is synonymous with the goals of the people. These surveys which have been done by 
organisations that have nothing to do with Zanu-PF and which have traditional links with the 
Party’s detractors have shown first that President Mugabe and Zanu-PF have recovered from 
the illegal regime change setbacks suffered in 2008 and second that the support for President 
Mugabe and Zanu-PF is among a growing majority of Zimbabweans - especially in the ranks 
of the youths, women and professionals between the ages of 18 and 40 – is dramatically surging 
while the support for opposition formations with no policies to offer to uplift the livelihoods 
of the people is plummeting. 
In this vein Zanu-PF sought to highlight its own experience and oppose it to ‘the 
political immaturity, ideological bankruptcy, policy inexperience, corruption, sexual 
scandals and the incapacity to govern of the MDC formations whose officials have 
used the GPA to show their true colours by abandoning the people in pursuit of selfish 
interests’ (Zanu-PF, 2013). 
In comparison to Zanu-PF’s campaign the MDC seemed less prepared for the 2013 
elections, presenting only a 36-page manifesto. A possible indicator of the influence 
of the donor-reporting culture was the fact that the MDC’s Manifesto began with an 
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executive summary, a structure commonly associated with donor reports. The MDC’s 
document touted the party’s role in the successes of the GNU; these included four 
years of economic growth after over 10 years of collapse, ‘the reduction of inflation 
from 231 million per cent to less than 10%’, and the improvement in basic services 
including electricity and fuel supplies. The MDC credited itself with other 
achievements, including the resuscitation of the education system. Finally, the party 
underlined the passing of the new constitution with its presidential term limits and 
broadening of citizenship rights as indicators of its record in government (MDC, 
2013). The MDC’s manifesto was certainly less detailed than Zanu-PF’s when it came 
to its proposed policies or their claimed benefits. The MDC proposed its JUICE 
economic strategy: Jobs, Upliftment, Investment Capital, Environment, which claimed 
that it would create 1 million jobs by 2018 and a $100 billion economy by 2040, which 
was certainly less ambitious than their competitor’s claim to immediately ‘unlock’ over 
$8 billion through indigenisation and idle assets. 
Phillan Zamchiya (2016), who shadowed the MDC’s 2013 campaign as a journalist, 
chronicles the debate between those party technocrats who recommended launching 
the campaign in Masvingo Province, and Nelson Chamisa, the party’s organising 
secretary, who wanted to ‘send a strong signal to Zanu-PF that the MDC was ready to 
rout its stronghold in Mashonaland’. Chamisa’s influence had grown in the party and 
he won out; as a result the MDC’s campaign was launched in Rudhaka stadium in 
Marondera. The internal contradictions and lack of party discipline in the MDC would 
be a critical factor in the build-up to the 2013 elections, as 29 disgruntled MDC-T 
members chose to run as independent candidates in protest at the way the party ran its 
primaries. Tendi makes the observation that, in comparison, Zanu-PF saw only three 
members break rank to run as independents (The Guardian, 23 August, 2013). 
The party’s rallies were reportedly as well attended as MDC rallies had been in 
previous elections (Zamchiya, 2014; Kondo, 2016). Tsvangirai’s message at rallies 
focused on the more realistic claims of providing free primary education and the 
creation of a million jobs in the following five years. As a testament to the increasing 
resonance of Zanu-PF’s ideological arguments around land reform, Tsvangirai found 
himself refuting the claim that he had been against the Fast Track Land Reform 
Programme. In a shift from the party’s position in elections since 2000, Tsvangirai 
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sought to nuance his position by arguing that he had been against the partisan 
distribution of the land and reassured resettled farmers that the MDC would not 
remove them from their allocated land (Zamchiya, 2013, 962). 
The MDC’s candidates were poorly financed compared to Zanu-PF’s election war 
chest which was stocked from the diamond bonanza. Zamchiya quotes MDC officials 
who stated that aspiring MDC councillors were each given $100 by the party to cover 
campaign-related expenses, while MP candidates each received $1 400, 1 000 posters 
and 1 200 t-shirts. In comparison, the average Zanu-PF parliamentary candidate had 
up to 15 000 t-shirts to disperse in their constituencies and $10 each per day to spend 
on their campaign staff (Zamchiya, 2013, p. 960). The differences in campaign finance 
would have had an impact in a country where access to small items of patronage made 
a notable impact on the lives of campaign staff and voters alike. While it would have 
been difficult to match the campaign funds resulting from the expropriated diamonds, 
it is possible that given the unexpected deadline for elections, even if donors or their 
implementing partners had wanted to support the MDC’s 2013 campaign they would 
not have been able to make their funds available on time. 
An observation of the MDC rallies would have indicated that the MDC were confident 
of victory as polling day approached. Timothy Kondo recalls in an interview in 2016 
that the night before polling the party’s executive met at Tsvangirai’s home and every 
conversation began with the slogan ‘Tapinda Tapinda!’ (We’re in!) (Kondo, 2016). 
When the results were announced on 1 August, Zanu-PF had garnered 197 seats while 
the MDC-T won 70 and the MDC-N won 2. Mugabe won the presidential election, 
having increased his share of the vote from 43.2% in 2008 to 61.09%, while 
Tsvangirai’s share dropped from 47.9% to 33.94% (ZESN, 2013). The outcome of the 
period of ‘passive revolution’ was a definitive victory for Zanu-PF at the polls and 
represented a blow to the counter-hegemonic movement in Zimbabwe. 
 
 
Why Zanu-PF won 
 
The African Union Election Observer Mission to the 2013 election made the general 
observation that ‘The voting and counting processes took place in a peaceful and 
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tranquil environment’ and that ‘voting was carried out in an atmosphere devoid of 
violence, harassment and disturbances’ (AU EOM, 2013). The preliminary statement 
cited the Electoral Commission’s failure to provide a copy of the voters roll within ‘a 
reasonable’ period of time. The Mission noted that the final voters roll was made 
public two days before the election – which was rather late for meaningful inspection 
and verification by voters, parties and candidates to take place. The Mission also noted 
that the 8.7 million ballot papers were 35% avoce the number of registered voters, and 
therefore significantly above international norms. The African Union also underlined 
that extremely high instances of voters were turned away, and that the high instances 
of assisted voters would not correspond to the country’s comparably high literacy rate, 
as well as the unbalanced coverage on the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (AU 
EOM, 2013). The Observer Mission’s preliminary statement was certainly more 
condemnatory than usual for the African Union. The content of the statement was 
overshadowed by the confrontational style of a BBC reporter questioning the AU Head 
of Mission, Olusegun Obasanjo, as to whether the elections had been free and fair. This 
would have forced the former Nigerian president to admit to having been unduly 
optimistic about the pre-election environment. In the conference, Obasanjo declared 
the elections free and fair, contrary to the statement of his own observer mission. 
Despite all the above irregularities the results were barely disputed by the MDC. 
Tsvangirai made muted calls for mass protest but was contradicted by his party’s 
treasurer-general, Roy Bennet. Bennet emphasised the state’s capacity for coercion as 
the key reason why the MDC made no calls for mass protest, stating that ‘Anybody 
who goes out to protest now will get shot. It would be suicide, and who's going to 
commit suicide?’ (The Guardian, August 3 2013). 
The outcome of the 2013 elections and the extent of Zanu-PF victory surprised most 
commentators, and more importantly was a shock to the MDC. Zanu-PF’s victory in 
2013 is indeed baffling. Tendi’s accounting for Zanu-PF’s victory points to the 
capacity for consent within Gramscian dialectic. Writing in The Guardian in the days 
following the election, Tendi argued: 
To say that the preponderance of incumbency continued in the latest election entirely because 
of Zanu-PF's obstruction and subversion of reforms would be incomplete. Tsvangirai's party 
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lost sight of the need for rapid and comprehensive institutional reforms in the early years of 
power-sharing. It expended most of its energies in fighting for appointments to the ministry of 
agriculture, attorney general, central bank and provincial governors. By the time it refocused 
on institutional reforms, the period to elections had shortened significantly. There was little 
time, energy and external goodwill left for the MDC-T to pursue what should have been its 
main pursuits from the beginning. (The Guardian, 5 August 2013) 
Raftopulous argues that Zanu-PF’s victory can be attributed to ‘Zanu-PF strategies in 
the context of the transformed political economy, the weaknesses in the MDC 
formations and the politics of the SADC, the EU and the US’ (Raftopulous, 2014, p. 
979). The first cause is echoed by Chan and Gallagher and can be understood as Zanu- 
PF’s increasingly cogent arguments for its policies in relation to land reform, 
indigenisation and informal mining (Chan & Gallagher, 2017). Chan and Gallagher’s 
analysis of Mugabe’s victory in 2013, and as such ZANU-PF’s durability is framed 
around ‘conditions, characters and relationships’ (2017, p. 3). They argue that the key 
conditions that shaped the 2013 elections were rooted in the colonial era and ‘the fact 
that the ruling party and its leaders were forged through a violent anti-colonial war 
still shapes the rationales of government’. Chan and Gallagher (2017, p.7) infer the 
influence of ‘characters’ and ‘relationships’ in that Mugabe had ‘masterly control over 
his own party, and over political events in the country, he had huge importance in the 
region (evidenced in his election as president of the SADC in 2014 and of the AU in 
2015) and continued to dominate and to a large extent manipulate Western policy 
towards his country’. 
As such, their argument frames the regime’s durability in 2013 on ‘material attributes 
of power’ but also ‘culturalist understandings’ of power. This latter framing represents 
Mugabe as ‘both a nurturing/ repressive father-figure and the best embodiment of 
Westernised sophistication. The English language, intelligence and ability to conduct 
himself on the world stage are a source of pride for many Zimbabweans’. This 
paradox, is for Chan and Gallagher, why so many people voted for Mugabe, 
a man who has presided over economic ruin, political violence and misery for millions of 
people. And it is why they rejected a man who is widely acknowledged to be personally 
courageous, and who, in joining the GNU, helped stabilise a nightmarish political and 
economic situation, bringing some measure of order. In the end, when Zimbabweans looked 
at the two men running, they couldn’t see Tsvangirai as president of Zimbabwe – it wasn’t 
‘thinkable’. He didn’t have the educational credentials, political sophistication, historical 
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embeddedness or regional standing of Mugabe. He didn’t encapsulate their idea of Zimbabwe. 
Mugabe, with all his complexity – his cold savagery, his brilliant rhetoric, his projection of 
power, and his ability to embody a new, independent, confident country – did (2013, p.15)23. 
To admit that Zanu-PF’s policies were convincing by implication concedes that 
Zimbabweans chose to punish the party which had brought about some degree of 
normalcy to the economy – as though the populace were entirely oblivious to the Zanu- 
PF mismanagement which had brought about the hyperinflation of 2008. It would also 
imply that a very significant segment of the population was convinced by Zanu-PF’s 
claims of over a billion dollars in ‘idle assets’ and that indigenisation would ‘unlock’ 
over four billion dollars. This would also be magically ‘unlocked’ in the financial 
markets to produce another 29 billion dollars which Zanu-PF would be trusted to 
distribute to the masses. It is perhaps not implausible to hypothesise that a population 
devastated by a lack of hope and fed a steady diet of propaganda might succumb to 
the populism of Zanu-PF’s ideology. But Chan and Gallagher are probably correct to 
link the appeal of Caesarist leadership to a particular combination of conditions and 
social forces. 
Derek Matyszak of the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa (2017) engages 
directly with Chan and Gallagher’s argument and provides a nuanced analysis of the 
2013 election result combining structural and technical approaches. Matyszak 
questions Chan and Gallagher’s interpretation of the 47% of respondents who declined 
to state a preference for either political party as ‘undecided voters’ or the equivalent 
of swing voters in more mature democracies. Chan and Gallagher argue that ‘even 
those with previous party affiliations were prepared to wait and see, and judge, on 
performance and persuasion factors as the full term of government expired and the 
election commenced. In short, the 47 per cent represented an ‘everything to play for’ 
factor’ (2017, p. 40). Matyszak cautions that this interpretation is incorrect bearing in 
mind the potential for retributive violence against respondents to such opinion polling. 
 
23 The framing of Zimbabwean societal relations around the paradoxical nurturing/ repressive father figure 
who embodies Westernised sophistication while confronting western dominance is  not  new. The  concept  is  
best encapsulated in  the title of  Tsitsi Dangaremgba’s 1988 novel  Nervous Conditions . The novel takes i ts 
t i t le from Jean Paul Sartre’ s foreword to Franz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth in which Sartre argues that 
the status of the African bourgeoisie is that of a nervous condition in that the ‘radical class’ which opposes 
colonial oppression must also mimic the language and mannerisms of the  colonial  oppressor.  
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Matyszak critiques ‘the new narrative’ that the policies of indigenisation, land reform, 
as well as the more relaxed policies towards artisanal mining and street vendors had 
sufficient mass appeal to shift 1.3 Million votes to Mugabe and Zanu-PF. While 
Matyszak emphasises the fact that the policies outlined in the Zanu-PF was ‘all smoke 
and mirrors’ given that it would be virtually impossible, even in Zimbabwe to enact a 
law requiring companies to get their shareholders to dispose of 51% of indigenous 
Zimbabweans. Matyszak also argues that the fear of losing farm land appropriated 
under the Fast Track Land Reform Programme or mining claims or vending spaces 
since 2008 may have accounted for continued support of Zanu-PF it would not account 
for an increase in electoral support for the party. 
Using evidence from the ZESN and African Union election observer mission reports 
noted above, Matyszak cites the fact that there were 207 000 assisted voters in the 
2013 election, a fact which does not correspond with Zimbabwe’s 96% adult literacy 
rate. This fact would suggest the that voters were fearful of violence should they have 
cast their vote for the MDC rather than Zanu-PF. Casting an assisted vote would 
therefore have acted as insurance that the voter had cast his or her ballot for Zanu-PF. 
Matyszak also highlights that the fact that 304,890 voters (accounting for 8.7%) of the 
electorate turned away from the polling stations supposedly due to not having been 
registered at those specific stations as evidence of bias in the voter registration process 
which would have explained the extent of the support for Mugabe in the 2013 election. 
Matyszak does concede that the argument that while support for Zanu-PF may not 
have increased, support for Tsavangirai and the MDC decreased. One of the core 
reasons he cites, in concurrence with Chan and Gallagher (2013), is Morgan 
Tsvangirai’s tarnished image as a leader. The waning of Tsvangirai’s lustre arose from 
his the perception of his weakness as a leader under the GNU in which he constantly 
appeared to be undermined by Mugabe. Tsvangirai’s indecisiveness is underlined by 
Chan and Gallagher and was echoed in primary interviews for this thesis by people 
who considered themselves close to him including Timothy Kondo, Collen Gwiyo, 
and Lucia Matibenga. In addition to his perceived weak leadership Morgan 
Tsvangirai’s complicated love life was also a source of public disaffection as Zanu- 
PF capitalised on the negative perceptions in a conservative society. Additionally, the 
MDC’s shift from a political movement to a political party in government meant that 
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a number of MDC politicians felt it was ‘their time to eat’24 and the endemic corruption 
in MDC local councils would have discouraged former MDC supporters from voting 
for the party in 2013. 
Certainly, the dilemmas and internal contradictions of the broad-based counter- 
hegemonic movement outlined in the previous chapters further consolidated when the 
party came into government. The first manifestation of coalition dynamics was when 
the MDC sought to staff their offices in the GNU, as the pool for recruitment for these 
key posts would come from civil society. This led to a drain of key actors from civil 
society while also producing a new competitive dynamic for technocratic 
appointments in the GNU. Pedzisayi Ruhanya, a former student activist who in 2011 
was employed at the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, was critical of the co-option of 
CSO leadership into government roles: 
The problem is that they have now formed a quasi-government NGO and [are] polluting the 
whole civil society. They have their own organisations and civil society that they say they are 





The poaching of civil society leadership also reflected the overlap with the donor 
community, as international NGOs – including the International Republic Institute and 
Freedom House –were the conduits for donor funding for staff in the Prime Minister’s 
office. Donor funding had a clear impact on policy once the party was in government; 
as Zhangazha (2009) notes: 
There is an over-reliance on one or two individuals within the top leadership about what should 
happen and what shouldn’t happen and the second point is external interference both in relation 
to funding strategic planning, thinking, and funding on specific terms, with an intended 
outcome. I mean if the IRI gives you money to get your top leadership to go to another place 
or country for some it’s clear that they expect you come up with policies that are palatable to 







24 An expression Matyszak borrows from Michaela Wrong’s book Our Turn to Eat about  corruption in  
Kenya. 
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The class dynamics of a movement which combined the contradictory interests of 
labour with those of industry leaders also became more urgent once the party was in 
government. In an interview in 2011, Lucia Matibenga describes the conflicts and 
sometimes cognitive dissonance at the core of the party: 
I had a meeting this morning at which there was Eddie Cross as the policy coordinator of 
policy secretaries in the MDC and he was proposing a vision. And in that vision, he talks about 
"a free market economy" ... you know. To me that’s a slap in my face. You also get to a meeting 
where people are like "why can’t we relax labour laws a bit and you are like, where am I? Am 
I in the DA in South Africa? I know I am having private fights with Morgan, and quite more 
openly with my cousin [Elias] Mudzuri, that you know that you are from a social democratic 
party and you play golf     what’s that? I'm not really talking about associating with white 
farmers and so on. I mean which party does not get funding from elsewhere? That will not for 
me qualify as a neo-liberal agenda. It’s because we have now included everybody and people 
have a different background and a different training. I’m not thinking profit, I'm thinking pay 
... but for a business person who of course was, they are also thinking profits and already these 
two cannot go together. (Matibenga, 2011) 
 
 
Increasing internal friction had not been limited to the larger MDC faction. In February 
2011 the smaller MDC faction voted to remove Arthur Mutambara as its leader and 
replaced him as party leader as well as delegate deputy prime minister with Welshman 
Ncube. Mutambara would continue to contest his party’s decision and remained 
deputy prime minister, with the support of Mugabe, until the end of the GNU in 2013. 
Added to the above lack of coherence the period of the inclusive government showed 
evidence of corruption by both MDC councillors and members of parliament. As noted 
above, MDC members of parliament had blatantly sought to profit from the 
constitution-making process by renting out state vehicles for the outreach process, 
while the party had been forced to admit that up to 25 of its councillors had been 
involved in varying levels of corruption (Bulawayo24, 2012). 
The reasons for the MDC’s loss were ultimately multifaceted. They depended as much 
on questions of coercion as they did on shifting patterns of consent, on the role of the 






This chapter concurs with Raftopulous’ assessment of the Government of National 
Unity as a case of ‘passive revolution’. As described in Chapter 2, Gramsci’s concept 
of passive revolution refers to the coming to power of a new historical situation of 
counter-hegemonic struggle in which social and economic relations become static. 
Passive revolution is often the outcome of a war of position by the dominant classes 
after a war of manoeuvre by the dominated classes. In Zimbabwe’s case, the passive 
revolution represented by the inclusive government came about as a result of the 
overwhelming use of coercion to subvert the results of the 2008 elections. Heeding 
Gramsci’s warning, this chapter has not interpreted passive revolution as historical 
defeatism, that is to say, it cannot suggest that by entering the inclusive government 
the MDC factions were destined for defeat. There was certainly sufficient potential for 
reforms and strategies in the GNU which the counter-hegemonic forces could have 
used to bring about an overall change in the country’s power balance. 
The chapter has outlined the structure of the GNU to illustrate how the counter- 
hegemonic parties’ inability to gain power over ministries related to state security (and 
therefore coercion) adversely affected the ability to bring about any conclusive change 
in the nature of hegemony. This particular outcome indicates the weaknesses in party 
negotiation strategies as they were unable to insist on control of these key coercive 
elements of the state. 
The chapter then outlined the measures taken to bring about economic recovery. The 
application and impact of dollarisation have been elaborated on in order to reflect the 
positive impact of the multicurrency regime. This brought hyperinflation to an end and 
led to a return to normalcy in banking, as well as the capacity to import goods such as 
fuel and food items. It has been shown, however, that the adoption of the US dollar in 
particular has led to Zimbabwe becoming a high-cost economy for production. In 
addition, dollarisation has led to further de-industrialisation and the loss of more 
employment as Zimbabwe can no longer compete with South Africa when labour and 
manufacturing costs are compared. It has also been shown that due to the 
overwhelming control of the state bureaucracies, the governing elites in Zanu-PF have 
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monopolised access both to the means of accumulation and to the national political 
economy where the state determines access to resources. This access to the state is 
particularly evident in the extraction of resources from the Chiadzwa/Marange 
diamond fields. The chapter has shown how access to Chiadzwa diamonds brought 
about a shift in the economic base of the state by providing an abundant source of 
income and patronage for the state based bourgeoisie and the armed forces. It has also 
provided a means of manufacturing economic dependence by controlling access to 
patronage through informal mining. Finally, the Marange Diamonds created a seismic 
shift in the interests and policies of European nations, particularly Belgium, in relation 
to sanctions. This shift had the effect of relieving external pressure on Zanu-PF while 
reducing political and financial support for Zimbabwe’s opposition civil society, 
which had become entirely dependent on donor support for its functions. 
The chapter continues to elaborate on the process of constitution-making as a key facet 
of the counter-hegemonic struggle in the country, as well as an indicator of the nature 
of passive revolution in the GNU period. Given that constitution-making had been a 
central arena of contestation throughout the counter-hegemonic struggle in Zimbabwe, 
the ability to manage the process of constitution-making signified a degree of progress 
in terms of setting the rules of the political game in the country. Constitution-making 
under the GNU, however, encapsulated the dilemmas of democratic counter- 
hegemonic struggle. Even the process of rule-setting was circumscribed by 
authoritarian power dynamics. This included intransigence in establishing the 
parameters of debate, the use of coercion to dissuade free expression, and ultimately 
ignoring those contributions which did not suit the hegemon’s interest. In the 
Zimbabwean case a compromise acceptable to the counter-hegemonic movement was 
made. Checks on executive and term limits were instituted, the Bill of Rights was 
extended by including social and economic rights as well as increasing the rights of 
women, an independent electoral commission was established and right to dual 
citizenship was enacted. 
In addition, the chapter illustrated how the battle over constitution-making led to 
further rifts in the counter-hegemonic bloc, as segments of opposition civil society 
contested the process run by politicians. This episode also reflects the dependence on 
donor funding in Zimbabwe’s civil society, as the decision to oppose the constitution- 
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making process left organisations such as the NCA entirely abandoned by the donors, 
while other organisations such as the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, Zimbabwe 
Election Support Network and Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights were funded by 
multiple donors to participate in the constitution-making process in terms of content 
as well as observers of the outreach process. 
The chapter concludes with an analysis of the build-up to the elections which Zanu- 
PF ultimately won, providing Robert Mugabe with another potential four-year term in 
office. The outcome of the election surprised most observers and commentators and 
has given rise to a number of hypotheses for why Zanu-PF won. Analyses of the 2013 
elections concluded that Zanu-PF’s ideological positions did win over a significant 
segment of the population, and changes in the economic structure further entrenched 
a dependency on Zanu-PF patronage. However, it was the party’s manipulation of the 
state mechanisms of registration and coercion which ultimately led to its victory in 
2013. 
Raftopulous (2014) correctly situates this moment as the ‘end of an era’ in the counter- 
hegemonic struggle in Zimbabwe. This can be understood in the context of a changing 
historical bloc, as the political and economic conditions which had initially given rise 
to the counter- hegemonic movement changed substantially as the county’s economy 
became more informal and more dependent on access to patronage. 
The next chapter deals with the continued weakness of organised opposition in 
Zimbabwe and the rise of new forms of counter-hegemonic forces. These new forces 
such as the Tajamuka and #ThisFlag movements used social media platforms and were 
more organic to the informal political economy. The next phase of Zimbabwe’s history 
is, however, marked by internal rifts within Zanu-PF which culminated in Mugabe’s 
removal via a supposedly bloodless coup d’état. The chapter will analyse these internal 
rifts in the hegemonic bloc and the outcome of the coup d’état in the context of previous 
chapters which outlined the nature of Zimbabwe’s governing class. It will be shown 
that the coup in 2017 reflected the predominance of coercion in the maintenance of 
Zanu-PF’s hegemony, as well as how the hegemonic party has been able to overcome 





New counter-hegemonic arenas and the 2017 coup 
 
 
This chapter analyses the balance of hegemony and counter-hegemony after the end 
of the Government of National Unity and the results of the 2013 elections. The post- 
2013 period witnessed the further disintegration of the counter-hegemonic bloc as well 
as the rise of new counter-hegemonic forces such as the Tajamuka and #ThisFlag 
movements. Apart from the bourgeoning of these new forces, Zimbabwe’s history 
after the 2013 phase will be defined by the removal of Robert Mugabe from office via 
a military coup and the reconsolidation of Zanu-PF under the leadership of Emmerson 
Mnangagwa. The chapter begins by outlining the continued disintegration of the 
counter-hegemonic bloc in the MDC after 2013, leading to the departure of Tendai 
Biti to form his own party, the MDC-Renewal, in 2014. The growth of new protest 
movements in the Tajamuka and #This Flag campaign in 2016 will then be outlined to 
show the changes in the terrain of counter-hegemonic politics towards movements that 
were more organic to the post-2013 political economy and used new methods and 
social media tools. The chapter will then address the internal dynamics within Zanu- 
PF starting with the conflict between Vice-President Joice Mujuru and Emerson 
Mnangagwa, which then evolved into a conflict between Mnangagwa and the 
President’s wife Grace Mugabe. The chapter will show how internal party dynamics, 
which date back to the Chimurenga period as outlined in Chapter 4, were instrumental 
in the military coup and the removal of Mugabe in 2017. On the counter-hegemonic 
front, events after 2017 would be defined by the death of Morgan Tsvangirai and the 
turmoil within the opposition movement. This was as the internal struggles between 
ideological and class cleavages detailed in the previous chapters left an even more 
divided opposition in the build-up to the country’s first post-Mugabe elections in 2018. 
These events allow for an analysis of the post-2013 historical bloc and the argument 
that the coup of 2017 does not reflect a hegemonic change. Rather, it emphasises the 
nature of Zanu-PF hegemony and how elements of both coercion and consent were 
used in the events of November 2017 to reconsolidate the party’s control of the 
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country. The chapter will conclude by analysing the build-up towards the 2018 
elections as a repeat of the dynamics which led to Zanu-PF’s 2013 victory, and as final 




The post 2013 historical bloc and a weakened counter-hegemonic movement 
 
The period following the 2013 elections in Zimbabwe brought about a shift in counter- 
hegemonic politics in the state. The outcome of the election was devastating for the 
MDC which won 70 seats out of the 270 available parliamentary seats. At a policy 
dialogue held at the Southern Africa Political Economy Series Trust in Harare in 
March of 2014, Tendai Biti, the MDC-T’s secretary general, provided his analysis for 
why the MDC had lost the 2013 election. ‘I think it’s important that the democratic 
movement has a message. The message of No to the big man has been exhausted’ 
(zimbabwesituation.com, 2014)). Biti continued, comparing the MDC’s manifesto to 
that of Zanu-PF: ‘We were selling hopes and dreams when ZANU was selling practical 
realities. “We (Zanu-PF) are going to give you a farm, it’s there. We (Zanu-PF) are 
going to give you $5000 from Kasukuwere’s Ministry”’ (ibid.). Ultimately, Biti 
situated the MDC’s defeat within the party’s incapacity to articulate policies that 
reflected the country’s crisis political economy: 
 
We must learn from 2013, and the lesson from 2013 is that the political economy of Zimbabwe 
has changed dramatically. Whereas in 1999 when the MDC was formed 60 to 70 percent of 
the working people in Zimbabwe were in formal employment, in 2013 and 2014 84 percent of 
the population is in the informal sector. Whereas the MDC could be successful, formed on the 
basis of the structure that the labour movement had, there is hardly any formal workforce worth 
talking about now. The challenge with the informal sector is that it operates on prediction, it 
operates on patronage if you want a table at Mupedzanhamo (the flea market in Harare’s Mbare 
suburb), the local ZANU-PF chairperson has got to give it to you. If you want a place to dig 
for gold in Chegutu, some Zanu-PF official has to give you that. (ibid.) 
 
 
Biti’s admission of the MDC’s failures in 2013 made bare the cracks in his party. On 
27 January, Elton Mangoma, the MDC’s deputy treasurer-general, wrote a letter to 
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Morgan Tsvangirai in which he argued that while the outcome of the 2013 elections 
had been the result of electoral fraud; the leadership of the MDC ‘should be 
responsible and shoulder some blame for allowing that electoral fraud to take place’. 
Mangoma further commented: 
 
It is my unbending resolve that leadership renewal, at this juncture, could be the only 
avenue to restoring the credibility of  the party lest it risks being confined to  history.  At 
a time when confidence is plummeting, there is need for the MDC to freshe n up, create 
fresh impetus and rally its troops to remain united and focused. The MDC still has a 
significant role to play in  the  democratisation process of Zimbabwe but cannot do so in 
its current state. With 2018 approaching, it is apparent that campaign ing for the same 
commences promptly under a renewed leadership. There is no denial that Morgan 
Tsvangirai has embossed his name into the history books of this country. There is also 
no denial that he has played a pivotal role in Zimbabwe’s quest for democr acy and socio-
economic transformation. However, it is my humble submission that at this juncture, it 
is time you consider leaving the office of the president of the movement. 2014 marks 15 
years of Morgan Tsvangirai as president of the party. You have done  the best that you 
could and continuing will result in diminishing returns and eating into your legacy. The 




Mangoma’s letter chastised Tsvangirai personally for having failed to bring about 
reforms while he had executive power, and took him to task over the perception of 
impropriety surrounding the purchase of his home in the affluent suburb of 
Highlands, his complicated personal life and the failure to abide by the party’s 
constitution and the evident financial corruption within the party. 
 
The letter concluded with the demand that Tsvangirai declare his intention to step 
aside and that interim leadership be taken by vice-president Thokozani Khupe. 
This would last until the party could hold an extra-ordinary congress as the only 
means whereby the party could achieve its objective of ‘Acquiring state power 
following an electoral win in the next election. Governing democratically and 
bringing about real transformation in Zimbabwe.’ (Mangoma Letter 2014) 
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After the letter was leaked, Mangoma was set upon and assaulted by youths supporting 
Tsvangirai. Following the attack Tendai Biti convened a meeting of the National 
Council of the MDC on 26 April 2014 and issued the following statement: 
 
Over the years, the MDC has developed tendencies and a culture that has led to the deviation 
from its core values. That culture has included the following: the use of violence as a way of 
settling disputes, corruption, disrespect of the constitution, a culture of impunity, the existence 
of parallel structures including a Kitchen Cabinet and vigilante groups associated with the 
leader. (Biti Press Statement, 26 April 2014 accessed via MDC email newsletter) 
 
 
Biti was joined by nine other sitting MDC MPs in suspending Morgan Tsvangirai as 
the party’s chairman. The MPs joining Biti were brothers Solomon and Paul Madzore 
who represented Dzivarasekwa and Glen View South respectively, Moses 
Manyengavana of Highfield West and Willas Madzimure of Kambuzuma. They were 
joined by six MPs from Matebeleland, Samuel Siphepha Nkomo, Bekithemba Nyathi, 
Evelyn Masaiti, Watchy Sibanda, Settlement Chikwinya and Reggie Moyo (Voice of 
America, 29 April 2014). On 29 April 2009 Tsvangirai chaired an MDC National 
Council meeting comprising Thokozani Khupe, Lovemore Moyo, Senator Morgan 
Komichi, Tapiwa Mashakada, Nelson Chamisa, Abedinico Bhebhe, Mwonzora and 
Theresa Makone. They stated that Biti’s call to suspend Tsvangirai was ‘bogus, 
illegitimate and illegal’ and ultimately expelled Biti and his co-conspirators from the 
party. 
 
The 2014 events were similar to the 2005 split in that the cleavage in the party was led 
by a charismatic intellectual joined by other representatives of this class within the 
party. The fact that representatives from Matebeleland joined the Biti split, reflected 
the loose bond between the counter-hegemonic leadership and political representatives 
of Ndebele identity, as had been the case in 2005 when Welshman Ncube (a Ndebele) 
had been joined by Gibson Sibanda (the former Secretary-General of the ZCTU who 
was also Ndebele). The Biti faction was later joined by one former trade unionist, 
Lucia Matibenga, who had become disgruntled under the leadership of Tsvangirai 
particularly during the GNU period (Matibenga, 2011). The April 2014 split notably 
did not include Nelson Chamisa, the former student leader who had been in Biti’s 
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shadow since the early days of the party’s formation; and Thokozani Khupe, the only 
remaining MDC MP from Matebeleland and a former trade unionist. The fracturing 
during this period might indicate that cleavages within the party were no longer 
entirely along class or tribal identities; however, Chamisa and Khupe’s status as 
outliers in remaining can be interpreted as having been driven by strategic ambition as 
both would be more likely to take over leadership of the party in Biti’s absence. 
Chamisa and Khupe’s presence in the party would however signify the party’s 
continued fissures along class and identity lines over the following four years. 
 
Biti’s coalition would ultimately form the People’s Democratic Party which in turn 
would also prove to be unstable, as Elton Mangoma would depart in 2015 and Paul 
Madzore re-entered the MDC fold in 2016. 
 
Tajamuka and #ThisFlag 
 
After the optimism of the early GNU years, the results of the 2013 elections resulted 
in a lack of confidence by foreign and national investors and the economy began to 
see a downturn. The IMF’s Article IV report on Zimbabwe covering the year 2013 
declared that the economic rebound which had seen GDP growth average 10.5% 
between 2009 and 2012 was officially over. According to the IMF, Zimbabwe’s 
poverty rate stood at 72% in 2011 while unemployment remained above 80%. Despite 
the latter, payment of civil service salaries accounted for 79% of the state’s projected 
total revenue. These economic indicators had a devastating impact on ordinary 
citizens, as while the country’s shops were stocked – unlike in 2008 – few people were 
able to afford the very basics and even government salaries were paid only 
intermittently. 
In October 2014 Itai Dzamara, a 35-year-old journalist inspired by the Occupy Wall 
Street protests, hand-delivered a petition to the president’s offices in Munhumatapa 
buildings requesting that Mugabe step down. The petition stated: ‘we occupied Africa 
Unity Square today, yet again forced the state to respond, and, yet again, demonstrated 
our goodwill by agreeing to negotiate. We are the people! We are the numbers!’ 
(Nehandaradio.com October 21 2014). Dzamara’s protest at the African Unity Square 
attracted no more than 150 participants on its first day and for the most part remained 
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a solitary protest for several months. On 9 March 2015 Dzamara was abducted by 
assailants who fitted the profile of military intelligence agents; he was never heard 
from again and has been presumed dead. Dzamara’s abduction represented another 
key reflection of the tremendous and arbitrary power of the state. 
 
 
On 14 April 2016 the MDC held the first mass protests since the stay-aways of 1998. 
The protest march was made up of over 2 000 MDC supporters, backed by students 
and trade union members, led by Morgan Tsvangirai and other MDC leaders (‘2 000 
people join anti-Mugabe protest in Harare’, news.bbc.co.uk 15 April 2016). In 
response to the protest Zanu-PF declared that it would hold its own ‘Million Man 
March’ on Africa Day, 25 May. 
 
On 16 April 2016 a Christian pastor, Evan Mawarire, posted a four-minute video to 
his Twitter and Facebook accounts. He began the video by stating ‘I'm not a politician; 
I'm not an activist... just a citizen’. Over a soundtrack of emotive music Mawarire then 
expressed his disappointment with how the country was falling short of what the 
standards represented by the colours of the national flag; agriculture, minerals, and the 
sacrifice of the country’s people in the liberation struggle. Mawarire’s video 
concluded with the statement: 
 
This is the time that a change must happen, quit standing on the sidelines and watching this 
flag fly and wishing for a future that you are not at all wanting to get involved in. This flag, 
everyday that is flies is begging for you to say something. Its begging for you to cry out and 




The #ThisFlag video accumulated tens of thousands of views within its first day and 
led to hundreds of similar videos being posted echoing Mawarire’s anger and 
individual hopes for change. As the video grew in popularity, Mawarire used his 
platform to call for a week of online protest beginning on the date of Zanu-PF’s 
planned ‘Million Man March’. The ruling party’s planned protest on 25 May 2016 
bussed in tens of thousands of supporters holding placards in support of the president, 
and independent newspapers reported that the event cost US$600 000. Mugabe’s 




The #ThisFlag movement can certainly be considered distinct from the previous 
protest movements in the country’s opposition and characterised a new counter- 
hegemonic phase. The social networking counter-hegemonic actions were largely 
unorganised and spontaneous, as young activists – including young lawyers Fadzayi 
Mahere and Douglas Coltart – began to appear on social media criticising the 
government. Mawarire, unlike previous waves of counter-hegemonic activity in the 
1990s and early 2000s, was not funded by international donors. He had not been 
trained in the counter-hegemonic use of social media as had several other activists such 
as the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, which had been by funded and trained the Open 
Society Foundation. As a result, #Thisflag was organic as it mushroomed from its start 
with an individual who had apparently decided of his own accord to make a critical 
video. Significantly, Mawarire was critical of both the ruling party and the opposition, 
and the methods he used are certainly more in keeping with the times as the use of 
social media globally in democratic struggles has become commonplace since the 
Arab Spring of 2011. 
 
Mawarire’s #Thisflag and the events of April and May 2016 coincided with another 
prominent protest in the Tajamuka/Sesjikile movement (Shona and Ndebele words for 
‘We’re fed up!’). Unlike Mawarire’s seemingly impulsive protest, Tajamuka was 
comparable to the professionalised NGOs which had formed the MDC. It was an 
organisation run  by  young  former  student  activists  including  former  ZINASU 
President Promise Mkhwananzi. For several months the Tajamuka movement staged 
a protest outside the Rainbow Towers Hotel against Vice President Pekhezala 
Mphoko, who had been residing in the presidential suite for over eighteen months. 
Mkhwananzi emphasised the role of social media in creating new counter-hegemonic 
fronts in an interview with NPR (npr.org, ‘Can Hashtags and Pop-Up Protests Topple 
a Leader?’ October 21 2016), stating: 
 
The major limitation of the opposition political parties has been that they're strait-jacketed, 
they're rigid. Now we have created platforms where people can operate freely, can participate 
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very easily. One of the major differences is the centrality of the social media in the whole 
equation. 
 
On 2 July 2016 spontaneous protests turned violent at the Beitbridge border with South 
Africa as the government passed Statutory Instrument (SI 64/2016). This imposed 
measures restricting the import of a range of products including grocery items, 
fertilisers, building materials and some cosmetic products (www.veritaszim.net). 
Given that the majority of the country’s urban population makes a living from informal 
trading (kukhiyakhiya) these import blocks posed a serious threat to livelihoods, 
especially in a border town. Protestors looted a Zimbabwe Revenue Authority 
warehouse, setting it on fire. 
 
 
The anger driving the protests against the ban on imports was heightened by public 
apprehension about the government’s announcement that it would soon be printing 
bond notes as a local surrogate currency, theoretically equivalent to the US Dollar, in 
a bid to deal with the country’s liquidity crisis. In a press statement issued on 4 May 
2016 the Reserve Bank had announced the establishment of a US$200 million foreign 
exchange and export incentive facility supported by the African Export-Import Bank 
(RBZ Press Statement, 4 May 2016). The Reserve Bank announced that ‘in order to 
mitigate against capital flight, this facility shall be granted to qualifying foreign 
exchange earners in bond coins and notes which shall continue to operate alongside 
the currencies within the multi-currency system and at par with the USD’. To many 
the bond notes marked a stealthy return of the Zimbabwe dollar, entirely unsupported 
by any value. There was also the looming possibility that those in power would shortly 
print their own money and allow themselves to spend the virtually counterfeit paper 
to acquire real assets, as government functionaries had done in 2008. Busisa Moyo, 
the President of the Zimbabwe Confederation of Industries, had stated that following 
the announcement of plans to introduce the bond notes people were ‘rushing to the 
bank to withdraw whatever they can as the significant concern is that people's hard- 
earned savings which are currently hard currency dominated may soon be changed 
into a denomination of soft currency’ (The Sunday Mail, 15 May 2016). 
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Building on the mounting popularity of the #This flag protest and spontaneous 
eruptions of discontent across the country, on 4 July 2016 Mawarire called for a 




We are shutting Zimbabwe down. As citizens we are staying away from work because 
government has not listened to us, they take us for fools when we say zvanyanya (it’s too 
much). Citizens of Zimbabwe I want to invite you to do something to save our country. To the 
government, we are doing this not because we hate Zimbabwe but because we love this 
country. We love Zimbabwe to keep watching it burn and to keep watching it go down. There 
shall be no violence, there will be no marching, there will be no protesting in the roads… 
 
Mawarire continued listing grievances and linked the shutdown to the Beitbridge 
protests. 
 
Civil servants: you have not been paid, don’t go to work on Wednesday. This government 
needs to deal with corruption. Deal with the fact that you can’t just make laws. You arrested 
17 people Beitbridge but you can’t arrest government officials in their offices. Enough is 




The national stay-away was publicised on social media under the hashtags 
#shutdownzimbabwe, #thisflag, and #tajamuka. These tags reflected the coalescence 
of two separate movements tied by the use of social media. While the use of hashtags 
to drive online conversations was a new development, calling a national stay-away 
reflected this use of a method of protest that had last been successfully used in 1997 
when Tsvangirai was still the leader of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions. 
 
On 6 July the country’s major urban centres were brought to a standstill as 
Zimbabweans stayed away from work. The protest coincided with a strike by 
commuter omnibus drivers which had begun two days earlier and had erupted in 
violence. The bus drivers’ protest was directly aimed at the police who had 
increasingly been setting up ad hoc road blocks to extort bribes. The stay-away also 
overlapped with a strike by teachers, doctors and nurses who began a strike on 5 July 
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protesting at unpaid wages. These strikes were organised by the Progressive Teacher’s 
Union of Zimbabwe (PTUZ) and the Zimbabwe Nurses Association (ZINA) 
independently from the #thisflag movement (www.dailynews.co.zw, 6 July 2016). 
The night after the stay-away Mawarire posted a video to his social media accounts, 
thanking Zimbabweans for ‘lifting their voices’. The pastor spoke against the violence 
which had taken place in certain parts of Harare, stating ‘we condemn violence’. As 
he had with the Beitbridge protests Mawarire integrated the grievances of the 
importers, commuter omnibus drivers, the teachers and medical workers into his 
video. This inclusion of broader concerns began to place Mawarire as the natural 
leader of a wider movement. Mawarire and the Tajamuka movement then called for 
follow-up stayaways on 13 and 14 July 2016. 
 
The morning before the second attempted stayaway, Mawarire was arrested and 
charged with ‘inciting violence and disturbing public peace’ which the state prosecutor 
then changed to ‘subversion and attempts to unseat the constitutional government’ 
(news.bbc.co.uk, 12 July 2016). Hundreds of citizens draped in the national flag 
mounted a vigil outside the magistrate’s court in Harare and launched a 12-hour vigil, 
chanting and singing songs. Over 100 lawyers from Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human 
Rights attended the hearing to offer legal assistance. Mawarire was released on 13 July 
after the presiding judge dismissed the case (http://www.dw.com/en/zimbabwe-
activist-evan-mawarire- is-freed/a-19398879). Possibly as a result of the focus on 
Mawarire’s arrest, as well as the signs that the state was willing to use force against 
protestors, the stayaway of 13 and 14 July did not take place. The Progressive 
Teacher’s Union of Zimbabwe had also announced that they would not be 
participating in the stay-away as they had not been consulted by Mawarire and the 
Tajamuka movement (www.voazimbabwe.com, 12 July 2016). 
 
Mawarire’s arrest was the zenith of the protests in 2016. Two days after his release 
Mawarire left the country and sought asylum in the United States of America citing 
his arrest and threats against his family as the justification for his application. His 
departure slowed the movement’s momentum. For the remainder of 2016 there were 
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virtually no similar protests and bond notes were introduced in November of that year, 
with no resistance. 
 
In Gramscian terms the spontaneous counter-hegemonic actions of 2016 oscillated 
between the actions of a war of position and those of a war of manoeuvre. The actions 
can be understood as a war of position in that activities began on social media, 
including Mawarire’s original video and his calls for a week of online activism. 
Hashtag protests are certainly on the terrain of war of position but manage to integrate 
the capacity to inform with outward protest. Virtual actions on the terrain of 
ideologies/superstructure/consent managed to galvanise spontaneous public protests 
on the streets over material issues and events. These included the vice president’s 
prolonged stay at the luxury Rainbow Towers, unpaid doctor and teacher salaries, 
import restrictions and the fear of a return to the mass printing of currency and resultant 
hyperinflation. The hashtags translated into a war of manoeuvre as a frontal assault on 
hegemonic power through the stay-away of 6 July. After Mawarire’s arrest and 
departure from the country, the war of manoeuvre was not sustained and remained 
unorganised, so it could therefore not make any decisive impact on the balance of 
power. 
 
The convulsions of the new opposition fronts from April to August 2016 
overshadowed two other major events which would affect the counter-hegemonic as 
well as the hegemonic forces. In June 2016 it was announced that Morgan Tsvangirai 
had been diagnosed with colon cancer. Tsvangirai declared that he would remain the 
leader of the party and would not appoint a successor. 
More important changes were occurring within the space of Zanu-PF as the hegemonic 
force. On 21 July 2016 war veterans from the country’s ten provinces, including all 
Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association district chairpersons, met to 
discuss the country’s economic and political crises. Issuing a communique after their 
meeting the leadership of the ZNLWA declared: 
 
 
The ZANU (PF) Party Leadership has dismally failed to use the resounding mandate given to 
it in the 2013 general election, to address the economic problems that have beset our great 
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nation since independence from British rule. We note, with concern, shock and dismay, the 
systematic entrenchment of dictatorial tendencies, personified by the President and his cohorts, 
which have slowly devoured the values of the liberation struggle in utter disregard of the 
Constitution, as demonstrated by the deliberate neglect and abandonment, by the Party 
President, of the masses, who are the foundation upon which the liberation war was fought and 
won, and who have, thereby, become the bedrock of the Party. Suddenly, ideologically 
bankrupt million-man marches are being organized in honour of bankrupt leadership! The 
same leadership has failed to address the bread and butter issues. (ZNLWVA communique 
published on theindependent.co.zw, 22 July 2016) 
 
Underlining the importance of the role of history in the formation of hegemonic power 
in Zimbabwe, and, intriguingly, in a significant re-scripting of the “patriotic” historical 
narrative that Zanu-PF had been propagating for the last decade, the communique 
referenced Mugabe’s release from prison as the result of the war effort rather than the 
sympathy of his jailers. Referring to the prison coup which made Mugabe President of 
Zanu the communique stated: ‘He was not the President of the Party ZANU (PF), but 
we made him so, thinking he was one of us. Our decision to make him the President of 
ZANU (PF) was accepted here at home, regionally by the Front-line States, and 
internationally’ (ibid.). 
The communique then listed a number of scandals including the looting of the 
Chiadzwa diamonds which it blamed entirely on Mugabe and his cabal who had 
‘absolutely no clue as to the difference between public funds earned from taxation of 
the people, and private individual income’ (ibid.). The ZNLWVA then made reference 
to the moniker for the competing political factions within Zanu-PF. The first was the 
G40 which represented Mugabe, his immediate family and other Zezuru leadership 
including Minister of Home Affairs Ignatius Chombo, Minister of Youth and 
Indigenisation Saviour Kasukuwere and the Police Commissioner General Augustine 
Chihuri. The second faction was known as the Lacoste, referencing the French brand’s 
use of a crocodile which happened to be the nickname for Vice President Emmerson 
Mnangagwa and his military leadership, which included Army General Constantine 
Chiwenga and Airforce General Perence Shiri. 
The communique concluded with the declaration: 
 
we the veterans of Zimbabwe’s war of liberation, together with our toiling masses, hereby 
declare that henceforth, in any forthcoming elections, will not support such a leader who has 
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presided over untold suffering of ‘the general population for his own personal aggrandizement 
and that of his cronies’. (ibid.) 
 
The declaration marked the beginning of the end of party unity and of Mugabe’s 
leadership of the hegemonic bloc. 
The Gramscian methodology allows for an analysis which posits such internal, 
internecine conflict in the identities and histories of a particular movement or bloc 
while maintaining the overarching realities of the national political economy. 
Certainly, the material experience of economic crisis resulting from the actions of a 
kleptocratic governing class were driving actions from the entire society; this external 






Fractures in the hegemonic bloc 
 
The fracturing of Zanu-PF into the G40 and Lacoste factions can be traced to the 
removal of Joice Mujuru as vice president in December 2014. Joice Mujuru, a 
liberation war veteran who had risen through the politburo and cabinet and had been 
appointed as vice president in 2004 following the death of Simon Muzenda (Bratton, 
2016, p. 176). Mujuru’s power was seen as deriving from her husband Solomon 
Mujuru, the former commander of the Zimbabwe National Army and business 
magnate who was also known under his guerrilla nom de guerre Rex Nhongo 
(Mandaza, 2011, 2018). Joice Mujuru’s rise to the vice presidency in 2004 had placed 
her in line for the presidency according to Amendment 18 of the national Constitution. 
 
Mujuru’s interests had clashed with those of Emmerson Mnangagwa after the latter’s 
role in the Tsholotsho plot in 2004. As noted in Chapter 6, the declaration of the 
Tsholotsho plot had sought to redress a perceived Zezuru primacy within the 
leadership of Zanu-PF by establishing an ethnic and regional balance between all four 
ethnic groups. The writers of the declaration understood this to mean Karanga, 
Manyika, Zezuru and Ndebele in the party’s four top leadership positions, ensuring a 
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rotation of the party’s presidency (Moyo, 2004). Mnangagwa’s attempt to secure 
leadership for himself as the prominent Karanga leadership candidate was exposed, 
apparently through Mujuru’s connections in the Central Intelligence Organisation. 
Mnangagwa’s ambitions also reflected the interests within the military structures, 
including General Constantine Chiwenga who sought a civilian proxy (Bratton, 2016, 
p. 176; Mandaza, 2018). While Mnangagwa and the other 2004 plotters had been 
ejected from the party each made their way back into Mugabe’s good graces over the 
following five years. Among these was Jonathan Moyo who had been rejected in 2004 
but redeemed himself and once again became party’s chief ideologue during the 2008 
election. Moyo had developed a pattern of being a political mercenary and supported 
Grace Mugabe and her G40 faction from 2016 onwards. Jacob Mudenda had been the 
governor for Matabeleland North and had re-entered the political fray as an MP and 
speaker of parliament after the 2013 election. Mnangagwa re-established himself 
within Zanu-PF during the 2008 elections where his ruthlessness and organisational 
skills were important to the party in retaining power. The factional conflict crystallised 
in August 2011 when Solomon Mujuru was killed in a suspicious fire in his home. Her 
husband’s death weakened Joice Mujuru’s support within the security forces and 
reduced any potential protection she may have expected from them. 
Mnangagwa’s interests began to coincide with those of First Lady Grace Mugabe in 
2014. Robert Mugabe maintained a degree of power in his refusal to name either 
Mujuru or Mnangagwa as his successor. The Mugabe family, Grace Mugabe, her 
children and the increasingly large patronage network that had arisen around her, 
began to require a degree of reassurance that she and her network would be somehow 
protected in the increasingly likely demise of the aged president. The campaign to 
make Grace Mugabe relevant included the bestowal of a doctorate in sociology from 
the University of Zimbabwe. This can also be understood as her ordination into the 
traditional corps of intellectuals as a prerequisite for her entry into political life. Once 
Grace Mugabe had received her doctorate she was in a position to accede to political 
power. 
In the build-up to the 2014 Zanu-PF congress a campaign carried out by Information 
Minister Jonathan Moyo and First Lady Grace Mugabe began to accuse Mujuru of 
corruption and of attempting to assassinate the president. By 4 December 2014 Mujuru 
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had been ousted from her position in the politburo and her position as vice president. 
As the ruling party’s mouthpiece, the Herald reported on Mujuru’s removal: 
 
 
Over the past few weeks, serious allegations of high level corruption and abuse of office 
have been raised against Dr Mujuru manifest in extorting shareholding from companies, 
demanding 10 percent bribes, illicit dealings in diamonds and gold, attempting to defeat 
the course of justice, extorting investors, undermining the  authority of the President and 
seeking to depose him through unconstitutional means, among them a plot to assassinate 
him. (herald.co.zw 4 December 2014) 
 
 
Eight other members of cabinet were also ejected along with Mujuru in the December 
2014 purge; these included Didymus Mutasa, Webster Shamu, Francis Nhema, Olivia 
Muchena, Dzikamai Mavhaire, Nicholas Goche, Simbaneuta Mudarikwa and 
Munacho Mutezo. Many of them had been permanent fixtures in the cabinet since 
independence. 
 
When the party’s congress was held between 2 and 7 December 2016 the removal of 
Mujuru and the ascendance of Grace Mugabe to political relevance was the central 
theme. The resolutions of the congress stated that Grace Mugabe 
 
showed revolutionary skill and courageous leadership when she nipped in the bud the scheme 
of the cabal of counter-revolutionaries and quislings… 
[The Party] further salutes the First Lady Cde. Dr Grace Mugabe, for her bold, forthright and 
refreshing candour in timely exposing the rot that had set in the Party and the national body 
politic as a result of the corrupt and treasonous actions of Vice President Mujuru and her cabal 
of counter-revolutionaries and quislings. (Resolutions of the Zanu-PF 6th National Congress, 
published on sundaymail.co.zw, 7 December 2017) 
 
By the end of the Congress, Grace Mugabe had been appointed chairlady of the party’s 
women’s league after the incumbent, Oppah Muchinguri had stepped aside to allow 
the first lady to take the position. Mngagagwa was appointed to the vice-presidential 
position vacated by Mujuru on 10 December 2014. 
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The coalition between Grace Mugabe and Mnangagwa was short-lived. This may have 
been the result of Grace Mugabe having lost a degree of political relevance for 
Mnangagwa when he was officially in line to become the president. Another possible 
reason would be the resilience of tribal identities which provided political protection 
in moments of insecurity, as the party’s multiple purges had shown. 
 
For her part, Grace Mugabe became more politically vocal once she became chair of 
the party’s Women’s League. Her patronage network had grown significantly and 
there were more reports of her distribution of rents in the form of groceries, which she 
would admit had been confiscated by the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (video of 
Grace Mugabe on povonews.co.zw twitter feed 
(https://twitter.com/povonewsafrica/status/833181452229541890). When it was 
alleged that a pipe bomb had been discovered at Mugabe’s dairy farm the first lady 
became more open and frantic in her criticism of Mnangagwa, openly asserting that 





By 2016 reports of the factions in the ruling party emphasised Mnangagwa’s ambition, 
however silent, as verging on treason. A major shift came about with the declaration 
in July 2016 by the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association that they 
would not be supporting a Mugabe candidacy in 2018, when he would be 95 years old. 
The declaration was interpreted as an implicit endorsement of Mnangagwa and 
certainly a criticism of Grace Mugabe who had no liberation war credentials; and 
referred to her personal greed. 
 
As a liberation war veteran himself, Mnangagwa was able to maintain his relationship 
with the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans particularly through the 
leadership of the veterans’ association chairperson, Christopher Mutsvangwa. 
Mnangagwa had joined ZAPU in 1962 as a guerrilla fighter to train in Tanzania. 
According to Chung (2013) Mnangagwa was court-marshalled and sentenced to death 
by a tribunal led by Dumiso Dabengwa in 1962 for criticising Joshua Nkomo. His life 
was spared by Leopold Takawira and Simon Muzenda, both of whom were Karanga 
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and with whom he joined ZANU in 1963. After his training at Nanking Military 
Academy he was involved in one of the first battles of the Second Chimurenga as a 
member of the Crocodile Gang. His membership of this guerrilla unit would earn him 
the nickname the Crocodile. Mnangagwa was arrested for his role in blowing up a train 
in Masvingo and only escaped the mandatory death penalty because he was deemed 
to be under-age. He was sentenced instead to 10 years in prison. Upon his released 
from prison he went on to study for a law degree at the University of Zambia. He 
returned to the liberation struggle in 1976 as a ZANU headquarters advisor to Robert 
Mugabe in Maputo, in Mozambique (Chan, 2013, p. 64). Following independence, he 
held positions as minister for justice, minister for defence as well as a period as speaker 
of parliament and a minister without portfolio appointed by the president. He had 
therefore been inside the Zanu-PF inner circle for close to 50 years. Mnangagwa had 
also developed a reputation for tremendous cruelty as he was complicit in the 
Gukurahundi massacres in the 1980s and had been instrumental in the election violence 
of 2008. His power was certainly more reliant on the fear of coercion than Grace 
Mugabe’s power which relied more on her patronage system. Mnangagwa was heavily 
involved in the profiting from the war in the DRC in the late 1990s, and in this regard, 
he is typical of the Zimbabwean governing class who came to enrich themselves 
through access to the state. However much in the line of succession Mnangagwa may 
have been, Zanu-PF’s obsessive hierarchy and party discipline had forced him to 
apologise in December 2016 after a photograph was taken of him holding a Mug which 
read ‘I am the Boss’ (allafrica.com). 
 
It is necessary to address the key Gramscian political economic indicators of class 
interest in this internal shift. While both the Zanu-PF factions originated in state-based 
bourgeoisie, the opposition between the factions was based on narrow material 
interests, distrust and a fear that either (loosely tribal) faction might sever the other’s 
connection to enrichment and patronage through the state. An important factor of the 
political economy of Zimbabwe’s crisis is the cross-generational role of the governing 
class and their access to the means of production. The economic downturn of the 
economy in the years preceding 2008 and then the final collapse of that year provided 
this class with more opportunity to enrich themselves. When the lack of access to 
foreign currency and the hyperinflation of this period combined with the almost total 
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lack of goods in the country, those who had access to cash through their political 
influence at banks were able to prey upon desperate Zimbabweans who were selling 
off assets of any form in order to make ends meet or just to afford food. A new section 
of the kleptocratic governing class emerged through access to hard currency. These 
newer predatory members of the governing class were therefore able to profit from 
buying from the very desperate and eventually selling off assets to whoever had access 
to stable foreign currency. They were also in a position to import desperately needed 
goods at exploitative mark-ups. This class included the members of the Zanu-PF 
hierarchy but also their children, many of whom had been evicted from western 
countries where they had been studying. The children of these Zanu-PF leaders were 
also often the beneficiaries of the land reform process; however, without title deeds 
and with the collapse of the banking system access to credit was all but impossible. 
These young men and women who had appropriated the farms of their cohorts at 
private schools were essentially little more than glorified farm managers as they 
inhabited commercial farms which they had neither the means nor the expertise to 
manage. Interestingly, this class of first-generation Zanu-PF descendants have a very 
tenuous relationship with the class upon whose loyalty and coercive capacity they are 
entirely dependent. Having been raised as part of the country’s growing governing 
bourgeoisie they were educated mainly in the country’s private schools, usually with 
a majority of white students, many of whose farms they would come to appropriate. 
This weak connection between the governing class and the coercive arms of the state 
is certainly a weak link in the bourgeois elements of the ruling party’s grip on power. 
It generally reflected the split between the younger G40 segments and the established 
military bourgeoisie in Mnangagwa’s Lacoste faction. These inter-class fractures 
overlapped with tribal identities only because of the historical Karanga dominance in 
the military, while the Zezuru factions surrounding Mugabe had taken over the police 
force and the intelligence services. 
 
This factionalism, then was the effect of a mixture of institutional, generational, class 
and ethnic considerations combining to fragment top-echelons of the Zanu-PF political 
community. Were these tensions, though, more than simply factional; did they have 
an ideological dimension, pointing to even varying conceptions of a hegemomnic 
project? It is very difficult to identify evidence that would support a definitive 
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argument in this direction. It is of course likely that the G40 group though supposedly 
aligned  with  the  Presidential  Guard,  the  police  and  the  leadership  of  Central 
 
Intelligence might have been less reflexively dependent on or willing deploy armed 
violence than the heavily militarised Lacoste faction (Moore, 2018, p. 9-10) , As 
Moore points, out even if police loyalty had been guaranteed, they would hardly have 
been “a reliable partner in a contest with a very good military force”(Moore, 2018 p. 
11). This shortcoming might have placed them on a slightly different point along that 
spectrum of coercion and consent that any hegemonic project must incorporate. But 
that is a long way from the factions actually each representing different positions 
respect to ideology or any re-envisioning of a future Zimbabwe. To be sure researchers 
in post-coup Zimbabwe could find plenty of street informants to tell them that “Grace 
Mugabe and Jonathan Moyo” were “moles”, intent on “decompos[ing] ZANU PF and 
destroying it from within” but evidence of such motivations has yet to emerge 
(Chirume, et al. 2018, 43-1, p. 81). This was of course a reflection of the justificatory 
language for the coup used by the military command who claimed they were acting to 




November 2017 coup d’état 
 
In September 2017 Grace Mugabe had escaped South Africa before criminal charges 
had been laid against her for assaulting a young female companion of her sons, Robert 
Junior and Belarmin. It had certainly become clear by this point that she would not be 
the face of her faction’s leadership, and rumours within Zanu-PF circles began to 
circulate that former defence minister Sidney Sekeramyi would probably be the G40 
candidate for vice president. 
In August of that year, Emmerson Mnangagwa had reportedly fallen ill at a rally and 
had to be airlifted to South Africa. The vice president then claimed he had been 
deliberately poisoned, insinuating that the act had been perpetrated by the G40. 
Addressing the accusation at a rally in a speech which was widely shared on social 
media, the first lady asked: ‘Why should I kill Mnangagwa? Who is Mnangagwa on 
this earth? Killing someone who was given a job by my husband? That is nonsensical’. 
Mrs. Mugabe then told the crowds ‘we are being threatened day and night that if this 
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one does not become president, we will kill you’ (theguardian.com, 6 October 2017). 
Grace Mugabe was certainly aware of the implications of openly declaring a coup 
attempt and thus fell short of disclosing the origins of this supposed threat. To openly 
accuse Mnangagwa of a coup attempt would have thrown down the gauntlet in an open 
confrontation, as such an accusation would have necessitated that Mnangagwa be 
immediately arrested and charged with treason. 
By November recriminations between the first lady and the vice president had come 
out into the open. While President Mugabe had remained above the fray of the internal 
squabbles, he began to criticise Mnangagwa after Grace Mugabe was booed by the 
crowd at a rally for Zanu-PF youths in Bulawayo on 4 November. Speaking mostly in 
Shona and appearing to address Mnangagwa who sat behind him, Mugabe declared: 
 
We don’t beg anyone to be part of our party. We are going towards congress. That is where 
we will decide a lot of things. Those of you who see yourselves as the members of the party 
from Masvingo: you can go and form your own party. We can’t have you insulting us, day in 
day out. What do you think you are? (video of the youth rally posted at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Fp2s5GZgA8) 
 
Once the president’s intentions to remove Mnangagwa became clear, the stakes of the 
simmering resentment between the factions were heightened. On 6 November 2018 in 
a statement read by the minister for information Simon Khaya Moyo, it was announced 
that the president was firing Mnangagwa as vice president. The statement read: 
 
It had become evident that his conduct in the discharge of his duties had become 
inconsistent with his official responsibilities. The Vice President has consistently and 
persistently exhibited traits of disloyalty, disrespect, deceitfulness and unreliability. He 
has also demonstrated little probity in the execution of his duties. 
(https://www.herald.co.zw/breaking-ed-mnangagwa-fired/) 
 
Mnangagwa issued his own statement and fled to South Africa. In it he declared: 
 
I voluntarily left Zambia to join the Liberation struggle in Mozambique in 1976 where I was 
assigned as the Special Assistant to the President, Cde R.C. Mugabe. This role was 
reconfirmed  at the Chimoio Congress in 1977. I have been  very  close  to the President ever 
since. Our relationship has over the years blossomed beyond that of master and servant but to 
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father and son. My mouth has never uttered a single foul word against the President nor have 
I ever contemplated bringing him harm in any way. I therefore find it preposterous that any 
sane person can lyrically direct such accusations towards me. Of late, I have been vilified 
beyond measure. My service to the party and government of Zimbabwe and my public and 
private posture towards my boss are well known. No amount of lies and convoluted thinking 
can diminish my loyalty to my party and the President. I have never appointed or surrogated 
myself in any position in the Party or in Government. I remain firm and resolute against those 
who plunder public funds and are used by foreign countries to destabilize the Party. These 
same people are brazenly protected in public by the First Lady thereby making a mockery of 





The ousted vice-president ended the statement vowing to return to Zimbabwe: ‘I will 
be communicating with you soon and shall return to Zimbabwe to lead you. 
PAMBERI NE ZANU-PF!!!! PAMBERI NE ORIGINAL ZANU-PF!!! PASI NE 
G40’. 
 
On 13 November 2017 the commander of the defence forces, General Constantine 
Chiwenga, called a press conference. Flanked by commanders of the various branches 
of the military he emphasised the military’s role in defending the ‘gains of the 
liberation struggle’. While in uniform Chiwenga spoke from the position of the 
defender of Zanu-PF’s legacy rather than that of the state. Endorsing the patriotic 
history refrain of Zanu-PF which cast national disputes as being driven by external 
colonial interests, the general warned of ‘the revolution being hijacked by agents of 
our erstwhile enemies who are now at the brink of returning our country to foreign 
domination against which so many of our people perished’. Chiwenga then claimed 
that ‘the current purging and cleansing process in Zanu-PF which so far is targeting 
mostly members associated with our liberation history is a serious cause for concern 
to us in the Defence Forces’. The foregoing reflected the general historical 
interconnection between ideology and coercion present in the reality of the Zimbabwe 
defence forces, this time casting themselves as protectors of the revolution and 
ultimately the party. 
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Emphasising the party’s history in dealing with internal dissent through violence, 
Chiwenga argued: 
 
Our revolutionary path is replete with conduct and rebellion by people who have attempted to 
destroy the revolution from within. The formation of FROLIZI, the attempt to remove the late 
Cde Chitepo from his position of Chairman at the Mumbwa bogus Congress in 1973, the 
Nhari-Badza rebellion, Ndabaningi Sithole rebellion soon after the death of Cde Chitepo, the 
Vashandi 1 and 2 as well as the rebellion that led to the death of the late ZIPRA Commander, 
Cde Alfred Nikita Mangena, among others are cases in point. Therefore, the current 
shenanigans by people who do not share the same liberation history of Zanu-PF Party are not 
a surprise to us. (ibid.) 
 
This reminder was evidently issued as a threat, and by blaming ‘people who do not 
share the same liberation history’, Chiwenga was identifying Grace Mugabe and her 
young coterie. 
 
The military’s statement was undoubtedly cautious of falling foul of SADC and 
African Union conventions on unconstitutional take-overs of power. The statement 
attempted to present their somewhat contradictory situation as that of the military 
representing the revolutionary party rather than the nation and therefore of managing 
an internal party dispute as opposed to staging a coup. Attempting to thread the needle 
in this case the statement added ‘standing political virtues are a product of faithful 
adherence to the founding values, decorum, discipline and revolutionary protocol’. 
 
In somewhat circuitous logic and departing from the above casting of the crisis as an 
internal party squabble, the statement then warned of the experiences of countries such 
as Somalia, DRC, Central Africa Republic and many others in the region where minor 
political differences degenerated into serious conflict that had decimated the social, 
political and economic security of ordinary people. 
 
Citing ‘Section 212 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe mandates the Zimbabwe Defence 
Forces to protect Zimbabwe, its people, its national security and interests and its 
territorial integrity and to uphold this Constitution’, the military’s statement then casts 
‘the reckless utterances by politicians denigrating the military which are causing 
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despondency within the rank and file’ as a threat to national security and therefore a 
potential cause for military intervention in party affairs. 
 
Concluding by tempering the threats of a coup implied in the statement, the general 
read: 
 
There is only one Commander-in-Chief, His Excellency, The President, Head of State and 
Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, Cde R. G. Mugabe. 
The military in an institution whose roles cut across the wider spectrum of Government support 
functions in the form of Military Aid to Civil Power and Military Aid to Civil Ministries, 
which are roles derived from Defence Instruments. Therefore, we want to state here and now 
that the history of our revolution cannot be rewritten by those who have not been part of it. 
(ibid.) 
 
The statement reflects how the history of the party and its power dynamics continued 
to influence Zanu-PF’s rule. In addition, it shows how exhibitions of coercive power 
are inseparably tied up with ideological concepts in the party’s national hegemony, as 
was as the military’s internal control over the party. 
 
On 14 November 2017, images of armoured personnel carriers on the roads outside 
Harare began to circulate on social media. The images triggered rumours of a coup 
though no other evidence of a military take-over had become evident. It was not until 
the evening of 15 November that Major General SB Moyo of the Zimbabwe National 
Army appeared on Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation TV and read the following 
statement: 
 
Firstly, we wish to assure the nation that His Excellency the President of the Republic of 
Zimbabwe, and commander-in-chief of Zimbabwe Defence Forces, Comrade RG Mugabe, and 
his family are safe and sound and their security is guaranteed. 
We are only targeting criminals around him who are committing crimes that are causing social 
and economic suffering in the country in order to bring them to justice. 
 
As with the statement of the 13 November, the military sought to cast their intervention 
as anything but a coup: ‘As soon as we have accomplished our mission, we expect that 
the situation will return to normalcy’. The statement then reassured the civil service, 
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the judiciary, the legislative branch and the general citizenry as well as the 
international community that the action was ‘not a military takeover of government. 
What the Zimbabwe Defence Forces is actually doing is to pacify a degenerating 
political, social and economic situation in our country, which if not addressed may 
result in a violent conflict’. 
 
If any further indication was needed that the locus of hegemony in the conjunctural 
moment lay only in within the space of hegemonic bloc, Morgan Tsvangirai called for 
a conference on 16 November 2017. Tsvangirai stated that his party appreciated ‘the 
assurances and the commitment to peace and the sanctity of human life by the 
Zimbabwe Defence Forces, including respect for citizens’ fundamental rights’ 
(nehandaradio.com, 16 November 2017). The fact that since its inception the MDC 
had suffered grievously under the actions of the military yet was forced to make this 
calculated statement that it trusted the Zimbabwean military’s respect for fundamental 
human rights, is quite telling. Tsvangirai continued that it was in the interest of the 
people that ‘Mr. Robert Mugabe step down immediately in line with the national 
expectation and sentiment, taking full regard of his legacy and contribution to 
Zimbabwe pre and post-independence’ (ibid.). That a party which had stood in 
opposition to Mugabe would deem it necessary to praise Mugabe’s legacy while 
demanding his resignation was also a testament to the ideological power of the Zanu- 
PF’s cultural hegemony. It also indicated the extent to which Zanu-PF controlled 
Zimbabwe’s narratives in what Gramsci refers to as hegemonic common sense. 
 
The MDC’s statement made a call for ‘a negotiated, all-inclusive transitional 
mechanism’ and for ‘comprehensive reforms for a free, fair and credible election to be 
held upon the full implementation of all reforms’. It ended with the apparently 
unnecessary threat to SADC ‘to our neighbours, you now all know the simple choice 
you face; either support our rights or our refugees’ (ibid.). 
 
On 18 November thousands of Zimbabweans came out on the streets waving national 
flags, cheering the military and demanding that Mugabe step down. The following day 
Mugabe appeared on national television and was expected to announce his resignation. 
Flanked by the various heads of all branches of the security forces, the president read 
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a statement in which he disclosed that a meeting between Mugabe and the security 
forces had been mediated by the Catholic priest Fidelis Mukonori. 
 
Mugabe stated that the meeting with the command element underscored the need to 
collectively start processes to return the nation to normalcy. Seemingly unaware of the 
anger of the general populace, Mugabe continued: 
 
if there is any one observation we have made and drawn from events of the past week it is the 
unshakeable pedestal upon which rests our state of peace, law and order amply indicating that 
as Zimbabweans we are generally a peaceably disposed people with a givenness to expressing 
our grievances and resolving our differences by ourselves and with a level of dignity, discipline 
and restraint so rare to many other nations.  
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ODfDvOc1i54) 
 
Mugabe’s speech successfully indicated that the operations of the previous week had 
not been a coup, describing the ‘strong sense of collegiality and comradeship now 
binding the various arms of our security establishment’. As the speech continued for 
twenty minutes it began to appear that Mugabe was not announcing his resignation: 
 
The way forward therefore is not swapping vying cliques that ride roughshod over party rules 
and procedures, there has to be a net return to the guiding principles to its constitution which 
must apply fairly and equitably in all situations and before all members. The era of 
victimisation and arbitrary decisions must be put behind. There must be a recognition that 
Zanu-PF is a party of traditions and has been served by successive generations who are bound 
together by shared ideals and values which must continue to reign supreme in our nations. 
Hence our intergenerational conflict must be harmonised through a melding of old established 
players as they embrace and welcome new rules through a well- defined sense of hierarchy 
and succession. Indeed, all these matters will be discussed and settled at the forthcoming 
congress within the framework of a clear roadmap which seeks to resolve once and for all any 
omissions which have affected our party negatively. (ibid.) 
 
Mugabe concluded his speech by stating: 
 
 
The congress is due in a few weeks from now. I will preside over its processes which must not 
be prepossessed by any acts calculated to undermine it or to compromise the outcomes in the 
eyes of the public. We cannot be guided by bitterness or vengefulness, both of which would 
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not make us any better party members or any better Zimbabweans. Our hallowed policy of 
reconciliation which we announced in 1980 and through which we reached out to those who 
had occupied and oppressed us for nearly a century and those we had traded fire with in a bitter 
war surely cannot be unavailable to our own both in the party and in our nation. We must learn 
to forgive and resolved contradictions in a comradely Zimbabwean spirit. (ibid.) 
 
In an aside, Mugabe spoke to the military brass sitting behind him in Shona saying 
‘Sorry, one or two places, ndambonzvengama25’, admitting that he had skipped 
sections of the speech. This led to speculation that the document had been switched at 
the last moment. 
 
It appeared that Mugabe’s instinct in this case was to emphasise the primacy of 
hierarchy. This in turn reflects his long history of using passive revolution as a tool 
managing external conflicts in which the power dynamic of a negotiated settlement 
would often have led to his opponents accepting less than optimal conditions. He 
would then have been able to manage a situation of passive revolution from a position 
of superiority, as had been the case with the Unity Accord with ZAPU and the 
Government of National Unity in 2008. The difference in 2017 was that the coercive 
element lay with the military and Mnangagwa, and Mugabe was therefore powerless 
in the coercive sense. 
 
Mugabe’s defiance was ultimately short-lived as the next day Zanu-PF members of 
parliament tabled a motion for impeachment for 22 November. While impeachment 
proceedings were brought before parliament a letter of resignation was handed to 
Jacob Mudenda, the speaker of parliament. The letter itself was short: 
 
Following my verbal communication with the Speaker of the National Assembly, Advocate 
Jacob Mudenda at 13:53 hours, 21st November, 2017 intimating my intention to resign as the 
President of the Republic of Zimbabwe, I, Robert Gabriel Mugabe, in terms of Section 96, 
Sub-Section 1 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, hereby formally tender my resignation as the 





25 The Shona word here translates to: sneaking past 
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My decision to resign is voluntary on my part and arises from my concern for the welfare of 
the people of Zimbabwe and my desire to ensure a smooth, peaceful and non-violent transfer 
of power that underpins national security, peace and stability. 
 
Kindly give public notice of my resignation as soon as possible as required by Section 96, Sub- 
Section 1 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
 
Yours faithfully, 
Robert Gabriel Mugabe, 




Spontaneous celebrations erupted across the country as joyous scenes of Zimbabweans 
on the street were broadcast across the world. 
 
The SADC secretariat issued a statement on its website: 
 
 
The Secretariat of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) commends His 
Excellency, President Robert Gabriel Mugabe, for his bold decision to step down from his 
position of Head of State of the Republic of Zimbabwe, and his lifetime commitment to serving 




The African Union issued a similar statement: 
 
 
Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat, welcomes the decision 
by President Robert Mugabe to step down from his position as Head of State following a 
lifetime of service to the Zimbabwean nation. President Mugabe will be remembered as a 
fearless pan-Africanist liberation fighter, and the father of the independent Zimbabwean 
nation. Today’s decision will go down in history as an act of statesmanship that can only 





Emmerson Mnangagwa returned to Zimbabwe from his brief exile in South Africa as 
the Zanu-PF nominee for the position of president and was inaugurated on 24 
November at the National Sports Stadium in Harare. 
 
In his inauguration speech Mnangagwa began by extending an olive branch to 
Mugabe (published on thechronicle.co.zw, 24 November 2017): 
 
Let me at this stage pay special tribute to one of, and the only surviving father of our nation, 
Cde Robert Gabriel Mugabe. He led us in the struggle for national independence and assumed 
responsibilities of leadership at the formative and very challenging time in the birth of our 
nation. That is to be lauded and celebrated for all times. 
 
Whatever errors of commission or omission that might have occurred during that critical phase 
in the life of our nation, let us all accept and acknowledge his immense contribution towards 
the building of our nation. (ibid.) 
 
Striking a different tone to that of his often-belligerent predecessor, Mnangagwa 
declared: 
 
For close to two decades now, this country went through many developments… We must 
accept that our challenges emanate in part from the manner which we managed our politics, 
both nationally and internationally, leading to circumstances in which our country has 
undeservedly been perceived as a pariah state (ibid.). 
 
Mnangagwa did however emphasise the primacy and irreversibility of Zimbabwe’s 
land reform: 
 
We wish the rest of the world to understand and appreciate that policies and programmes 
related to land reform were inevitable. Whilst there is a lot we may need to do by way of 
outcomes, the principle of repossessing our land cannot be challenged or reversed (ibid.). 
 
Treading a new path, however, Mnangagwa declared that: 
 
 
Government is committed to compensating those farmers from whom land was taken, in terms 
of laws of the land. As we go into the future complex issues of land tenure will have to be 
addressed both urgently and definitely, in order to ensure finality and closure to the ownership 
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and management of this key resource which is central to national stability and to sustained 
economic recovery (ibid.). 
 
In a signal to international investors he stated that: 
 
 
All foreign investments will be safe in our country and we will fully abide by the terms of 
Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements which we have concluded with a 
number of nations (ibid.). 
 
In his conclusion the newly inaugurated president referred to elections in 2018: 
 
 
I encourage all of us to remain peaceful, even as preparations for political contestations for 
next year’s harmonised elections gather momentum. The task before us is much bigger that 
competing for political life (ibid.). 
 
In short, Mnangagwa hoped that economic recovery and a selection set of political 
concessions during the upcoming electoral season might re-consolidate “domestic 
legitimacy” (Beardsworth, et al. 2019). At least one seasoned observer viewed these 
sentiments as a self-conscious “distancing” from Mugabe’s regime, even a “shift in 
vision”, albeit if only a “stated” change (ICG, 2018) 
 
During the honeymoon after Mnangagwa’s ascendance, positive albeit symbolic 
measures were taken including reducing the size of the famously large presidential 
motorcade. In the first weeks of December 2017 international investors deployed 
political risk advisors to Zimbabwe to assess the new dispensation. The exclusive, 
subscription-only journal Africa Confidential effused: ‘The good news is relentless. 
Each week another wide-eyed foreign investor pitches up in Harare [and] meets 
President Emmerson ‘’Open for Business’’ Mnangagwa, then pledges to pour tens of 
millions of dollars into the country's rich geological resources’ (Africa Confidential, 
20 April 2018). With the belligerence of the Mugabe years over and Zimbabwe open 
for business, the country’s state-based bourgeoisie was set to re-engage with global 
capital as it had prior to the land reform in 2000. 
 
To cast the events of late 2017 into the Gramscian framework which this thesis uses it 
would be important to ask if the coup d’état of 2017 reflected a hegemonic change in 
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the country. The answer to this would surely be, no. The coup reflected the continued 
dominance by the hegemonic bloc as a state based bureaucratic and military 
bourgeoisie. When Mnangagwa announced his cabinet on 1 December 2017 it was 
composed entirely of individuals who had been in previous cabinets under Mugabe, 
with the addition of Major SB Moyo (who had read the televised declaration on 15 
November as minister foreign affairs) and the appointment General Constantino 
Chiwenga as the new vice president next in line to Mnangagwa – unconstitutionally 
he retained his miliyart rank. In addition to Chiwenga and Moyo’s placements there 
has been further advance of top military figures adding to their already extensive 
portfolios in agriculture, mining and parastatals, “further enmeshing themselves in key 
areas of economic activity” (Beardsworth et al. 2019, p. 17). The military are 
increasingly visible in the protocol surrounding the presidency; the substitution of 
soldiers for the policemen who used to serve Mugabe as his close protection officers 
has been interpreted by one Zimbabwean observer as “a less-the-subtle a statement 
about the power behind the president” (Magaisa, 2019). 
 
The discourse of the coup as seen in the speeches of all the major actors, including the 
military and even the country’s counter-hegemonic forces, indicated that the power of 
Zanu-PF’s ideological framing of history and politics was to remain unchallenged. In 
the Gramscian sense of hegemony as a continuum between consent and coercion the 
coup indicated that the coervcive power remained within Zanu-PF and had ultimately 
proven decisive in determining the trajectory fo the coutnry’s history. The counter- 
hegemonic forces of the MDC were forced to become complicit with the military 
power and use the vocabulary and terminology of the hegemon. Other explanatory 
factors such as the role of tribal identities and conflict between the Karanga and Zezuru 
elements are not primary aggregations of power as much as they reflect more latent 
identities actors turn for support. Internal dynamics within the governing class 
continued to play a greater role in the nature of the conflict. A younger predatory class, 
with its patronage network attached to the first lady and centred around Zezuru- 
dominated intelligence circles, began to clash with the older military-based 
bourgeoisie which was Karanga-dominated as a result of the historical engagement of 
the Karanga in the war of liberation. These tribal identities ultimately held little sway 
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as, shown by Grace Mugabe’s vain efforts to convince any reasonable number of 






Build-up to the 2018 elections 
 
Following the inauguration, the 2018 elections provided space for hegemonic 
contestation and an opportunity for Mnangagwa to prove constitutional legitimacy. 
For the opposition there will be an opportunity to compete on a more level playing 
Field should  the president’s inauguration promises have been kept. 
 
Prior to Mugabe’s removal Zimbabwean civil society had advocated for the 
introduction of a biometric voter registration and identification system 
(theindendent.co.zw 16 March 2017). Biometric systems, which record data such as 
finger print scans, iris scans or facial recognition indicators, will arguably provide a 
more reliable voter’s roll. This will in turn which make it difficult to duplicate 
registration and should allow for the removal of deceased voters from the roll. 
Biometric voter registration does not, however, mitigate against a number of the other 
strategies which Zanu-PF had used in the past to influence the outcome of elections, 
including the suppression of registration through bureaucratic means or by outright 
intimidation. In May 2016 the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) announced 
that it would be implementing a $US55 million voter registration exercise before the 
2018 election. By February 2017, there was a fog of political uncertainty in which it 
had become evident that delays in the procurement of the BVR equipment would 
probably cause delays in polling or result in the abandonment of the biometric system 
and a return to the previous system with its evident flaws. Once the kits were procured 
with joint support from the EU and the UNDP, registration commenced in October of 
2017 (https://www.ec-undp-electoralassistance.org). According to reporting from the 
EC-UNDP electoral assistance division, the ZEC would be in a position to register 5.5 
million registered voters, representing 80% of the eligible voter population. By the end 
of 2017 4.87 million people had been registered, representing 67.5% of the total 
eligible voter population. The ZEC then extended voter registration for an additional 
etc.  
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30 days between January and February 2018 and registered 5.03 million by the end of 
January 2018 (ibid.). The implementation of the registration certainly appears to 
provide the potential for a more credible election insofar as it would prevent 
malfeasance during registration. 
It was announced on 10 April 2018 that Zimbabwe would be inviting international 
election observers for the first time since 2002. In addition to observers from the AU 
and SADC who had been provided with accreditation since 2002, observers from the 
European Union, the Carter Center, the International Republican Institute and the 
National Democratic Institute would be accredited to observe the polls 
(https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKBN1HH1A9-OZATP). Registration 
reforms and the presence of international observers certainly offered the possibility 
that Zimbabwe’s 2018 elections would be credible. On 30 May 2018, Mnangagwa 
announced the date for the elections as 30 July 2018. 
In the context of understanding regime durability and change it is important to note 
that underestimating the impact of electoral reforms often leads to changes in the 
incumbent’s grip on power. The foregoing was the case in Zimbabwe in 2008 when 
the governing party underestimated the impact of counting at polling stations rather 
that at central counting offices. 
 
 
Zanu-PF’s 2018 campaign 
 
Zanu-PF launched its campaign on 4 May 2018 under the theme ‘Unite, Fight 
Corruption, Develop, Re-Engage, Create Jobs’ (newzimbabwe.com, 4 May 2018). The 
Zimbabwe Independent claimed that the Zanu-PF campaign would cost $US200 
Million. The newspaper claimed that the ruling party’s war chest had been funded by 
‘several foreign governments, struggling parastatals as well as investments from the 
security establishment thought to be contributing illegally’ (ibid.). 
Quoting the Zanu-PF national political commissar, Lieutenant-General Engelbert 
Rugeje (retired), the Herald reported that the party distributed more than 15 million 




Party primaries held in early May 2018 indicated that the ascendance of a Mnangagwa 
faction in the party was far from decisive. A number of key Mnagagwa allies failed to 
gain the party’s nomination. Among these were Oppah Muchinguri and Chris 
Mutsvangwa (https://www.herald.co.zw/bigwigs-fall-in-zanu-pf-primaries). In 2018 
Muchinguri became Zanu-PF national chairperson, having often been a Mugabe 
cabinet minister. She was appointed by Mnangagwa as minister for environment in 
December 2017. Mutsvangwa had been  the  chairman  of  the  Zimbabwe National 
Liberation War Veteran’s Association when the party broke ranks with the Mugabe’s 
leadership in 2016 and had been appointed minister for information by Mnangagwa. 
Rather than indicating weakness within the party, the volatility in the Zanu-PF 
primaries may indicate the reconsolidated hegemony of that party as candidates 
interpret securing the party’s nomination as tantamount to winning a parliamentary 
seat. 
 
Any notion that Zanu-PF may have changed its attitude to dissent was banished in 
April 2018 when Vice President Chiwenga summarily fired 16 000 striking nurses 
(https://news.pindula.co.zw/, 17 April 2018). Though the nurses were rehired a week 
later and the government promised to hire additional nurses, the episode reflects how 
the newly-militarised Zanu-PF leadership is likely to continue dealing with dissent 





Morgan Tsvangirai died on 14 February 2018, leaving a counter-hegemonic 
movement splitting along the lines of the contradictory class interests of the ‘big 
church’ he had assembled twenty years earlier. The split between bourgeois 
intellectuals and labour, which had triggered all previous splits within the party, 
became even more important in the immediate aftermath of Tsvangirai’s death. Vice- 
president of the party Thokozani Khupe, the former trade unionist, was Tsvangirai’s 
legal successor in the event of his incapacitation. However, in a decision that reflected 
the extent to which the party had long abandoned its connection to labour, the day after 
Tsvangirai’s death MDC vice chairman Morgan Komichi announced that former 
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student leader Nelson Chamisa would be the party’s candidate in the 2018 elections 
(https://www.iol.co.za/). The struggle for power between Khupe and Chamisa 
exploded at Tsvangirai’s funeral when youths attacked Khupe and Douglas Mwonzora 
at Tsvangirai’s rural home in Buhera, forcing her to take refuge in a hut in the former 
leader’s compound (thechronicle.co.zw, 23 February 2018). Multiple incidents of 
inter-factional violence would continue to take place throughout 2018 leading to the 
abandonment of polls, particularly in urban districts of Harare and Bulawayo 
(https://www.newzimbabwe.com, 21 May 2018). 
With the 40-year-old former student leader Chamisa in charge the MDC had 
successfully reformed an alliance with its previous breakaway parties, led by 
Welshman Ncube and Tendai Biti in August of 2017. After Tsvangirai’s death and 
Khupe’s removal, the strategic re-alliance indicated the core of the party as a bourgeois 
project. The MDC Alliance launched its campaign after Tsvangirai’s death in March 
2018, conducting mass rallies across the country pulling in up to ten thousand 
supporters in Bulawayo and Harare and smaller though sizeable crowds in rural rallies 
across the country (nehandaradio.com, 28 April, 2018). As with the Zanu-PF 
primaries, sitting MPs in the MDC alliance also lost primary elections in May of 2018; 
these included James Maridadi (Mabvuku/Tafara), Fani Munengami (Glen View 
North) and Simon Chidhakwa (Zengeza West). A national representative sample of 
2,400 Zimbabweans was surveyed by Afrobarometer between 28 April 2018 and 12 
May 2018. In the poll, 19 per cent refused to answer , and another 7 per cent didn’t 
know. 42 per cent were willing to declare their intention to support ZANU-PF. Thirty 
per cent professed support for Chamisa’s MDC. Both in the presidential and 
parliamentary contests, the poll suggested ZAMNU retaining its historic advantage in 
the countryside (Afrobarometer, 2018, pp. 8-10). 
It is unlikely that the MDC would have been able to secure a majority in parliament 
and less likely that Chamisa would be able to beat Mnangagwa in the presidential 
election. Arguably, the alliance’s complicity in supporting the military coup, having 
judged Mnangagwa as the lesser of two evils, stripped the movement of it moral 
superiority in relation to its belief in constitutionalism. With international partners 
seeking to re-engage with the Zimbabwean government after Mugabe’s removal, the 
party evidently does not have the financial support it had enjoyed when its ability to 
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bring about a hegemonic shift in the country appeared more viable. The stark 
ideological difference between the MDC and Zanu-PF has been blurred by 
Mnangagwa’s recasting of himself and his party as business friendly 
(https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/24). Pretence of supporting non-violence and respect 
for the rule of law has been invalidated by the party and particularly by Chamisa’s 
tendency towards violence to achieve his political goals, as well as the subversion of 
the party’s constitution in order to promote ambitious young leadership. As both a 
woman and as Ndebele, Khupe would arguably not have been a viable candidate in a 
conservative male-dominated society where tribal identity is unlikely to allow a 
candidate from the minority group to win the presidency. However valid this strategic 
concern may have been in removing Khupe from leadership, the application of this 
logic would therefore discount any claims that the party is an ideologically driven, 
non-tribal, non-class-based movement seeking to provide a democratic alternative, or 





This chapter has traced the narrative of recent Zimbabwean history until the most 
recent events at the time of writing. Thematically the chapter brings this thesis to its 
point of departure, which is the reality of a bafflingly durable hybrid, semi- 
authoritarian regime in Zimbabwe. As noted in the introduction to this thesis, 
Zimbabwe’s durable hybrid regime is not an anomaly on the African continent. The 
chapter began by tracing the events surrounding the post-2013 splits in the MDC. It 
was shown how, after the defeat in the post-GNU elections, fractures along lines of 
class identity as well as issues with Tsvangirai’s leadership led to Tendai Biti’s 
departure along with a number of key party leaders. As with the 2005 split, Nelson 
Chamisa’s decision to remain is interpreted as being driven by ambition rather than 
principle. Chamisa’s ambition also indicates calculations based on a keen 
understanding of the nature of the party. With Biti outside the MDC fold, and despite 
Thokozani Khupe’s seniority in the party hierarchy, Chamisa was aware that he would 
be next in line for the leadership. This calculation is based on the understanding that 
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the power of the labour movement within the party had waned. as well as the fact that 
the party’s procedures and discipline could easily be flouted. 
The chapter then addressed the period of spontaneous organic political unrest in 2016. 
The emergence of new actors in the counter-hegemonic sphere included the Tajamuka 
movement and the online activism of Pastor Evan Mawarire’s #Thisflag which began 
to manifest in street protests and a successful stay-away. It has been shown how 
spontaneous online criticism arose against state corruption, the drafting of arbitrary 
and self-serving legislation and the proposals to impose bond notes. The chapter 
discusses how ideological and cultural actions on the war of position translated to an 
effective albeit unsustained war of movement, as Mawarire’s #Thisflag movement 
grew from a single video to a movement capable of mobilising the first national stay- 
away in 18 years. However, the fact that the movement was not organised and that its 
reluctant figurehead fled the country for 6 months led to a loss in momentum by the 
end of 2016. 
Zanu-PF’s party discipline had remained largely unwavering for over fifty years. 
Cracks had begun to appear from 2004 as separate camps began to vie to replace 
Mugabe whose bewildering capacity for clinging to power was matched only by his 
longevity. The chapter outlines how Emmerson Mnangagwa had been able to redeem 
himself after the debacle of the Tsholotsho plot in 2005. Mngangagwa would form a 
coalition with First Lady Grace Mugabe to oust Vice President Joice Mujuru in 2014. 
With Mujuru ejected from the party and the vice-presidency, Mnangagwa and Grace 
Mugabe would turn on each other. The former’s Lacoste faction engaged in a 
competition for control of the party with the first lady’s G40. While the Mnangagwa 
group represented his personal interest in Karanga leadership, and representatives of 
the G40 group are mostly from Mugabe’s Zezuru tribe, the chapter has argued that 
these tribal identities are coincidental to class factions within the state-based 
bourgeoisie. It has been argued that Mnangagwa represents an older generation of 
state-based bourgeoisie who accumulated wealth through access to the state and the 
means of state violence. Grace Mugabe’s cabal represented younger members of the 
governing class who had risen from petty thugs during the election violence of 2000 
and 2002 and had enriched themselves by preying on opportunities resulting from the 
economic crisis and hyperinflation. The extent to which these broad categories 
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reflected tribal identity drew on the largely Karanga military structures and the fact 
that the Mugabe family had established a substantial predatory patronage network 
within their own tribe. 
The chapter then outlined in detail the events leading to the 2017 coup d’état. The 
detail sought to provide an answer to the question of whether the new dispensation 
reflects a change in hegemony. It does not. The chapter has shown that understanding 
hegemony as the overlapping continuums between consent and coercion within the 
context of the historical bloc, which is the interaction between the base and 
superstructure, Zanu-PF hegemony has remained intact since 2017. 
The chapter analysed the extent to which electoral reforms, including bio-metric voter 
registration and the invitation of international election observers, may serve to balance 
the electoral playing field. This thesis would cautiously posit that an underestimation 
of the capacity of such reforms is a critical factor in regime collapse as Zimbabwean 
experiences in 2008 had previously shown. 
The chapter then concludes by analysing the electoral campaign strategies of both the 
hegemonic and the counter-hegemonic forces respectively. It shows that Zanu-PF’s 
strategies are similar to those the party has always used, though relying heavily on the 
momentum gathered from events in 2017. It shows that the hegemonic bloc is not 
entirely stable given high-profile losses in the primaries. The loss of party chefs may 
however reflect the competitive locus of national political power within the party 
rather than in competition with the opposition. 
The chapter concludes more resolutely than this thesis’ point of departure by stating 
that the MDC’s role as a counter-hegemonic force is moribund. In their complicity 
with the coup, the party has found itself legitimating Mnangagwa’s leadership in a 
regime that remains identical, apart from the purging of a few individuals. The party’s 
following of Zanu-PF’s lead has resulted in the use of the very same discourse of 
‘patriotic history’ which the hegemonic bloc has used successfully to paint the MDC 
as outsiders and sell-outs. This chapter argues that the contradiction of bourgeois and 
labour identities and ideologies within the party has been the central conflict within 
the movement and may be the cause of its failure to bring about hegemonic change. 
The actions of the opposition leadership in flouting party discipline, a convenient 
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disregard for constitutionalism and the tendency towards violence reflect that the 
MDC does not provide a viable alternative to Zanu-PF hegemony. The events of 2017 
have been able to recast Zanu-PF as a party in reform and could be interpreted as the 
party’s consolidation of hegemonic power for the foreseeable future, as Zimbabwe 




Conclusion: Case study findings and implications for the analysis of 
other counter-hegemonic movements 
 
This thesis has sought to answer the research question: 
 
How to account for the durability of Zanu-PF rule? 
 
It has done this by applying Antonio Gramsci’s historical political economy, 
particularly his concepts of historical blocs and hegemony, to account for the nearly 
four decade-long rule of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (Zanu- 
PF). The thesis has argued that Gramsci’s theories provide useful tools for explaining 
the durability entrenched regimes such as ZANU-PF by employing an ontology, an 
epistemology and a method that incorporates historical, economic and ideological 
factors. Gramsci’s theories help us analyse dynamics of structure and agency, modes 
of production and ideology, as well as consent and coercion in the creation and 
maintenance of long lasting political dominance. The Gramscian concept of the 
historical bloc has supplied a conceptual continuum between the base, a society’s 
mode of economic production and reproduction, and the superstructure, the dominant 
ideologies and political institutions. The thesis identified three post-independence 
historical blocs in Zimbabwe: 1980 era’s ‘corporatist/welfarist’ or ‘compromise state’ 
historical bloc; the attempted neo-liberal Economic Structural Adjustment Programme 
(ESAP) historical bloc and finally the crisis hegemonic bloc which corresponds with 
the Third Chimurenga and the Fast Track Land Reform Programme. The thesis 
considers that this last bloc includes the period of the Government of National Unity 
Between 2009-2013 and has persisted to the present. Hegemony has been understood 
as the continuum between ‘intellectual and moral leadership obtained by consent’ and 
the strategies employed on the terrain of ‘relations of force’ in achieving and 
maintaining political dominance (Gramsci, 2000, p. 202). The thesis has shown that 
while Zanu-PF has never enjoyed leadership based solely on intellectual and moral 
leadership without the threat of violence the party also never ruled entirely by force 
without claiming to derive its authority from a higher ideological and moral source. 
Through the substantive chapters of the thesis from Chapter 4 to Chapter 8 the thesis 
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has sought to make explicit at which points either consent or coercion has been primary 
in maintaining the party’s dominance within each historical bloc. In applying 
Gramscian theories to Zimbabwean history and politics the thesis has been sensitive 
to the conundrums at the centre of Gramsci’s and indeed wider Marxian theory. Firstly, 
the question of whether politics and ideology can be read off an analysis of a society’s 
mode of production and reproduction? Secondly whether scholars and political actors 
can develop accurate analyses or political strategies bound by relations of consent and 
coercion based off the analysis of production and the class structures it creates? In 
using a Gramscian tools of the Historical Bloc and Hegemony as continuums between 
base and superstructure and consent and coercion respectively the thesis has hopefully 
been faithful to Gramsci’s engagement with wider political theories and his warnings 
against binary engagements of either of these theoretical conundrums. Theoretical 
questions notwithstanding; the primary concern of the thesis has been empirical. It has 
sought to understand how Zanu-PF (and by generalisation other similarly entrenched 
African regimes such as those for instance in Algeria, Sudan, and Ethiopia) has used 
varying combinations of consensual and coercive measures within the framework of 
history defined by economic and ideological factors. Thus the engagement with 
Gramscian theory has been considered so as to avoid reductionism and subjective 
voluntarism about base or superstructure, structure and agency or the dominance of 
either consent or coercion while not aiming to resolve these theoretical questions. 
The methodological approach holds that Zimbabwe’s turbulent history is determined 
as much by modes of production as it is by ideology, politics and methods of 
representation and that Zanu-PF’s maintenance of power has relied on both coercion 
and consent. Gramsci’s theories have provided useful heuristic tools to understand 
these dynamics and their deep historical roots in a manner that equally considers 
structural factors as it does key moments of agency and strategic decisions by 
important political leaders 
This dissertation also began with the observation that despite the existence of 
democratic procedures such as elections in all African states, more African states can 
be considered undemocratic than democratic. The Freedom House, Freedom in the 
World survey for 2018 counts 7 democracies in sub-Saharan Africa, 21 other countries 
221  
that are considered partly free, while 19 are considered unfree regimes (Freedom 
House 2018). Indeed, at any given point since the wave of African independence in 
the 1960s, no more than a handful of African states have been considered fully free if 
we use the democratisation indices as a measurement. Furthermore, the countries that 
have been considered free have not always remained so and there have been as many 
backsliders as there have been democratisers at any given time. This observation 
allows for the assertion that contrary to the teleological assertions of democratic 
transition and consolidation theories, African states are not necessarily transitioning 
towards democracy. This observation therefore provided a further justification for the 
analysis of a more general trend in Africa which is the persistence of authoritarian 
forms of rule and hybrid regimes in African states? 
The dissertation has used the single case study of Zimbabwe to refine current theories 
on the durability of authoritarian forms of rule in African states. The research design 
follows the structured-focused case study approach defined by George et al. (2005) as 
‘the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test 
historical explanations that may be generalisable to other events’. The case of 
Zimbabwe has had a number of objectives; firstly, to underline the weaknesses and 
gaps in transition theory’s applicability to the case in hand. This has accomplished the 
objective of what Lijphart and Eckstein refer to as disciplined configurative or 
disciplined interpretive case studies which have the capacity to impugn established 
theories that ought to but do not fit. In doing so, it has shown how transition theories 
fail to suitably explain or account for the lack of change in Zimbabwe. Secondly, the 
case study approach has served a heuristic purpose by inductively ‘identifying new 
variables, hypotheses, causal mechanisms, and causal paths’ (George & Bennett, 2005, 
p. 75). 
The method used has been structured so that the researcher proposed general questions 
to reflect the research objective, and these questions have been applied to the case 
study. This has been in order to guide and standardise data collection, thereby making 
possible the systematic comparison and cumulation of the findings in other cases. The 
method has been focused to deal with only certain aspects of the historical case under 
examination. The requirements for structure and focus ‘apply equally to individual 
cases since that may later be joined by additional cases’ (George et al., 2005, p. 67). 
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Zimbabwe is a representative case of an authoritarian regime which has remained 
durable despite the presence of a viable democratisation movement. In 2017 Robert 
Mugabe, the country’s leader since independence, was removed from power through 
unconstitutional means and at the hands of his own party rather than through the ballot 
box. This unconstitutional succession and the death in February 2018 of Morgan 
Tsvangirai, who had led the country’s opposition for twenty years, are clear indicators 
of the degree to which the opposition in Zimbabwe has become quasi-irrelevant. 
While noting the ‘protracted and necessarily contingent’ nature of negotiations over 
rules and practice’ (Le Bas, 2016), this thesis argues that after nearly 20 years of 
counter-hegemonic struggle, Tsvangirai’s Movement for Democratic Change has 
failed to change to the rules of the game. This is particularly true of the period after of 
the GNU when the movement had some access to state machinery yet was still not 
able to make a decisive shift to a position of dominance over Zanu-PF, either 
electorally or ideologically. The Zimbabwean reality points to the dilemma at the 
centre of all pseudo-democracies and electoral autocracies; while the mechanisms for 
a democratic overturn of power have theoretically been in place, these have not been 
respected by at least one of the central actors in the political game. Central to this is 
the fact that, in order to bring about any changes in the nature of the regime, it was 
necessary that Mugabe lose control over coercive power in the country. 
 
 
The Gramscian method and its application to the Zimbabwean context 
 
Gramsci’s historical materialism is an elaboration of Marxist political economy which 
holds that understanding political movements requires both an appreciation of material 
factors arising from the mode of production as well as the ideational superstructure 
and political institutions which accompany the base mode of production. Gramsci’s 
method has provided useful tools for the analysis of political change and of regime 
durability in Zimbabwe. 
The first of these concepts is the historical bloc which interweaves elements of the 
mode of production (the base) and ideological and cultural frameworks for explaining 
these societies (the superstructure). The historical bloc has been useful in framing the 
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various phases of Zimbabwe’s colonial and post-colonial history and how modes of 
accumulation have created the various class structures and their interests. To this 
material reality of production, the concept of the historical bloc weaves the ideological 
and cultural awareness of each class. The thesis therefore observed distinct phases in 
the early colonial historical bloc, the post-Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
settler-state bloc, the immediate post-independence bloc and the crisis bloc. 
The second Gramscian tool used by this thesis is the theory of hegemony, which is 
understood as the intersection between elements of consent and coercion in the 
creation and maintenance of political power. The thesis has therefore analysed the 
interplay between elements of coercion and ideological and cultural understanding 
within each of the above noted historical phases. The dissertation has sought to 
elaborate on whether elements of coercion or consent have been decisive in 
maintaining hegemony in various phases in Zimbabwe’s history. In framing 
democratisation in Zimbabwe as counter-hegemonic, the thesis has applied Gramsci’s 
strategic theories of the ‘war of position’ (which takes place on the plane of the 
ideological and cultural), and the war of movement (which takes place on the plane of 
the material and coercive) to analyse the various strategies of the counter-hegemonic 
movement in Zimbabwe. 
The Gramscian concept of intellectuals as producers of ideological and cultural 
understanding of material reality is also particularly applicable to the Zimbabwean 
reality where ideologies have had a central role in the maintenance of political power. 
The concept of passive revolution has also been helpful in understanding compromise 
by hegemonic powers in order to maintain a degree of dominance. This offered 
illuminating insights into analysing firstly, the compromise at the time of 
independence in 1980 between white and international capital and the nationalist 
movement; and secondly, the Government of National Unity in 2009 in which Zanu- 
PF as hegemonic power made political compromises with the counter-hegemonic 
forces in order to reorganise and maintain its dominance. 
Gramsci’s method for analysing a political movement during the course of its 
development has also been relevant in studying counter-hegemony in Zimbabwe. This 
study has been directed by Gramsci’s method for the analysis of counter-hegemonic 
movements. This has been conducted by asking questions of the Movement for 
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Democratic Change such as the social content of their membership (Chapter 5) and 
the movements role in the balance of forces and the strategies it applies to achieving 
its goals (Chapters 6, 7 and 8). 
One strength of Gramsci’s method is that it does not insist on either economic or 
cultural determinism and does not discount the application of other aggregations of 
power, including ethnic or tribal identities as they exist in states like Zimbabwe. The 
Gramscian historical method does not emphasise either structure or agency as the 
determining forces in history. Instead, it allows for the analysis of political struggles 
within a framework broadly established around a continuum between the mode of 
production and class interests as they correspond to other forms of identity such as 
race or class and which can also be influenced by intellectual and cultural framing of 
this material reality. This thesis has therefore applied Gramscian methods to study the 
formation and durability of the Zanu-PF regime in Zimbabwe through the broad 
historical phases of the post-independence historical blocs. 
 
 
Chapter 3: The construction and consolidation of Zanu-PF hegemony 
 
Chapter 3 of this thesis outlined the construction and consolidation of hegemony by 
the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF). This served as a 
point of departure for addressing the primary research problem of accounting for the 
durability of the regime when faced with a seemingly robust opposition in the late 
1990s. The chapter applies the Gramscian theoretical constructs of the historical bloc 
and hegemony in order to analyse how Zanu-PF came to power through its own 
counter-hegemonic struggle against the white settler state and how the party 
constructed its own hegemony in the post-independence historical bloc. The chapter 
thus situated the formation of leadership in the political economy of the colonial settler 
state. The settler-colonial state was created with the primary function of managing the 
extraction of labour and primary resources. This proletarianisation of the black 
population through alienation from their land in the early part of the 20th century 
produced an African working class which was forced to bridge its rural and urban 
existence. The dispossession of the black majority from their land created the central 
conflict in Zimbabwe’s political economy. Framed within the concept of the historical 
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bloc, land tenure in Zimbabwe has been central to hegemonic and counter-hegemonic 
struggle. It has been shown that a black educated elite became the organic intellectuals 
for the post-World War II nationalist movement. The fact that the leadership of the 
nationalist movement originated in the country’s small petit bourgeoisie would 
determine its interests in the struggle, its motives and its ideology, and how these 
influenced the approach to a counter-hegemonic stance against the settler state. As 
such, this generation of nationalists bridged the concerns of black urban labour and the 
rural peasantry which it brought under its umbrella,and chose armed guerrilla warfare 
as their primary means for counter-hegemonic struggle. Armed struggle would 
account for why the nationalist leadership became less reliant on a politicised labour 
movement than on the rural peasantry, a fact that may have influenced the nature of 
post-independence nationalist hegemony. The party’s strategy of armed struggle 
would give the party an insight into how to protect its own hegemony once 
constructed. The party’s reliance on a strategy of violence and a culture which was 
intolerant of dissent also translated into the maintenance of hegemony after 
independence and the durability of the regime. The discourse of armed struggle, which 
necessarily views adversaries as enemies and internal dissent as ‘selling out’, would 
inform the nature of the post-independence ideology and this would crystallise in 
periods of stronger opposition. This patriotic history was central to the post- 
independence hegemonic superstructure. 
 
While the nationalist leadership paid lip service to an ideology of socialism, historical 
scholarship of the period indicates that their commitment was at best lukewarm 
(Moore, 1991; Herbst, 1990; Mandaza, 1986; Dashwood, 2000; Chung, 2006). The 
dilemma that this petit bourgeois group encountered would be the same as that faced 
in general by anti-colonial movements across the continent and is best encapsulated in 
Cabral’s statement that ‘in order to truly fulfill the role in the national liberation 
struggle, the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie must be capable of committing suicide as 
a class in order to be reborn as revolutionary workers’ (Cabral, 1966). The nature of 
the state, whether dominated by a white settler class or the black petit bourgeois class, 
is resilient to counter-hegemonic resistance. 
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Chapter 3 further outlined how the new governing class sought to construct its own 
hegemony through an economic base which applied corporatist practices. The 
objective of this was to maintain both white settler capital and the interests of 
international capital in Zimbabwe while also adding a welfarist component to the state. 
The chapter outlines how Zanu-PF hegemony was constructed from 1980 until the 
organic crisis which became apparent from about 1997 onwards. The class 
compromise meant that while the state’s institutions were intended not to challenge 
the central interests of the agrarian and entrepreneurial elites, the black bureaucratic 
and political elite within the state began to transcend its petit bourgeois status through 
privileged access to state resources and the capacity for patronage that these produced. 
The change in the economic sphere also resulted in the gradual embourgeoisement of 
the African petit bourgeoisie. Zanu-PF faced very little opposition during this period 
as post-independence euphoria and a largely de-politicised polity meant that there 
were virtually no challenges to the party’s hegemony. The party’s tendency towards 
authoritarianism was revealed in how it immediately sought to fuse itself with the state. 
It intensified its intolerance of opposition by quashing the rebellion in the south of the 
country in the Gukurahundi massacres between 1983 and 1987, and the calls for a one-







The application of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme indicates the level 
of embourgeoisement of the governing class and the calculations of their interests in 
managing the political economy of the state. When attempts at liberalisation began to 
affect the urban working class through de-industrialisation, dissent in this class began 
to rise. The chapter describes how the regime increasingly relied on coercion to 
maintain its power. In retaining our analysis within the frame of the historical bloc it 
is important to note that the sources of discontent in the society which drove the 
counter-hegemonic movement were economic and lie in the Marxian/Gramscian base 
rather than in the ideological superstructure. The rise of opposition in Zimbabwe 
during the late 1990s corresponds with the Gramscian concept of organic crisis. 
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Gramsci’s note that the events surrounding the organic crisis ‘form the terrain of the 
“conjunctural”, and it is upon this terrain that the forces of opposition organise’, 
accurately depicts the period from 1997 onwards when the counter-hegemonic 
movement in Zimbabwe was formed. 
Chapter 4 then asks the question outlined by Gramsci in his method for the analysis of 
a counter-hegemonic social movement by addressing the question: ‘What was the 
social content of the mass following of the movement?’. By the mid-1990s a counter- 
hegemonic movement began to form around twin issues: the poor economic 
performance resulting from the application of the Economic Structural Adjustment 
Programme, and the evident centralisation of power and intolerance of opposition. The 
late 1990s saw a shift from attempts to engage with the government into confrontation 
as the opposition began to coalesce around questions of constitutional reform, forming 
the National Constitutional Assembly in 1997. In this respect, Zimbabwe’s counter- 
hegemonic movement was composed of multiple overlapping constituencies and 
social groups which came together in the period of organic crisis beginning in 1997. 
The question also allows us to apply another key concept of Gramsci’s methodology 
by examining the extent to which these elements constitute organic intellectuals of the 
counter-hegemonic struggle. The chapter then analyses the country’s most prominent 
membership-based group in the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions. In doing so the 
chapter details the ZCTU’s membership and organisational structures, key demands 
and concerns of the movement’s membership as well as its leadership and mobilisation 
methods. 
The chapter then elaborated on the role of critical intellectuals from the University of 
Zimbabwe as a counter-hegemonic force advocating for political reform. In addition 
to critical intellectuals, student leadership at universities at the end of the 1980s had 
been central in opposing the one-party state. The legacy of this leadership would 
produce the next cadre of critical intellectuals who would move from student 
leadership to a central position in all other sections of the counter-hegemonic 
movement, apart from the trade unions. Student leaders also introduced a tendency 
toward violence for achieving political ends into the counter-hegemonic movement. 
This violence has, however, focused mainly on internal conflict rather than at the 
regime which would have had greater coercive power. Former student leaders would 
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become key actors in cross-pollinating different segments of the counter-hegemonic 
movement; these included active lawyers, members of the professionalised NGO 
sphere and religious organisations as well as the national (that is, local Zimbabwean) 
staff of international foundations and donor agencies. 
The thesis has outlined the problematic role of the professionalised NGO space. 
Among the key attributes of professionalised NGOs are narrow membership base, 
their small leadership pool, dependence on donor funding and the overlaps between 
the leadership component of NGOs and the national staff of international donor 
agencies. 
The thesis chronicles how the dovetailing memberships and coalitions which formed 
the National Constitutional Assembly in 1997 would combine with the formal 
structures of the ZCTU to form the Movement for Democratic Change political party 
in 1999. The structures at the formation of the NCA and MDC in the late 1990s would 
foreshadow the interaction of these diverse interests once they coalesced, either as an 
opposition civil society or within the formal structure of the MDC. Chapter 5 
concludes with a conjunctural account of the formation of both the NCA and the MDC 
and the potentially fragile coalitions and contradictions in the movement. These would 
account for later weaknesses which manifested in multiple splits in the party and 
would continue to surface even after Tsvangirai’s death in 2018. 
The chapter concludes by returning to a chronological narrative which outlines the 
conjunctural roots of the opposition movement in the formation of the National 





Hegemonic and counter-hegemonic relations of force, 2000-2008 
 
Chapter 5 addressed the first phase of open contestation in Zimbabwe between the 
hegemonic power in the form of the Zanu-PF governing class, and the counter- 
hegemonic force which was a broad coalition of labour, sections of the middle class 
and some representatives of national white industry and farming. Gramsci’s method 
distinguishes relations of forces on three levels or moments. The first of these is the 
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relation of economic forces, the mode of accumulation and production, and the 
development of material forces. The second moment is the degree of homogeneity, 
self-awareness and organisation attained by the various social groups. The third is the 
relation of military forces which encapsulates not only brute coercive power, but also 
ideological consent (2000, p. 202). 
The political economy of Zimbabwe after 2000 is the political economy of a state in 
crisis as its formal economy collapsed. The Fast Track Land Reform Programme 
(FTLRP) effectively put an end to the existence of a white land-owning class in the 
country. This class was replaced by a new black land-owning class under the A1 and 
A2 structures of the FTLRP. The latter are essentially high-ranking military officials 
and Zanu-PF loyalists who created a state-based bureaucratic bourgeoisie. By 2008 
the number of beneficiaries in this class would be approximately 16 000. The class of 
A1 farmers who each received plots of approximately 12 acres comprised about 145 
000 individuals. Given that neither of these classes holds title deeds to the plots they 
occupied they are entirely beholden to the whims of Zanu-PF leadership and could 
have their 99-year leases revoked with little notice. 
Apart from the land grab in the land reform programme, the governing class essentially 
became a kleptocratic class using access to the state to buttress their predatory 
accumulation. This class capitalised on the collapse of the economy to further enrich 
themselves. Where access to foreign currency, mines and agriculture was entirely 
dependent on access to the state, these individuals were able to leverage their access 
to great profit as shortages of commodities such as fuel and food led to the governing 
class monopolising supply chains. Targeted international sanctions may have affected 
the ability of the governing class to externalise funds but did not prevent a collapse 
into a more blatant kleptocracy. 
The urban working class became a dispersed urban poor reliant on informal trading 
for their economic existence. Labour structures would be severely weakened. 
Membership in the ZCTU declined from 1.7 million in 1998 to 350 000 in 2011 
(Kanyenze, 2011) The effects of the mass evictions in operation Murambatsvina in 
2005 would exacerbate this as the work force moved towards an informal basis. 
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Throughout this period Zanu-PF’s notorious party discipline had been able to maintain 
the hegemon’s structural and organisational integrity. The party had consolidated its 
structures in 2000 following its loss in the constitutional referendum and called on old 
allies in the National Liberation War Veterans Association. Charismatic young leaders 
such as Border Gezi added new organisational strength and were able to drum up a 
degree of organisational self-awareness, coupled with an increased capacity for 
violence against the new opposition. 
While the centre was able to hold within Zanu-PF, internal rifts were never far below 
the surface. Intrigue within the party was revealed with the 2004 Tsholotsho plot in 
which Emmerson Mnangagwa, Jacob Mudenda and Jonathan Moyo were apparently 
exposed as planning a plot to place Mnangagwa, then Speaker of Parliament, as vice 
president and therefore in direct line of the presidency. Other camps were forming 
with Joice Mujuru (then vice president) appearing as the most likely candidate with 
the support of her estranged husband General Solomon Mujuru. Zanu-PF’s internal 
disciplinary force held the plot in check. 
The fact that the MDC was a broad coalition meant there would always be the potential 
for fractures. By 2005 the MDC had begun to splinter, apparently due to principles of 
strategy. However, the split took a regional (ethnic) and to some degree class nature 
as Sibanda, a labour leader, joined his fellow Ndebele, the intellectual Welshman 
Ncube to form their own faction of the MDC. The lack of coherent strategy in the 
counter-hegemonic movement was also triggered by competition for donor funding, 
as the opportunity to secure a significant salary when other opportunities for 
employment are diminished becomes an important motivational factor in engaging in 
the counter-hegemonic struggle. The additional pull of access to power was another 
motivation for engaging in the counter-hegemonic movement. This shift to politics 
also weakened civil society and labour as prominent leaders were leaving the labour 
movement and civil society to join other sections of the movement in the MDC, as 
well as to well-paid jobs in the donor agencies. 
Given that the party and state had been fused since independence, Zanu-PF was able 
to use coercive power and both legal and institutional superstructures to maintain its 
hegemony. The police, army, and Central Intelligence Organisation provided 
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overwhelming force to support Zanu-PF and this was supplemented by the war 
veterans and youth militia during the land invasion and election periods. 
For its part, the MDC continued to focus its counter-hegemonic strategy on elections. 
This strategy was, however, proving ineffective against Zanu-PF’s overwhelming 
capacity for coercion, its ability to compromise legal and electoral institutions, and by 
2008 its ability to ignore the results of the election and refusal to relinquish power. 
Apart from the institutional and coercive capacity of Zanu-PF the party also used its 
ideological  weaponry in  the form  of patriotic history on a largely  captive 
audience.There is not question that, notwithstanding Mugabe’s and Zanu-PF’s 
attraction based on fear of coercion or ever-diminishing sources of patronage, the 
party’s ideological narratives within the framework of patriotic history indoctrinated 
a great nuber of Zimbabweans. The extent to which patriotic history convinced a large 
section of Zimbabwe can be interpreted as that part of Zanu-PF’s hegemony which 
supplemented the coercion inflicted on sections of the population, and the  patronage 
doled out  to others. Mugabe and his intellectuals had compelling arguments blaming 
the West, white farmers and the opposition as their puppets. These must wholly account 
for why even a substantial proportion of citizens in urban areas, who – despite the 
evidence of their personal economic hardships, despite having their pensions 
obliterated or losing their jobs – would continue to vote for the party. Given that the 
majority of Zimbabweans consumed media only from sources owned by the 
government and managed by Zanu-PF propagandists, it is no surprise that such people 
do exist, and in no small numbers. By 2008 Zanu-PF’s propaganda had become 
increasingly sycophantic, as all national news and the state-owned press began to refer 
to Mugabe as ‘His Excellency The President and First Secretary of ZANU-PF, 
Commander in Chief of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces Cde. Robert Gabriel Mugabe’, 
or ‘Our Vanguard leader’. 
By 2008 the balance of forces in Zimbabwe between hegemony and counter- 
hegemony had reached a stalemate. Violence could no longer maintain Zanu-PF’s grip 
on power, as the results of the party’s policies had crippled the economy and all 
consent mechanisms were beginning to ring hollow. The trajectory of hegemony in 
Zimbabwe from 2008 would be determined by the MDC’s strategic decision to enter 





The Gramscian concept of passive revolution refers to the coming to power of a new 
historical situation of counter-hegemonic struggle in which social and economic 
relations become static. Passive revolution is often the outcome of a war of position 
by the dominant classes after a war of manoeuvre by the dominated classes. In 
Zimbabwe’s case, the passive revolution represented by the inclusive government 
came about as a result of the overwhelming use of coercion to subvert the results of 
the 2008 elections. Heeding Gramsci’s warning, this thesis has not interpreted passive 
revolution as historical defeatism; that is to say, it cannot suggest that by entering the 
inclusive government the MDC factions were destined for defeat. There was certainly 
sufficient potential for reforms and strategies in the GNU which the counter- 
hegemonic forces could have used to bring about an overall change in the country’s 
power balance. 
The structure of the GNU illustrates how the counter-hegemonic party’s failure to gain 
power over ministries related to state security (and therefore coercion) adversely 
affected their ability to bring about any conclusive change in the nature of hegemony. 
This particular outcome indicated the weaknesses in party negotiation strategies as 
they were unable to insist on control of these key coercive elements of the state. 
The chapter then outlined the measures taken to bring about economic recovery. The 
application and impact of dollarisation have been elaborated on in order to reflect the 
positive influence of the multicurrency regime. This brought hyperinflation to an end 
and led to a return to normalcy in banking, as well as the capacity to import goods 
such as fuel and food. It has been shown, however, that the adoption of the US dollar 
in particular has led to Zimbabwe becoming a high-cost economy for production. In 
addition, it has led to further de-industrialisation and the loss of more employment as 
Zimbabwe can no longer compete with South Africa when labour and manufacturing 
costs are compared. It has also been shown that due to the overwhelming control of 
state bureaucracies, the governing elites in Zanu-PF have monopolised access to both 
the means of accumulation and the national political economy, where the state 
determines access to resources. This access to the state is particularly evident in the 
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extraction of resources from the Chiadzwa/Marange diamond fields. The chapter has 
shown how access to Chiadzwa diamonds brought about a shift in the economic base 
of the state by providing an abundant source of income and patronage for the state and 
the armed forces. It has also provided a means of manufacturing economic dependence 
by controlling access to patronage through informal mining. Finally, Marange 
Diamonds created a seismic shift in the interests and policies of European nations, 
particularly Belgium, in relation to sanctions. This shift had the effect of relieving 
external pressure on Zanu-PF while reducing political and financial support for 
Zimbabwe’s opposition civil society, which had become entirely dependent on donor 
support for its functions. 
The process of constitution-making during a period of passive revolution is central to 
the question of regime durability in a semi-authoritarian regime. The constitution- 
making process allowed the counter-hegemonic movement a role in drafting the rules 
of the political game. Given that constitution-making had been a central arena of 
contestation throughout the counter-hegemonic struggle in Zimbabwe, the ability to 
manage the process of constitution-making signified a degree of progress in terms of 
setting the rules of the political game in the country. Constitution-making under the 
GNU, however, encapsulated the dilemmas of democratic counter-hegemonic 
struggle. Even the process of rule-setting was circumscribed by authoritarian power 
dynamics. This included intransigence in establishing the parameters of debate, the 
use of coercion to clamp down on free expression, and ultimately ignored those 
contributions which did not suit hegemon interest. In the Zimbabwean case a 
compromise acceptable to the counter-hegemonic movement was made. Checks on 
executive and term limits were instituted, the Bill of Rights was extended by including 
social and economic rights as well as increasing the rights of women, an independent 
electoral commission was established and right to dual citizenship was enacted. 
 
 
Rifts in the counter-hegemonic bloc 
 
Chapter 6 of this dissertation illustrated how the battle over constitution-making led to 
further rifts in the counter-hegemonic bloc as segments of opposition civil society 
contested the process run by politicians. This also reflects the dependence on donor 
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funding in Zimbabwe’s civil society, as the decision to oppose the constitution-making 
process left organisations such as the NCA entirely abandoned by the donors. Other 
organisations such as the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, Zimbabwe Election Support 
Network and Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights were funded by multiple donors 
to participate both in the constitution-making process in terms of content, and as 
observers of the outreach process. 
The chapter concludes with an analysis of the build-up to the elections which Zanu- 
PF ultimately won, providing Robert Mugabe with another potential four-year term in 
office. Analyses of the 2013 elections concluded that Zanu-PF’s ideological positions 
did win over a significant segment of the population, and changes in the economic 
structure in the country created a dependency on Zanu-PF patronage. However, it was 
the party’s manipulation of the state mechanisms of registration and coercion which 
ultimately led to its victory in 2013, effectively the ‘end of an era’ in the counter- 
hegemonic struggle in Zimbabwe. 
 
 
New counter-hegemonic actors and the resurgence of the hegemonic bloc 
 
After the defeat in the post-GNU elections, fractures along lines of class identity as 
well as issues with Tsvangirai’s leadership led to Tendai Biti’s departure along with a 
number of key party leaders. As with the 2005 split, Nelson Chamisa’s decision to 
remain is interpreted as being driven by ambition rather than principle. Chamisa’s 
ambition also indicates calculations based on a keen understanding of the nature of the 
party. This calculation is based on the understanding that the power of the labour 
movement within the party had waned, as well as the fact that the party’s procedures 
and discipline could easily be flouted. 
The chapter then addressed the period of spontaneous organic political unrest in 2016. 
The emergence of new actors in the counter-hegemonic sphere included the Tajamuka 
movement and the online activism of Pastor Evan Mawarire’s #Thisflag, which began 
to manifest in street protests and a successful stay-away. It has been shown how 
spontaneous online criticism arose against state corruption, the drafting of arbitrary 
and self-serving legislation and the proposals to impose bond notes. The chapter 
discusses how ideological and cultural actions on the war of position translated to an 
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effective albeit unsustained war of movement, as Mawarire’s #Thisflag movement 
grew from a single video to a movement capable of mobilising the first national stay- 
away in 18 years. However, the fact that the movement was not organised and that its 
reluctant figurehead fled the country for six months led to a loss in momentum by the 
end of 2016. 
Zanu-PF’s party discipline had remained largely unwavering for over fifty years. 
Cracks had begun to appear from 2004 as separate camps began to vie to replace 
Mugabe, whose bewildering capacity for clinging to power was matched only by his 
longevity. The chapter outlines how Emmerson Mnangagwa had been able to redeem 
himself after the debacle of the Tsholotsho plot in 2005. Mngangagwa would form a 
coalition with First Lady Grace Mugabe to oust Vice President Joice Mujuru in 2014. 
With Mujuru ejected from the party and the vice-presidency, Mnangagwa and Grace 
Mugabe would turn on each other. The former’s Lacoste faction engaged in a 
competition for control of the party together with the first lady’s G40. While the 
Mnangagwa group represented his personal interest in Karanga leadership, and 
representatives of the G40 group are mostly from Mugabe’s Zezuru tribe, the chapter 
has argued that these tribal identities coincide with the class factions in the state-based 
bourgeoisie. It has been argued that Mnangagwa represents an older generation of 
state-based bourgeoisie who accumulated wealth through access to the state and the 
means of state violence. Grace Mugabe’s cabal represented younger members of the 
governing class who had risen from petty thuggery during the election violence of 
2000 and 2002 and had enriched themselves by preying on opportunities resulting 
from the economic crisis and hyperinflation. The extent to which these broad 
categories reflected tribal identity drew on the largely Karanga military structures and 
the fact that the Mugabe family had established a substantial predatory patronage 
network within their own tribe. 
The chapter then outlined in detail the events leading to the 2017 coup d’état. The 
detail sought to provide an answer to the question of whether the new dispensation 
reflects a change in hegemony and concluded that it does not. The chapter has shown 
that understanding hegemony as the overlapping continuums between consent and 
coercion within the context of the historical bloc, that is the interaction between the 
base and superstructure, Zanu-PF hegemony has remained intact since 2017. 
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The chapter analysed the extent to which electoral reforms, including bio-metric voter 
registration and the presence of international election observers, may serve to balance 
the electoral playing field. This thesis cautiously posits that an underestimation of the 
capacity of such reforms is a critical factor in regime collapse, as Zimbabwean 
experiences in 2008 had previously shown. 
The chapter concludes by analysing the electoral campaign strategies of both 
hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces. It shows that Zanu-PF’s strategies are 
similar to those the party has always used, though relying heavily on the momentum 
gathered from events in 2017. It shows that the hegemonic bloc is not entirely stable 
given high-profile losses in the primaries. The loss of party chefs may however reflect 
the competitive locus of national political power within the party rather than in 
competition with the opposition. 
The chapter concludes more resolutely than the departure point of this thesis by stating 
that the MDC’s role as a counter-hegemonic force is moribund. In their complicity 
with the coup, the party has found itself legitimating Mnangagwa’s leadership in a 
regime that remains almost identical, apart from purging a few individuals. That the 
party has followed Zanu-PF’s lead has resulted in the use of the same discourse of 
patriotic history which the hegemonic bloc has used successfully to paint the MDC as 
outsiders and sell-outs. This chapter argues that the contradiction of bourgeois and 
labour identities and ideologies within the party constitutes the central conflict within 
the movement and may cause its failure to bring about hegemonic change. The actions 
of the opposition leadership in flouting party discipline, a convenient disregard for 
constitutionalism and their tendency towards violence reflect that the MDC does not 
provide a viable alternative to Zanu-PF hegemony. The events of 2017 have recast 
Zanu-PF as a party in reform and could be interpreted as the party’s consolidation of 
hegemonic power for the foreseeable future, as Zimbabwe returns to the corporatism 
of the 1990s unburdened by the necessity for land reform. 
 
 





This thesis first sought to answer the case specific question of how to account for the 
durability of authoritarian rule in Zimbabwe. 
This thesis views the struggle for democracy in African states as necessarily on of 
counter-hegemony because the very nature of democratic struggles in semi-
authoritarain states necessitates the defeat of the non-democratic regime in order to 
bring about changes in the rules of the political game. Taking the foregoine as a point 
of departure this section outlines some of the conclusions based on the preceding 
chapters to account for the durabilityof authoritarian rule in Zimbabwe Taking the 
foregoing as a point of departure this section outlines some of the conclusions based 




A primary observation based on Gramscian historical political economy is the 
importance of how the regime established and consolidated its hegemony. Gramsci’s 
concept of the historical bloc as the continuum between the mode of production and 
ideological and cultural superstructures is a critical factor in securing the analysis in 
an economic and ideological foundation while not privileging either as necessarily 
determinant. The Gramscian concept of hegemony as the combination of consent and 
coercion is equally significant for this analysis. 
In the Zimbabwean case, Zanu-PF’s hegemony has its roots in the mode of production 
of the colonial state. The fact that the class that would govern the independent nation 
came from the country’s educated elite would affect their engagement with the post- 
colonial state. The nationalist elites’ role as organic intellectuals for the black majority 
emphasised the material as well as symbolic impact of alienation from the land. The 
strategy of counter-hegemonic action against the white settler state, which necessitated 
armed struggle, inevitably influenced the nature of the regime. As noted above this 
strategy resulted in a regime that depended heavily on coercion in order to maintain 
its authority, as well as a number of ancillary outcomes. These included the regime’s 
relationship with the peasantry, its view of internal and external opposition as well as 
its modes of generating consent through guerrilla propaganda techniques. An 
understanding of the nature of the state as part of the historical bloc is also crucial to 
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understanding the governing class. This thesis has situated Zimbabwe’s post-colonial 
historical bloc in the compromise in class forces resulting from the Lancaster House 
Agreement and the resultant constitutional structure. This compromise of class forces 
produced a framework in which the governing black petit bourgeoisie were able to 
enrich themselves through access to the state while paying minimal attention to the 
question of civil and political rights, or broader questions of economic redistribution 
and land reform, even after the constitutional prohibitions on land reform had expired. 
The concept of organic crisis, understood as the moment when the underlying 
contradictions of hegemonic order become apparent, situates the rise of democratic 
counter-hegemonic action in the country. In this regard this thesis has relied on 
Gramsci’s method for the analysis of counter-hegemonic forces, and a general lesson 
from this analysis is that the composition of counter-hegemonic forces is of crucial 
importance. 
Gramscian concepts such as the historical bloc and hegemony have analytical as well 
as strategic importance. An observation arising from the MDC as a counter-hegemonic 
movement is that its emphasis on the superstructure and ideologies (particularly those 
of democratic, civil and political rights) at the expense of social and economic issues 
weakens their position. The battle of a counter-hegemonic movement must necessarily 
involve an understanding of both the base and the superstructure. This emphasis arose 
from the influence of middle-class interests including some sections of academia, 
students, and the professionalised NGO sphere which overlaps with the national staff 
of donor agencies. 
It is evident from the analysis of democratic NGO space that actors in this arena are 
not necessarily more inclined to behave in a particularly democratic manner. Indeed, 
evidence in the Zimbabwean case has shown that NGOs which work in areas of 
democratic governance often represent very narrow interests, have virtually no 
membership basis and as such are not organic to their society. These organisations in 
Zimbabwe are often more motivated by the interests of international donors than they 
are influenced by national concerns relating to democratisation. In the Zimbabwean 
case this space reflects middle-class interests, as the conflict between these actors and 
the former labour leadership in the MDC has shown. The NGO sphere also offers 
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examples of narrow nepotism as shown by the overlap in the boards of Zimbabwe’s 
handful of democratisation and governance NGOs. International donor support for 
democratic movements must be understood in light of its capacity to produce pools of 
patronage similar to those created by the state. The connection between local donor 
workers and opposition leadership produces the capacity for patronage and corruption 
as their overlapping personnel and previous relationship has shown in Zimbabwe’s 
opposition civil society. Possibly the most important observation in the case of 
Zimbabwe is that support for a professionalised NGO sector may limit the momentum 
of organic civil society organisations, as the rise of donor funded NGOs effectively 
ended the effectiveness of national organisations such as the Organisation of Rurual 
Associations for Progress and irreversibly changed the approaches of organisations 
such as ZIMRIGHTS. 
A similar observation from Zimbabwe is that with the formation of the MDC as a 
counter-hegemonic movement in which the forces of labour were combined with those 
of the middle class and capital-owning classes, the interests of the middle classes are 
more likely than the labour movement to influence leadership. The social content of 
the opposition also influences the strategies used by this movement when engaged in 
counter-hegemonic actions. The MDC’s focus on elections as the route to hegemony 
was fraught with the dilemma of semi-authoritarian counter-hegemony. However, 
without a degree of coercive capacity the movement was not able to enforce the rules 
of the political game, or indeed to change them in order to level the playing field. 
The time it took to bring about change in Zimbabwe was a factor in the overall failure 
of the MDC’s counter-hegemonic project. Their inability to bring about a speedy 
change to the dynamics of power exposed the movement’s weaknesses. This may 
explain the general hypothesis that when faced with a coercive regime, a counter- 
hegemonic force is more likely to fail the longer it takes to bring about a change in 
power. This was further underlined by the engagement of the GNU in the passive 
revolution. Zimbabwe’s experience illustrates the fact that opposition movements 
entering into governments of national unity after violent elections do so to their 
detriment. This is because the incumbent hegemonic power usually maintains control 
over the means of coercion and adjusts its strategies to maintain power. The foregoing 
observation may allow the positing of a counterfactual hypothesis, that had Morgan 
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Tsvangirai and the MDC decided not to enter into the government of national unity 
and had instead insisted on his electoral win in 2008, the MDC may either have had to 
force the military into an engagement, or to capitulate. Indeed, Zanu-PF may also have 
been forced to continue its leadership (which in 2008 had proved disastrous) and 
shoulder the blame for any continued failures. 
 
The events of 2017 indicate that control of the means of coercion is probably the 
decisive factor in bringing about change in a semi-authoritarian regime. This 
observation is less optimistic than transition theories as counter-hegemonic 
movements are seldom in a position to gain coercive dominance. Should they achieve 
this it would not be without great cost, which may explain why democratic counter- 
hegemonic change in Africa is so rare. The change in the nature of the leadership in 
Zimbabwe may confirm transition theories such as those of Guillermo O’Donnell, 
which emphasise contingent choices by elites and decisions by soft-liners within the 
regime to bring about reform. These observations can only be stated as hypotheses 
however, as Zanu-PF’s commitment to democratic change has certainly not been 
tested. It would also be inaccurate to categorise Emmerson Mnangagwa as a soft-liner 
given his record during the Gukurahundi, the 2008 elections and indeed the 
unconstitutional takeover of power in 2017.  
 
 
How to account for the persistence of authoritarian forms of rule and hybrid 
regimes in African states 
 
Using the case of Zimbabwe as an example of how a semi-authoritarian regime 
remained durable despite the presence of a vibrant democratic opposition, this thesis 
has shown that Gramsci’s theory of political economy provides useful tools for the 
analysis of regime durability and stalled democratisation movements. 
The thesis began with the observation that democratisation in ultimately about 
changing the rules of the political game or being able to enforce those rules and hold 
actors that break them to account. However, democratic opposition movements often 
lack the power to do so. As this thesis has shown in Zimbabwe, democratisation is 
dependent on the capacity for democratic opposition movements to gain sufficient 
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political power to change the rules of the game and to ensure that these rules are kept. 
The thesis has shown that Gramsci’s hegemony framed as the capacity to access and 
maintain state power, is a valuable method for the analysis of regime durability and 
change in African states. It is argued here that as the thesis has been able to account 
for the persistence of authoritarian rule in Zimbabwe, this method is similarly suitable 
for the analysis of other authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes on the African 
continent. These include, at the time of writing, Cameroon, Kenya, Ethiopia, Algeria, 
and Democratic Republic of Congo. The method can also be applied to research 
designs that consider previously durable regimes and how they eventually collapsed; 
recent examples are Yaya Jammeh’s fall in Gambia in 2017, and Blaise Compaoré’s 
decline in Burkina Faso in 2014. This thesis also rejects the teleological arguments of 
democratic transition and consolidation theory which might consider states such as 
South Africa Botswana, Namibia and Ghana to be consolidated democracies and 
therefore immune to the dynamics of semi-authoritarian regimes noted above. It is 
therefore argued that the Gramscian method is also applicable to analysing the political 
economies and democratic trajectories of these countries. 
The Gramscian tool of the historical bloc, which consists of elements of the mode of 
production (the base) with ideological and cultural frameworks to explain these 
societies (the superstructure), illuminates the study of counter-hegemonic 
democratisation movements on the African continent. This underscores the 
importance of a historical analysis of how authoritarian regimes came to power. The 
historical study of how movements such as the Front de Liberation National in Algeria, 
the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front in Ethiopia, or the off-shoots 
of the Parti Demcoratique du Cote D’Ivoire in the Ivory Coast and the Kenya African 
National Union established and defended their hegemony may provide explanations 
for the durability of the rule of these parties. Bereketeab et al. (2016) have shown how 
national liberation movements in the cases listed above were able to combine coercive 
instruments of state with ideological frameworks which legitimated their rule. These 
were rooted in a reference to colonial dispossession in a manner which contributes to 
the durability of these forms of regime. Framing the history of such durable regimes 
within the economic structures of the mode of production and class interests in the 
state, as well as ideological and cultural superstructures, is an effective tool for 
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analysing their political economies. The Gramscian method does not discount the 
salience of identities other than class, including tribe (Kenya, DRC, Ethiopia), 
linguistic differences (Cameroon) or religion (Nigeria). However, these are 
contextualised in their relationship to production and accumulation as articulated 
through state power. The method is also applicable to other hegemonic parties which 
may not currently behave in authoritarian ways, without assuming that they will 
remain as they are. These include the African National Congress in South Africa in 
power since 1994 and the Botswana Democratic Party which has been in power since 
1965. The historical bloc has been useful in framing the various phases of Zimbabwe’s 
colonial and post-colonial history and how modes of accumulation have created the 
various class structures and their interests. To this material reality of production, the 
concept of the historical bloc integrates the ideological and cultural superstructure with 
an awareness of material and economic realities. 
The second contribution of the Gramscian method is the theory of hegemony, 
understood as the continuum between consent and coercion in maintaining political 
power. In the Zimbabwean case the thesis showed how Zanu-PF has been able to 
maintain in its hegemonic authority by a combination of consent or coercion used to 
varying degrees at different periods. This view of hegemony consists of the 
combination of elements of different forms of violence with the ideological and 
cultural capacity to convert segments of the population and would be useful for 
understanding the supremacy of political leadership in any African state and the extent 
to which this leadership is based on the use of consent or coercion. Among suitable 
examples, the analysis of hegemony as the combination of consent and coercion would 
be useful for understanding hegemony in Rwanda under Paul Kagame’s Rwandan 
Peoples Front, or Burundi under Pierre Nkurunzinza’s Conseil National Pour la 
Défense de la Démocratie–Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie, CNDD–FDD. 
The dominance of semi-authoritarian regimes across the continent can be explained 
by the extent to which they are either capable of applying sufficient coercive power to 
ensure conformity, or by their ability to generate adequate consent. The generation of 
consent can also be determined by the extent to which hegemonic forces are composed 
of organic intellectuals who effectively articulate material reality into ideological and 
cultural frameworks, which resonate with a majority of the population. Certainly, the 
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consent component may impose fewer costs but its combination with an effective 
threat of violence helps to contain its risks. 
Where hegemonic parties are faced with a viable opposition, the Gramscian method 
provides a framework for analysing these counter-hegemonic movements. As noted 
above, these political parties and civil society organisations should not be considered 
as necessarily democratic, which democratic transition theories tend to do. This thesis  
s shown that counter-hegemonic actors must be situated in the historical bloc by 
analysing the social content of these movements and how and where their leadership 
and membership fit within the national modes of production. The extent to which a 
movement’s methods combine elements of coercion and consent is therefore a crucial 
factor in studying their success or failure. Gramsci theorised that the balance of 
hegemonic forces has three planes; firstly economic forces, the mode of accumulation 
and production, and the development of material forces; secondly the degree of 
homogeneity, self- awareness and organisation; and thirdly the relation of military 
forces which means both coercive power and ideological consent. Some examples of 
counter-hegemonic movements to which these methods can be appropriately applied 
are: the Kenyan civil society- driven democratisation forces in the late 1990s, the 
Movement for Multi-Party Democracy in Zambia in the early 1990s, and Etienne 
Tshisekedi’s Union pour la Democratie et le Progres Social in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. The counter-hegemonic actions these movements take can be 
categorised according to the Gramsci’s war of position, which consists of ideological 
actions in the form of consent building; or war of movement which consists of direct 
political engagement such as mass strikes or indeed coups d’état. In other words, 
counter-hegemonic movements as with ruling groups need to have the forces that 
enable them to command loyalty and promote action both through persuasion or 
consent and through coercion. Hence the nature of African oppositional movements 
that are similar to ruling groups in that they seek to monopolise territory and enlist 
mass armies of youthful supporters. Physical presence and on-the-ground activism 
remain critical components in many African electoral setting. The Gramscian theory 
unlike democratisation theory would not see civil society as inherently good and a 
bulwark against the tyrannical state. Rather it situates democracy promoting NGOs 
within the national and international political economy which also considers the role 
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of donor funding in the interests of national NGOs. 
Another key Gramscian concept observed in Zimbabwe which may be generalised to 
other African regimes in passive revolution. As noted above the formation of the GNU 
in 2008 is an example of a passive revolution as the counter-hegemonic party’s failure 
to gain power over ministries related to state security (and therefore coercion) 
adversely affected their ability to bring about any conclusive change in the nature of 
hegemony. National Unity Government’s as a method of passive revolution can be 
corroborated in the case of Kenya in 2007 as well. The 2017 coup in Zimbabwe is also 
representative of passive revolutions as various versions of “coups a la Zimbabweene” 
have taken place on the continent in which ruling parties have been able to remove 
their long-standing leaders without brining about any overall change in the form of the 
regime. Since late 2017 Ethiopia, Algeria and Sudan have all seen such changes in 
leadership and only Sudan appears to have brought about a more inclusive transition 
though the change is far from decisive. 
The Zimbabwean case has provided some observations which can be stated as 
hypotheses and these might guide the application of Gramscian methods to the analysis 
of durable regimes and counter-hegemonic challenges in Africa. One hypothesis worth 
considering in comparative analysis is the primacy of coercion over consent in 
maintaining or changing regime forms. Using Zimbabwe as an example, it may be 
reasonable to infer that the reason why semi-authoritarian regimes remain durable is 
that they maintain an overwhelming capacity for coercion. One could therefore posit 
that while consent generation may be necessary it is not sufficient to bring about 
hegemonic change. A second hypothesis based on the Zimbabwean case would be that 
the collapse of structural employment reduces the capacity for interest aggregation and 
thus for a working-class or labour-driven opposition movement. In addition, where 
opposition movements incorporate multiple overlapping class identities, these 
contradictory interests may curtail their capacity to engage in counter- hegemonic 
action. 
Taking the recent history of negotiated settlements as a recommendation for settling 
disputed elections, the Zimbabwean case may indicate that such settlements are likely 
to produce situations of passive revolution which harm the counter-hegemonic 
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challenge and protect the hegemonic powers. Hypothetically, counter-hegemonic 
change may only come about where the counter-hegemonic power has achieved 
coercive dominance or there is a coercive stalemate. 
These scenarios are stated purely as hypotheses based on observations from the 
Zimbabwean case. This thesis has also indicated that by applying such questions to 
account for the durability of authoritarianism in Zimbabwe, the Gramscian theory of 
historical political economy is equally applicable elsewhere for the generation and 
testing of hypotheses accounting for the durability of authoritarian regimes in Africa 
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